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Abstract  
A thesis which explores the possibility of introducing Bayesian probability methods into the 
criminal justice system, and in doing so, exposing and eradicating some common fallacies. 
This exposure aims to reduce miscarriages of justice by illustrating that some evidence 
routinely relied upon by the prosecution, may not have as high a probative value towards its 
ultimate hypothesis of ‘guilt’ as has been traditionally thought and accepted. 
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1 CHAPTER I: Introduction 
 
In probability theory, Bayes' theorem (BT) can be derived from more basic axioms of 
probability, specifically conditional probability. With the Bayesian interpretation of 
probability, the theorem expresses how a subjective degree of belief in a given hypothesis 
should rationally change to account for evidence. Bayes' theorem is named after Thomas 
Bayes (1701–1761), who first suggested using the theorem. His work was posthumously read 
at the Royal Society before being further developed by Laplace, who first published the 
modern formulation in ‘Théorie Analytique des Probabilités’ (1812). 
 
In a criminal trial, a ‘finder of fact’ (a jury or a judge/magistrate sitting alone – although, in 
this thesis the term ‘jury’ will supplant ‘finder of fact’ for the sake of brevity) observes 
evidence to support either the prosecution or defence cases (or ‘hypotheses’) and returns a 
verdict. It is therefore logical that BT, which is designed to update beliefs on a given 
hypothesis after observing evidence, should be a good fit with criminal trials. 
 
‘Trace evidence’ links a defendant with the scene of the crime; whether by eyewitness 
evidence of the defendant’s presence there, a latent fingerprint, or blood stains, or footwear 
marks, or DNA. In recent years the use of DNA matching has exponentially increased and is 
now a crucial evidential tool in many cases brought by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS). 
Where there is a crime scene DNA trace, and the identity of the suspect is not known, the 
method of presentation of this type of evidence is explicitly probabilistic and incredibly 
complex, with much room for error and misinterpretation of the weight of evidence, by not 
only laypersons, but also legal practitioners, and even in some cases, scientists, who are 
purportedly experienced in dealing with probabilistic evaluation. Due to these commonplace 
errors, and with the criminal justice system’s constant striving for transparency in the trial 
process, it would be logical to presume that the use of explicit probabilistic reasoning in court 
would become more popular. 
 
Indeed, attempts HAVE been made over the years to reconcile the criminal trial process with 
explicit probabilistic reasoning methods, including the introduction of BT, but these efforts 
have met with little success. In fact, BT is now less accepted by the legal community than 
ever, following the Court of Appeal decisions in cases such as R v Doheny & Adams [1997] 
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[1] and R v T [2010] [2], which has seen an almost blanket ban on any use of BT in the 
criminal justice system, except in extremely narrow circumstances, and nearly always only 
when DNA match evidence is involved.  
 
In fact, the elevation of DNA, by the legal community - and some key members of the 
mathematical community - to a type of evidence which has almost uniquely probabilistic 
qualities, has meant that probabilistic reasoning in the courtroom has become somewhat of a 
niche discipline, instead of the usual method of combining all evidence in complex cases - 
which is the firm stance taken by the many supporters of BT. This thesis explores the reasons 
why this is so, and seeks to answer the many criticisms levelled at the use of BT in court. At 
the same time, the thesis will demonstrate that correctly applied BT is the only logical way to 
combine evidence and present it to juries, thereby becoming a crucial aid in the decision-
making process. The main problem with the application of BT is the fallacy committed when 
attempting to combine evidence across ‘types’. These types, (of which trace evidence is one, 
as is geographical reference class evidence – called ‘location evidence’ in this thesis – and 
propensity evidence, among others) cannot be easily combined without losing context, 
denoted in this thesis by the hidden value ‘K’, across the model. The fallacy that these types 
of evidence can be combined under the currently adopted method, is identified and exposed 
in Chapter 6. 
 
Further, there is no formalised approach to the decision–making process used by the CPS in 
deciding whether or not to bring a case to trial - despite the CPS guidelines stating that a legal 
test exists. The problem is that without a formalised approach to the existing test, there are no 
proper means of redress to the defendant. Therefore, a Bayesian approach to the current test 
provides a logical and rational framework to assist in helping make the trial process more 
transparent and accountable, from the pre-trial evidence evaluation stage to the in-trial 
evidence presentation stage. 
 
For these reasons, the research hypothesis is: 
 
‘In criminal cases with multiple pieces of evidence, a Bayesian approach to evidence 
evaluation and presentation must be used, to increase accuracy and transparency in the pre 
and mid-trial decision-making processes’. 
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Chapter 2 explains the fundamental differences between the ‘frequentist’ and ‘subjectivist’ 
approaches to probabilistic reasoning. The reason that this is discussed so early in the thesis is 
that at the very heart of the legal debate as to why BT should be banned by the legal system 
for most types of evidence, is the notion that some types of evidence are objectively certain - 
and therefore amenable to expressly quantified probabilistic reasoning processes, such as BT 
- while others are not. Thereafter, the probability axioms are discussed in detail, in order to 
prove the validity and logical progression of thought process which leads naturally to the 
conditional probability axiom and the introduction of BT.  
 
Despite this thesis being aimed at non-mathematicians, any thesis which deals with the 
subject matter of probability must explain the foundation principles of how probabilistic 
reasoning works and is expressed, in the traditional mathematical way. There may be a 
number of mathematic notations to encounter, but these are fairly simple and straightforward. 
 
After explaining the inner workings of BT, there is a short discussion on the general 
complexity of probabilistic reasoning, with illustrations provided to give a visual 
representation of the enormity of the problem in trying to calculate the many variables 
inherent in even the simplest cases with the least amount of evidence. The solution to this 
complexity will be provided by the use of Bayesian Networks (BNs), for which a definition 
and examples are provided. 
 
Chapter 3 begins to explore one of the most recorded of all probabilistic fallacies (and one 
which almost certainly increases the risk of ascribing too much weight to the prosecution 
case) - thereby increasing the risk of an unfair guilty verdict if the judge and jury fail to 
identify the error: the ‘Prosecutor’s Fallacy’. Worryingly, the Court of Appeal has begun to 
allow committals of the fallacy in some situations, and this thesis explores the reasons why 
this happens, and the dangers of allowing the practice to continue.  
 
There is a discussion, using an in-depth analysis of Bayesian reasoning, on how the courts 
may have been misled into believing that some of these ‘safe’ situations may arise, and who 
may have assisted the courts in reaching their conclusion. The discussion in this thesis, on 
this point, has never been put to the legal community, and it is this author’s view that recent 
cases permitting a ‘threshold’ of an allowable prosecutor’s fallacy is dangerous and 
potentially damaging to the safety of the guilty verdicts of the defendants in each case, where 
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the appellate courts’ reasoning has remained unchallenged. This chapter also introduces the 
innovative 1/World Population (1/WP) prior which will be discussed in great depth later in 
Chapter 6. 
 
There are many types of probabilistic fallacies routinely committed in the course of 
presentation of evidence – and others, such as the ‘base rate neglect’, the ‘jury observation 
fallacy’ and the ‘missing variable fallacy’, have been well documented [3] – but the focus of 
this thesis is the recommendation of BT for use in criminal trials, and therefore a discussion 
solely of the ‘Prosecutor’s Fallacy’ will suffice to make the necessary points to support the 
general use of BT for all cases. 
 
In Chapter 4, the legal cases referred to in this thesis are listed chronologically with a 
summary of their facts and key probabilistic errors highlighted. This list is not supposed to be 
a comprehensive study of every probabilistic fallacy and error presented to a jury in court, but 
merely a collection of cases which best serves and encapsulates the research hypothesis. 
 
One of the main problems with discovering faulty probabilistic reasoning in court is that 
while express probabilistic reasoning is easy to identify, there is also little doubt that implicit 
probabilistic reasoning routinely takes place during trials, simply because the adversarial trial 
process concerns itself with persuading a jury of the believability of either the prosecution or 
defence version of events – ie which is the most ‘probable’? However, unless the errors are 
identified by the judge or defence counsel after the trial (presumably if identified during trial, 
the error is immediately eradicated as part of cross-examination or judicial summing-up) and 
the error is considered as ‘material’ enough by the appellate court to grant an appeal, the 
errors will never see light of day. This is because magistrates’ court (where the majority of 
cases are heard) and Crown court proceedings are not recorded and made public as a matter 
of course, although the appeal judgments are. Therefore, unless the case is appealed, any 
probabilistic errors become overlooked and forgotten.  
 
 
Chapter 5 aims to pinpoint the precise reason why the Court of Appeal in cases such as R v 
Doheny & Adams [1997] and R v T [2010] has arrived at its almost blanket refusal to allow 
explicit quantified probabilistic reasoning in criminal trials. In order to do this, a potted 
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history of the development and early criticisms of the use of courtroom probabilistic 
reasoning has been provided.  
 
As with Chapter 4, the Chapter 5 collection of legal cases, scholastic viewpoints and 
academic theory is not meant to be comprehensive, but is designed to show the main 
objections to BT and the way that these objections have been answered by BT’s supporters. 
One may suggest that the original, most wide-ranging and vehement attack on courtroom 
mathematics came from Laurence Tribe in his 1971 paper ‘Trial by mathematics: Precision 
and ritual in the legal process’ [4], which was written as a criticism of the prosecutor’s 
presentation of his case in People v Collins [5] - a case where multiple probabilistic errors 
were committed and led to an unquestionably unsafe guilty verdict for the defendants. 
 
Since Tribe’s paper, the debate concerning academic support for and against his rigid 
opposition to BT, has raged constantly throughout the past forty-three years, largely between 
those who believe that probabilistic reasoning (albeit implicitly) is commonplace in legal 
trials and must be formalised, and those who believe it has no place in the courtroom at all. 
At the time of writing this thesis, the BT naysayers have certainly triumphed thus far – 
resulting in the Court of Appeal’s firm ruling against its routine use in the UK.  
 
Although the substance of the debate has not moved incredibly far for the best part of a half-
century, the science of identification evidence certainly has, with the use of DNA match 
evidence becoming a commonly-used, modern, prosecution tool. The use of DNA matching 
in many cases necessarily entails the use of explicit probabilistic reasoning, in the form of 
random match probabilities (RMPs), to present the evidence to juries, and this, with renewed 
vigour, has ignited the debate about the best way to present and combine DNA evidence with 
other types of evidence in the case.  
 
In recognition of the complexity and high-risk approach to mathematically-untrained 
laypersons presenting probabilistic arguments to other mathematically-untrained laypersons, 
the Nuffield Foundation in London has supported a consortium of academics who have 
between them compiled a series of four practitioner user guides to presenting explicit 
probabilistic arguments in court. The Foundation’s recommendations to use the non-
quantitative Wigmorean method of evidence presentation for most types of evidence, apart 
from DNA matching, instead of the quantitative, and arguably more fit-for-purpose BT, 
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echoes many of the sentiments present in the Court of Appeal’s stance against BT. Chapter 5 
exposes and explains these similarities in a novel way, and seeks to dispel some of the more 
irrational objections, using Bayesian inference arguments and reasoning. 
 
The general structure of Chapter 5 summarises and follows Tribe’s five main objections to 
the use of courtroom mathematics and answers each of these objections using modern 
academic viewpoints in support. The recent work of Norman Fenton and Martin Neil [3], and 
others, in exploiting software for Bayesian networks as a means of reducing the complexity 
in Bayesian calculations, is a strong argument to counter one of Tribe’s main original 1971 
objections. While the science of DNA match testing has advanced exponentially in recent 
years, so too has the computing capabilities of software programmes like Agenarisk and 
Hugin which have been created and developed to meet the task. 
 
Chapter 6 continues the earlier discussion of the ‘1/WP’ prior, previously mentioned in 
Chapter 3, and deeply discusses the reasoning behind the prior for DNA evidence matching. 
There has been a propensity for some influential members of the mathematical community to 
forget that probability theory in legal trials must reflect the beliefs of the jury in order to 
protect the jury’s autonomous fact-finding role. Any other method of introducing BT to the 
criminal justice system carries the risk of subjecting defendants to a ‘trial by mathematics’ – 
a result that no-one advocates. 
 
However, in delving deeply into the mechanics of the random match probability (RMP), and 
in particular explaining the problems with a mathematician assigning priors to a jury member, 
there exposes a fundamental issue with the RMP – that of its actual meaning. Currently, the 
RMP is routinely used by expert witnesses, and endorsed by the courts, to assign a particular 
evidential weight (or ‘probative value’) to DNA match evidence – usually in favour of the 
prosecution hypothesis. The idea is that the smaller the RMP, the unlikelier the evidence 
would be observed as a mere coincidence (the ‘random match’), and therefore the more 
probative it is towards the prosecution case. 
 
As the science of DNA matching has advanced and become more reliable, cases are being 
settled and verdicts of guilt are becoming increasingly reliant on DNA ‘random match’ 
evidence. However, what may have not been adequately explained to the jury in many cases 
is how what a ‘random match’ actually entails. In effect, the jury needs to know exactly how 
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many people in the world population, apart from the defendant, are likely to match the DNA 
trace found at the crime scene. By exploring the number of potential matches, we have our 
RMP, and therefore our probative value. 
 
However, up until now, the expert witnesses, led by practitioner guides, such as those 
compiled by the Nuffield Foundation, and by Buckleton et al [6], have been presenting the 
RMP without much instruction to the jury as to how many people, apart from the defendant, 
may share the same evidential traits – no doubt a key prosecution/defence proposition. In 
fact, by the CPS’s own guidance [7] there is no advice provided on how to present the 
evidence in a way which the jury can relate to - thereby leaving the defendant open to the risk 
of the prosecution blinding the jury with DNA evidence, the asserted importance of which 
cannot be effectively diminished by any other evidence in the case. 
 
The CPS, recognising this danger, has recommended that no case should be brought on the 
basis of a DNA RMP alone, and recommends that DNA should be somehow combined with 
other evidence in the case. Chapter 6 explains how the current method of combining RMPs 
with other types of evidence (alibis, records of previous criminal activity, eyewitness 
evidence etc) in the case is almost impossible without a formalised approach provided 
through BNs. Further, Chapter 6 also explains how the unaided jury left to surmise on how to 
combine the evidence, are almost certainly going to give undue weight to the DNA evidence 
and therefore increase the risks of a miscarriage of justice. 
 
In Chapter 7, the likelihood ratio (‘LR’) is doubted as a means of presenting evidence without 
the use of a full Bayesian application, such as would be provided by BNs. Until now, many 
influential members of the mathematical community have recommended to juries the use of 
the LR alone to show the probative value of evidence in cases such as R v George [2007] [8] 
and R v Clark [2000] [9]. However, as Fenton, Berger et al [10] have discussed in their paper 
‘When ‘neutral’ evidence still has probative value: implications from the Barry George 
Case’, the LR is an unreliable means of illustrating the true probative value of single pieces 
of evidence, without placing them within a full Bayesian model to show how the evidence fits 
with the prosecution case as a whole. 
 
One of the main reasons why the advocates of the ‘lone LR’ have not recommended the full 
Bayesian approach to evidence presentation, is the reluctance to assign priors to a jury 
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member, as this would admit that conditional probabilistic reasoning is a subjective science, 
and therefore would lead to ‘uncertain’ results. However, Chapter 6 should dispel this 
objection from its foundation, and Chapter 7 further explains why the LR, if used without the 
full Bayesian model, is an unreliable method of calculating single pieces of evidence. 
 
In the case of George, the LR was used to ‘prove’ that a single piece of firearm discharge 
residue (FDR) had neutral probative effect, thereby persuading the judge at the defendant’s 
retrial to exclude the evidence. In the case of Clark, the LR was used to show the difference 
between the probabilities of a mother murdering her two children against the two children 
dying of natural causes. In both George and Clark the LR was used without the full Bayesian 
interpretation of the prosecution case. If it had, the model would have shown that regardless 
of whether a single piece of evidence is neutral or has probative effect towards either a 
specific prosecution or defence hypothesis (ie that the defendant was the source of a piece of 
evidence or not, or whether there are many cases in the general population of natural infant 
deaths), this does not mean that the evidence is not probative towards the ‘ultimate’ 
prosecution hypothesis of ‘guilt’ or innocence’. Only a full formalised Bayesian approach 
introducing all of the evidence in the case together with their many variables and nuances can 
do this. 
 
One of the main reasons for the difficulties in the case of Clark was that a single piece of 
evidence of other crimes was used to convict, without consideration of any alternative 
hypotheses. This has brought up issues of mutual exclusivity/exhaustivity (MEE) when 
considering the hypothesis pairings within a LR – something which has been highly 
contentious between those who believe that these pairings should be mutually exclusive 
(absolute and true negations of each other), without necessarily being exhaustive (exhausting 
all possibilities within the sample space). Chapter 7 explains how ensuring that MEE is 
preserved is the only means of maintaining the two opposing ‘stories’ within a Bayesian 
model and therefore showing the true probative value of evidence in relation to the ultimate 
hypotheses. After all, if the question of the defendant’s guilt is not the ultimate consideration 
of the jury, then what is? 
 
In Chapter 8, BNs are recommended for use by the CPS before a case is brought to trial to 
evaluate, in probabilistic terms, the chance of success. Chapter 8 explains that the current test, 
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designed to weed-out unmeritorious actions, is not fit for purpose, and that there is no fair and 
effective means of redress for wrongly-tried defendants.  
 
Currently the threshold for bringing an action is based on an explicitly probabilistic ‘more 
likely than not chance of conviction’ test, but that this is based on the individual prosecutor’s 
subjective decision after considering the prosecution and defence evidence in the case. At the 
moment, this decision is not open to effective scrutiny, due to its subjective nature, and 
therefore the only way for a wrongly-tried defendant to seek redress is to successfully defend 
him/herself in court – a state of affairs fraught with risks of miscarriages of justice due to a 
jury’s possible natural biases against defendants who are on trial. 
 
Chapter 8 explains that a formalised Bayesian approach to pre-trial evidence evaluation is the 
best way to ensure that the CPS’s decision to proceed, is transparent, rational and in line with 
the Rule of Law and the fundamental human right to a fair trial, and non-punishment without 
a breach of the law. 
 
In dealing with any level of uncertainty in evidence, it is inevitable that some assumptions 
have to be, and have been, made. This is the first comprehensive forensic analysis of all of 
those assumptions, exposing some common misconceptions and inconsistencies, and in doing 
so, explaining where those misconceptions and inconsistencies may lead to miscarriages of 
justice. 
 
About the author: 
 
With a Bachelor of Laws (LLB Hons) degree and a Bar Professional Training Course (BPTC) 
postgraduate diploma, the author has a background in law rather than statistics, and, as such - 
having now spent a great amount of time researching the Bayesian approach to evidence 
modelling - is in the rarefied position of bridging the gap between the legal and mathematical 
worlds. His findings, which recommend the widespread use of Bayes’ theorem in court, as 
long as it is correctly applied, place him in the unique position of having posited a research 
hypothesis, and reaching conclusions in support of that hypothesis, which are contrary to 
other legal scholars working in statistics and the law. 
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2 CHAPTER II: Conditional Probability 
 
2.1 Introduction: 
 
This chapter focuses on the foundations of conditional probability in order to explain how 
conditional probability exists and how its principles can be formulated into mathematical 
‘models’ which assist in identifying and reducing uncertainty in our decision-making 
processes. 
 
The beginning of this chapter discusses the key philosophical differences between frequentist 
and subjective probability. This is of pressing and vital importance, as discrepancies in views 
concerning the very cornerstone of probability has arguably led to the UK courts’ blanket ban 
on explicit probabilistic reasoning for most types of evidence. Therefore it is vital to begin 
the substantive part of this thesis with a discussion of how the opposing 
statistical/mathematical viewpoints, discussed later in Chapter 5, have caused confusion and 
misinterpretation of key probabilistic principles among those members of the legal 
community not trained in, or familiar with, routinely dealing with them. 
 
This chapter then continues with a formulaic, step-by-step guide to probability, necessary to 
prove Bayes’ theorem – the focus of the research hypothesis – and illustrating the inner 
workings of causal pathways which make up the ‘event tree’ that lies at the heart of the 
Bayesian network. This is necessary to establish, identify and illustrate the many variables 
which influence our decisions. 
 
Finally, Bayesian networks are introduced as a means of reducing the complexity in large 
event trees when dealing with many variables. In complex criminal cases, the number of 
variables exponentially increases with each piece of evidence introduced to the model, 
making the event tree unwieldy.  
 
This chapter also deals, for the first time, with the notion that frequentist and subjective 
probability are really not opposing camps, but can only exist in conjunction with each other, 
which is why some of the UK court decisions listed in Chapter 4, and discussed in depth in 
Chapter 5, are irrational. 
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2.2 Frequentist v Subjective probability:  
 
Probability is used to measure our uncertainty about the existence of past or future events. 
We may be uncertain either about whether it rained in London on this day in 1915 or whether 
it WILL rain in London on this day in 2915, but, probabilistically, the approach to uncertainty 
for both of these events is the same. Unless we have complete knowledge of either event, 
both of them carry an element of uncertainty. It seems as if there would be more certainty in 
past events than future ones, since the future has not happened and the past has, but this is 
untrue. The past is recorded and the future has yet to be recorded, but the uncertainty in each 
state relates to how much trust we place in our knowledge of the evidence and the world 
around us.  
 
When we use our knowledge to calculate the probability of past events, we use evidence (E) 
to build a picture of how the world was at that time. E is collated and logged and then used to 
reduce uncertainty in our beliefs, which we consider in a hypothesis (H). H is merely the 
answer to a question we may ask ourselves before E is presented, such as: ‘It DID rain in 
London on 19th May 1915’. 
 
When we use knowledge to calculate the probability of future events, such as H: ‘It WILL 
rain in London on 19th May 2915’, we use data of past events (E) to build a picture of how 
the world may be on a specified future date. Therefore, it is possible that the same database of 
information might be used to collate E in the same way for both past and future events on 
similar subject matter. Collecting data is at the heart of frequentist probability, which is 
defined as the probability of seeing the event again, over an infinite number of repeated 
experiments.  
 
There are two main problems with databases: (1) That past performance of an event cannot 
guarantee future performance; and (2) That the results from the database are open to 
uncertainty themselves, in terms of errors or misinterpretation. For this reason there can never 
be complete knowledge of any event, which is why frequentist probability is founded on an 
element of subjective probability. Subjective probability uses sets of assumptions and 
personal beliefs of the world around us to make the ‘leap of faith’ necessary to satisfy 
ourselves that what we see or are told is true. Conversely, ‘objective’ probability pertains to 
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the object, independent of the observer. The legal community are uncomfortable with the 
notion of subjective probability, due to its imprecise nature. However, the distinction between 
objective and subjective probability is irrational because even a so-called ‘complete’ database 
of frequentist information works on a set of subjective assumptions and personal beliefs that 
the database is complete. 
 
Therefore, since subjective probability needs some frequentist information to work from and 
frequentist probability requires a subjective ‘leap of faith’ at its very heart, the two 
philosophical counterpoints are really a fabrication. In fact, subjective and objective 
probability must both exist in the same universe in order for us to be able to make the link 
between the external world and our internal beliefs.  
 
2.3 Axioms and theorems of probability: 
 
Taking the above two statements as examples, we have shown that they are amenable to both 
the frequentist and subjective definitions of probability: 
 
(1) ‘It DID rain in London on 19th May 1915’ 
(2) ‘It WILL rain in London on 19th May 2915’ 
 
Even though these statements are of similar subject matter, one concerns a past and one a 
future event. However, for both events, our uncertainty can be expressed in the following 
point: 
 
2.3.1 PROBABILITY POINT 1: 
 
Uncertainty about past or future events can be expressed in percentage terms. 
 
Percentages are sometimes expressed in an ‘odds’ form. Odds are the ratio of the event 
happening divided by the event not happening. Therefore odds of 2/1 means that the chance 
of the event happening is twice as likely as it not happening. This is the same as saying that 
there is a 1 in 3 chance or 66.67% chance of the event happening. Odds of 1/1 is a 50% 
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chance (or ‘even odds’) of the event happening. This reasoning brings us to the following 
point: 
 
2.3.2 PROBABILITY POINT 2: 
 
The percentage chance of an event happening can never exceed 100%. 
 
This point signifies that in either frequentist or subjective probabilistic reasoning, the most 
certain we could ever be is 100%, which means that we can never be more sure than 
‘absolutely certain’ of anything. Conversely, we can never be more than 100% ‘absolutely 
uncertain’ of anything, which brings us to the following point: 
 
2.3.3 PROBABILITY POINT 3: 
 
The percentage chance of an event not happening can never be less than 0%. 
 
This point is consistent with both frequentist and subjective probabilistic reasoning, because 
we can never be less than 0% certain about any event. These last two points provide us with 
parameters of certainty between 0 and 100% for any event, which allows us to consider the 
next point: 
 
2.3.4 PROBABILITY POINT 4: 
 
Uncertainty expressed as a percentage, if divided by 100, can be represented by a 
number between 0 and 1. 
 
This last point can now be stated by the following axiom: 
 
2.3.5 PROBABILITY AXIOM 1: 
 
The probability of any event happening is between 0 and 1. 
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This axiom satisfies both the frequentist and subjective probabilistic approaches. If we think 
of any event as a result of experiments testing the event’s parameters, we can see that the 
parameters make up a ‘sample space’ of possible results. Taking a standard deck of 52 face-
down playing cards, the probability of the top card turned over being an Ace of Clubs is 1/52, 
as we can assume that the deck is standard, the number of cards is 52 and each card is 
different. The sample space = 52 cards. Since within any sample space all of the possible 
outcomes must be considered, it follows that the following axiom makes sense: 
 
2.3.6 PROBABILITY AXIOM 2: 
 
The probability of the combined (exhaustive) events in any sample space is 1. 
 
Axiom 2 is a natural progression from axiom 1 due to any sample space being 100% of all of 
the possible outcomes. It is logical to argue that in a standard deck of 52 playing cards that 
there could not be a ‘53rd’ possible outcome. This axiom relates to a single event within the 
sample space, but in any sample space there may be more than one event, together with 
experiments to test its parameters, with many different outcomes. Taking the standard deck of 
52 cards as an example again, we might want to know the probability of turning the top card 
over and seeing the Ace of Clubs, but we also might want to know the probability of turning 
the top card over and NOT seeing the Ace of Clubs. 
 
Event 1: ‘Seeing the Ace of Clubs’  
Event 2: ‘NOT seeing the Ace of Clubs’ 
 
The probability of Event 1 is 1/52; whereas the probability of Event 2 is 51/52. The sum of 
all of the events together must follow axiom 2, adding up to 1, which means that Events 1 and 
2 are mutually exclusive of each other. In essence, within the sample space, Event 1 is a true 
negation of Event 2, and vice versa. This principle can be elucidated in Axiom 3: 
 
2.3.7 PROBABILITY AXIOM 3: 
 
With mutually exclusive events, the probability of either event happening is the sum of 
the probabilities of the individual events. 
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Axioms 2 and 3 when taken together prove that within any sample space, the events and 
possible outcomes within it must be mutually exclusive and exhaustive (MEE). This may 
seem simple to understand, but errors in understanding the importance of these points has led 
to much academic debate when dealing with evidence in criminal trials. This issue will be 
explored in depth, later in this thesis, in the discussion relating to R v George [8]. Using these 
axioms we can derive probability theorems which follow as natural progressions from them: 
 
2.3.8 PROBABILITY THEOREM 1: 
 
The probability of the negation of the event is equal to one minus the probability of the 
event. 
 
Using the above two events, this simply means that the probability of seeing any OTHER 
card than the Ace of Clubs (Event 2) is 1 - (51/52). In effect, the probability of Event 2 is 1 – 
(the probability of Event 1); while the probability of Event 1 is 1 – (the probability of Event 
2). Where two events within a sample space are not necessarily mutually exclusive, we can 
use a probability theorem to calculate the probability of the union of these two events. 
 
2.3.9 PROBABILITY THEOREM 2: 
 
For any two events, the probability of EITHER event happening (their ‘union’) is the 
sum of the probabilities of the two events minus the probability of BOTH events 
happening (the ‘intersection’). 
 
This theorem is denoted thus: P(AUB) = P(A) + P(B) – P(A∩B) 
 
If we take the standard deck of cards again, we can consider the experiment of drawing a 
single card. This time instead of calculating the probability of seeing a particular card like the 
‘Ace of Clubs’ we can calculate the probability of events which are not mutually exclusive. 
Let us say that we wish to know the probability of drawing either any Ace OR any Club: 
 
Event A: ‘The first card drawn is an Ace’ 
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Event B: ‘The first card drawn is a Club’ 
 
The event we wish to calculate is the probability of seeing EITHER an Ace or a Club: 
P(AUB). 
 
P(A) = 4/52 (4 Aces in the deck) 
P(B) = 13/52 (13 Clubs in the deck) 
P(A∩B) = 1/52 (1 Ace of Clubs in the deck) 
 
By probability theorem 2: 
 
P(AUB) = 4/52 + 13/52 – 1/52 = 16/52  
 
= 4/13 
 
2.4 Conditional probability: 
 
If we were to draw a card from our standard pack and then replace it, shuffle the pack and 
draw again, these two draw are considered independent events. If we wish to calculate the 
probability that both drawn cards were the Ace of Clubs we firstly need to know the size of 
the sample space. 
 
Where the standard deck is 52 cards, the number of possible outcomes is 522: 2704. 
Assuming that each outcome is equally likely, each outcome has a probability of 1/2704. If 
we ask ourselves the number of possible outcomes which could result in two draws of the 
Ace of Clubs after replacement of the first draw, we know that this is: 
 
1/52 x 1/52 = 1/2074 
 
Therefore, we can conclude that where A and B are independent events, the probability that 
BOTH A and B happen is equal to the probability of A times the probability of B. In other 
words: 
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P(A∩B) = P(A) x P(B) 
 
P(A∩B) (also written as P(A,B)) is the ‘joint event’. 
 
However, where the events are not independent of each other, for example where we repeat 
the above experiment but do NOT replace the cards and reshuffle the pack between the two 
draws; we know that the number of possible outcomes will change. In this case it is no longer 
2074, but 2652 (52 x 51). 
 
Let us say that we are calculating the probability of drawing ANY two Aces without 
replacement, we know that this is: 
 
4/52 x 3/51 = 12/1652 
 
Therefore, we can conclude that the probability that both A and B happen is equal to the 
probability A times the probability of B GIVEN A. This can be denoted thus: 
 
P(A∩B) = P(A) x P(B|A) 
 
As long as P(A) is larger than 0, the above equation can be denoted thus: 
 
P(B|A) = P(A∩B) / P(A) 
 
The expression P(B|A) is stated as ‘the probability of B ‘given’ A’. This is conditional 
probability and is at the heart of Bayes’ theorem. Therefore our next axiom is a fundamental 
rule of conditional probability and is expressed as follows: 
 
AXIOM 4: 
 
The event ‘B given A has occurred’ (where P(A) is not equal to 0) is written as B|A, with 
P(B|A) = P(A∩B) / P(A) = P(A,B) / P(A). 
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Even when frequentists assign a probability value to an event, say the probability of drawing 
an Ace of Clubs from a standard deck of cards, they are conditioning this on a set of 
assumptions about the fairness of the pack and the way the card is drawn. For this reason, 
ALL probability is conditional. 
 
This thesis concerns criminal trials where there is not a simple way to establish reasonable 
frequentist values to all probabilities, which means that we are dealing with subjective 
probability at the very heart of each calculation. With probability P(A) we might refer to this 
as a ‘degree of belief’, which will be updated with evidence of the world around us. This 
updating of our beliefs is something we do without thinking on a day-to-day basis, but it can 
be elucidated by means of ‘mathematical models’ which illustrate and visualise the many 
choices available before decisions are made. At the very heart of each model is a causal link 
between the hypothesis (H) and the evidence (E). 
 
2.5 Conditional probability in criminal trials: 
 
Criminal trials are a good fit for the use of conditional probability models, because the legal 
trial process is based upon the principle of using evidence to update beliefs about an 
uncertain event. Hypothesis (H) in a typical criminal trial might be ‘the defendant left a trace 
of DNA at the crime scene’, or it might be ‘the defendant is guilty of the crime’. Evidence (E) 
is used to update the jury’s beliefs about H before a verdict is expected. Therefore, the basic 
causal model at the heart of any criminal trial looks like this: 
 
Fig 2.5: 
 
 
 
If we take H (‘the defendant is guilty of the crime’) as true, then we would expect to receive 
evidence LINKING the defendant to the crime. Conversely, if we take H to be false we 
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would expect to see evidence, such as an alibi, which would DISTANCE the defendant from 
the crime. Using this simple causal model we can see that probabilistic reasoning involves us 
having a ‘prior’ belief about a hypothesis, which we denote P(H), which then updates with 
evidence E, until we arrive at a ‘posterior’ belief P(H|E), which is ‘the probability of H given 
E’. Using axiom 3, We can calculate P(H|E) in terms of P(H), but in order to do that, we will 
have to know P(H∩E) - which will be rarely available. Instead, since we WILL know the 
likelihood of the evidence P(E|H), we can compute the posterior P(H|E) of the hypothesis H 
using Bayes’ theorem. Priors will be discussed later in much depth in Chapter 6. 
 
2.6 Bayes’ theorem: 
 
Bayes’ theorem (BT) gives us a simple method of calculating (P(H|E) in terns of P(E|H) 
rather than the rarely known P(H∩E): 
 
P(H|E) = P(E|H x P(H) / P(E)  THIS IS BAYES’ THEOREM (BT) 
 
To prove this theorem, by axiom 4, we know that: 
 
 P(H|E) = P(H∩E) / P(E) 
 
...which is the same as: 
 
P(E|H) = P(H∩E) / P(H) 
 
...therefore, rearranging this equation gives us: 
 
P(H∩E) = P(E|H) x P(H) 
 
...which is the same as: 
 
P(H|E) = P(E|H x P(H) / P(E)... which is BT. 
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One of the most noticeable benefits of BT is that it clearly distinguishes between (PH|E) and 
P(E|H). In each case the ‘conditional’ is the value after the ‘|’ symbol. By transposing them, 
as prosecution lawyers have routinely done in many reported cases (as will be later identified 
in Chapter 3), the ‘prosecutors’ fallacy’ is committed, which can have the effect of falsely 
altering the apparent probative value of the evidence in favour of the prosecution hypothesis - 
greatly increasing the risk of a miscarriage of justice. Conversely, transposing the conditional 
the opposite way gives false weight to the defence case – thereby causing a committal of the 
‘defence fallacy’. These fallacies will be discussed later in depth in Chapter 3. 
 
2.7 Probative value: 
 
Where E supports H, we say it has ‘probative effect’ towards a hypothesis – ie it is evidence 
which ‘proves’ the hypothesis. Where E supports the negative hypothesis (¬H), we say it has 
probative effect towards the opposite hypothesis. Evidence can also be said to have ‘neutral 
probative effect’ – ie that it supports neither hypothesis. 
 
Our belief in a hypothesis is expressed as a probability. The prior probability of a hypothesis 
P(H), is the probability of H before we observe any evidence. When there are two mutually 
exclusive hypotheses H and ¬H, the greater our belief in one, the less our belief in the other, 
since P(H) = 1- P(¬H) - as was discussed in ‘probability theorem 1’ above. When we observe 
evidence E we revise our belief in H (and similarly ¬H) to our posterior P(H|E).  If the 
posterior probability is greater than the prior probability then it makes sense to say that the 
evidence E supports the hypothesis H, because our belief in H has increased after observing 
E.  And if our belief in H has increased then our belief in ¬H must have decreased since they 
are mutually exclusive explanations for the evidence, E.  So, in such situations, it is both 
natural and correct to say that the evidence supports H over ¬H. The bigger the increase, the 
more the evidence E supports H over ¬H. 
 
2.8 The ‘likelihood ratio’ (LR): 
 
Since in a criminal trial we are only interested in whether evidence has probative effect 
towards either the prosecution H (‘The defendant is guilty’) or defence ¬H (‘The defendant is 
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not guilty’) hypotheses, we are only interested in whether the evidence is true or false. 
Therefore, we need to consider two different likelihoods: 
 
1. P(E|H): The probability of seeing the evidence if H is true 
2. P(E|¬H): The probability of seeing the evidence if H is false (and, conversely, if ¬H is 
true) 
 
If in a criminal case, there was an eyewitness saying he saw the defendant leaving the crime 
scene, we might assume that P(E|H) = 1, since we would expect to see this evidence if the 
defendant actually did leave the scene of the crime. However, we might believe that the 
eyewitness could have been mistaken and we might therefore attribute a probability of ½, or 
50% to P(E|¬H) on the basis that we are only half certain of the evidence. 
 
By dividing P(E|H) by P(E|¬H) we have our ‘likelihood ratio’ (LR), which represents the 
probative value of the evidence. 1 / ½ = 2, which means that the evidence is twice as likely to 
be seen if the defendant is guilty than if he is not guilty. This means that the eyewitness 
evidence has probative value towards the prosecution hypothesis and will most certainly be 
put to the jury. 
 
Of course, it is up to the jury to decide whether the evidence is enough to convict after seeing 
all of the evidence in the case, but the LR should be used both by the CPS in deciding 
whether to bring a case to trial (to be discussed in later in depth in Chapter 8) and by the jury 
to help in their decision-making process. 
 
As we saw in the discussion on the ‘odds form’ of BT, the probability of an event divided by 
its negation is simply the ‘odds’ of the event. By rearranging BT into an odds equation, we 
get: 
 
Posterior                 Likelihood Ratio              Prior 
P(H|E) / P(¬H|E)      =     P(E|H) / P(E|¬H)      x      P(H) / P(¬H) 
 
...which is the same as saying: ‘The odds of the hypothesis given the evidence, is equal to the 
likelihood ratio of the evidence, multiplied by the odds of the hypothesis’. 
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2.9 Event trees: 
 
An event tree can be used to demonstrate the causal pathways of any conditional probabilistic 
reasoning process. By showing all of the possible eventualities in the sample space, the tree 
can provide calculations of all possible outcomes and will, in laborious longhand, explain the 
inner-workings of BT. 
 
At the very heart of BT, when dealing with trace evidence of matching evidential traits, like 
DNA where the identity of the suspect is not known, is the idea that we will divide ‘true 
positive’ results by the combined ‘true positive’ and ‘false positive’ results to provide us with 
our posterior probability. The reason for this is that when H is true we would expect to see a 
positive match from the suspect (which the prosecution assert is the defendant), yet when H is 
false we would also expect some positive matches from other people in the world population 
(which is the opposite case that the defence is asserting). In the following event tree, the 
hypothesis H is that ‘the defendant is innocent’ and represents our entire sample space, which 
for a piece of DNA match evidence would be approximately seven billion people in the entire 
world population. Our prior probability is P(H), or 1/7,000,000,000. Evidence (E) is a DNA 
sample left at the crime scene. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
32 
 
Fig 2.9(a) 
 
 
In effect, the event tree provides us with two equal and opposite states of the sample space. 
On one side we have true matches ending in eventual branch ‘A’ and false matches ending in 
eventual branch ‘B’ (we don’t bother considering the DNA non-matches as they conclude 
with a probability of ‘0’ and have no part to play in either prosecution or defence cases). In a 
case where DNA is stated to have a random match probability of 1/1,000,000,000, which 
means that the matching DNA profile can be found in every one billion people in the world 
population, there will be a ‘true’ match – ie the suspect’s, and a number of ‘false’ matches – 
ie where innocent people may possess the same matching evidential traits.  
 
So, for a single piece of evidence, the event tree is fairly small with only four eventual 
branches at its widest point, and therefore fairly easy to negotiate and then calculate the 
posterior. However, criminal cases almost never consist of a single piece of prosecution 
evidence (in fact, for policy reasons, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) routinely refuses 
to bring cases simply on a single piece of DNA evidence and nothing else), instead relying on 
combining evidence to make its case. Where evidence is combined in a single tree, the 
number of branches exponentially rises. So for a case where there are only two pieces of 
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evidence, the event tree starts to become very large indeed. In the following example DNA 
evidence is combined with footwear mark evidence found at the scene of the crime. 
 
Fig 2.9(b) 
 
 
 
As can be seen here, with only two pieces of evidence introduced to the model, we now have 
eight branches to contend with, and many calculations to make. Fenton et al [11] do not 
accept that with even a single piece of DNA evidence that assumptions can be made of the 
certainty (authenticity) of the evidence without making the uncertainty transparent in an 
eight-branch event tree. The following event tree is a representation of the variables inherent 
within a single piece of evidence, which aims to illustrate that some fairly basic assumptions 
made by prosecution and defence lawyers, and then potentially passed onto juries, may need 
to be considered in detail.  
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Fig 2.9(c) 
 
 
 
The complex nature of this supposedly simple piece of evidence is exacerbated when other 
evidence is then introduced to the model. An eight-branch event tree would then 
exponentially grow to 16, then 32 (and onwards...) individual branches, in order to provide 
the necessary aid to the jury’s decision-making task. However, all of this unnecessary 
complexity can be avoided by using Bayesian networks (BNs) instead. 
 
2.10 Bayesian networks (BNs): 
 
BNs have been around for a long time. In 1991, Ward Edwards [12] explained the 
fundamental idea behind a BN in simple terms, understandable to non-mathematicians: ‘A 
chance node in an influence diagram can be thought of as a four-storey building seen from its 
top. The top level contains the name of the node and the arcs linking it to other nodes. The 
second level contains a list of the mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive states that 
the node can be in. The third level contains the probabilities of these states. If node C has 
arcs coming into it from A and B, then the probability of each state that node C can be in 
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must be assessed once for each possible combination of states that nodes A and B can be in. 
The three top levels of any chance node are accessible to, and under control of, the user. The 
fourth level, inaccessible to the user, contains the machinery that implements Bayesian 
inference’. Crucially, it is the ‘fourth level’ containing the ‘inaccessible’ computer code 
which simplifies the whole process and makes BNs usable by juries, lawyers and judges, who 
are normally untrained in explicit probabilistic reasoning. 
 
If we convert the complex eight-branch event tree at figure (?) above, the much simpler BN 
looks like this: 
 
Fig 2.10(a) 
 
 
...and after the probability values have been inserted into the ‘third level’ of the BN nodes 
(these two BNs in figure 2.10(b) below are shown with different sets of assumptions about 
the error probabilities): 
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Fig 2.10(b) 
 
 
Fenton and Neil [3] recently define a BN as ‘...an explicit description of the direct 
dependencies between a set of variables. This description is in the form of a ‘directed graph’ 
and a set of ‘node probability tables’ (NPTs). The ‘Directed Graph (or structure of the BN) 
consists of a set of nodes and arcs. The nodes correspond to the variables and the arcs link 
directly dependant variables. An arc from A to B encodes an assumption that there is a direct 
causal or influential dependence of A on B; the node A is then said to be a ‘parent’ of B. We 
also insist that there are no cycles in the graph (so, for example, if we have an arc from A to 
B and from B to C, then we cannot have an arc from A to C. This avoids circular reasoning. 
‘NPT’ – Each node A has an associated probability table of A, called the NPT of A. This is 
the probability distribution of A given the set of parents of A. For a node A without parents 
(also called a ‘root node’) the NPT of A is simply the probability distribution of A. An 
example of a NPT is shown below: 
 
Fig 2.10(c) 
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NB. The simple illustrative NPT shown at Fig 2.10(c) sits ‘behind’ the causal HE model at 
Fig 2.5, with the ‘False’ and ‘True’ values having been manually placed into each node. After 
the model is run, the completed BN is in the format as shown in Fig 2.10(b) above. 
2.11 Conclusion: 
 
As can be seen here, ‘Bayesian probability methods’ are really just a means of charting 
uncertainty in any given hypothesis. Since a BN is a graphic representation of our decision-
making process, it is useful as a tool to engender debate about the weight of single pieces of 
evidence and how pieces of evidence combine to support either the prosecution or defence 
hypotheses. This debate can be used at the pre-trial evaluation stage of the criminal trial 
process – discussed in depth in Chapter 8 – to ensure that only meritorious cases are brought, 
or at the in-trial presentation stage of the process – discussed in depth in Chapters 6 and 7 – 
to ensure that juries understand the amalgam of evidence and dependencies between pieces of 
evidence in complex cases. 
 
Therefore, the importance of using BNs is not simply to provide a formalised illustration of 
complex probabilistic reasoning, but it is a means to eradicate fallacies, rectify errors in 
communication and promotes transparency in the decision-making process. These attributes 
all have the potential to reduce miscarriages of justice – an aim which MUST be in the 
interest of the legal community, to say nothing of the rest of society. 
 
The legal community should not concern itself with whether the underlying mathematical 
reasoning supports the introduction of the widespread use of Bayes’ theorem and BNs in 
court, but should concern itself more with the values placed into the model. This aspect of the 
problem is dealt with in detail in Chapter 6.  
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3 CHAPTER III: DNA and the Prosecutor’s Fallacy 
 
3.1 Introduction: 
 
This chapter introduces an in-depth analysis of one of the key and most commonly committed 
fallacies in criminal cases: the prosecutor’s fallacy. The chapter begins with a definition of 
the fallacy, together with an explanation of how the fallacy is committed.  The chapter then 
continues with an explanation of why the fallacy can occur when trace evidence, such as 
unattributed DNA samples left at a crime scene - presented as a random match probability 
(RMP) – can and routinely do lead to a committal of the fallacy.  
 
The chapter then continues with a forensic examination of the RMP to establish whether the 
UK courts’ current stance, seen in key recent decisions such as C v The Queen [13] and R v 
Kelly Gray [14], that there can be an ‘acceptable committal of the prosecutor’s fallacy’, is 
logical.  
 
The courts’ potentially highly controversial stance is an area which has never been discussed, 
researched or refuted by any legal or mathematical scholar to date, and which, if found to be 
untenable, could leave the guilty verdict decisions mentioned in this chapter - together with 
the many which are left unnoticed, unreported or knowingly following the precedent set out 
by the Court of Appeal - open to serious questions as to their safety. 
 
The discussion in this chapter is vital in supporting the research hypothesis and provides the 
UK courts with a clear framework in which to understand the issues and controversies its 
recent decisions have exposed.  
3.2 The Prosecutor’s and Defence fallacies: 
 
The fallacy of the transposed conditional, or in criminal trials, the ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’ [15] 
confuses P(Hd|E) with P(E|Hd), thereby overvaluing the prosecution case against the 
defendant, as will be seen in many of the cases in Chapter 4. This transposition can also 
overvalue the defence case, known as the ‘defence fallacy’ where P(Hp|E) is confused with 
P(E|Hp). Taking the example of a piece of DNA evidence with a random match probability 
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(RMP) of 1/1 million, which means that the same evidential traits can be found in ‘one in 
every million people in the world population’, transposing the conditional in this case will 
have the following effect: 
 
Hp: ‘That the defendant is the source of E 
Hd: ‘That the defendant is not the source of E’ 
E: DNA with a RMP of 1/1 million 
 
P(E|Hd) = 1/1 million, which in other words is: ‘the probability of seeing the evidence given 
that the defendant is not the source is 1/1 million’,  
 
is confused with:  
 
P(Hd|E) = 1/1million, which in other words is: ‘the probability that the defendant is not the 
source, given the evidence is 1/1 million’.  
 
P(E|Hd) tells us that there are approximately 7,000 potential evidential matches in a world 
population of 7 billion people, therefore the probability of the defendant being the source is 
actually 1/7,000, while P(Hd|E) tells us that the probability of the defendant not being the 
source is 1/1million – grossly overstating the prosecution case. 
 
Buckleton et al [6] have recognised the risk of a jury misinterpreting the value of a 
prosecution or defence case when transposing the conditional, but have argued that in some 
cases the effects of this fallacy are negligible, or in some cases nil. It is argued that ‘the 
transposition is of no consequence if the prior odds are in fact 1[- which, although unclear 
here, means that P(H) = P(¬H)]. This is because the answer arrived at by transposition and 
the ‘correct’ answers are the same in this circumstance. The only issue occurs if the prior 
odds differ from 1. If the odds are greater than 1 then the transposition is conservative. For a 
high likelihood ratio (a low RMP) the practical consequences are negligible [- this is the key 
error which the UK courts have unfortunately accepted]. The practical consequences, if they 
occur at all, are for lower likelihood ratios and where there is little ‘other’ evidence against 
the defendant, or where there is evidence for the defendant’. Only when P(Hd) = P(not Hd) 
(i.e. a 50-50  prior which we will argue later in this thesis is never correct) is  P(E|Hd) equal 
to  P(Hd|E) – i.e. only in the special case is the effect of transposing P(E|Hd) with P(Hd|E) 
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irrelevant. In all other cases, contrary to what Buckleton says transposition will lead to the 
wrong results. Let us say that the prior for DNA evidence is 1/WP (world population of 
approximately 7 billion people), which means that the hypothesis pairing for this evidence is: 
 
Hp: ‘That the defendant is the source of the DNA’ 
Hd: ‘That someone else in the world population, alive at the time of the crime, is the source 
of the DNA’ 
 
As a misinterpretation of Buckleton’s advice, the UK courts would argue that if the RMP for 
the evidence is very low (let us assume 1/WP or lower), then the effect of a committal of the 
prosecutor’s fallacy is nil, because: 
 
P(E|Hd) = 1/7 billion, which in other words is: ‘the probability of seeing the evidence given 
that the defendant is not the source is 1/7 billion’  
 
...means the same as: 
 
P(Hd|E) = 1/7 billion, which in other words is: ‘the probability that the defendant is not the 
source, given the evidence is 1/7 billion’.  
 
In other words, where the RMP is 1/7billion and there were around seven billion people in 
the world population at the time of the crime, that the probability of the defendant not being 
the source of the evidence is 1/7 billion, which means that there could only have been one 
suspect – the defendant. The Nuffield Foundation [16] supports Buckleton’s and the UK 
courts’ view that it is possible to legitimately transpose the conditional under certain 
conditions: ‘The conditional is legitimately transposed through the application of Bayes’ 
Theorem. Illegitimate transpositions arise through confusion and are always unjustifiable. 
Whether replicating the classical “prosecutor’s fallacy” or some variation on source 
probability error, illegitimate transpositions adopt the flawed logic of thinking that “If I am a 
monkey, I have two arms and two legs” implies that “If I have two arms and two legs, I am a 
monkey”.’ 
 
In the conjoined appeals of R v Doheny & Adams [1], Lord Phillips sitting in the Court of 
Appeal stated:  ‘the more remote the random occurrence ratio, the less significant will be the 
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adoption of the “Prosecutor's Fallacy”, until the point is reached where that fallacy does not 
significantly misrepresent the import of the DNA evidence.’ In the case of Doheny the RMP 
of the DNA evidence was 1/40 million, while in Adams the RMP was 1/27 million – in 
neither case was the blatant committal of the prosecutor’s fallacy said by the Court of Appeal 
to be a significant risk to the soundness of the convictions.  
 
In more recent cases such as R v Kelly Gray [14] and C v The Queen [13], Lord Phillips’ 
judgement was interpreted by the Court of Appeal to provide a RMP ‘threshold’ by which the 
committal of the prosecutor’s fallacy was deemed to be safe. In Gray the RMP was 1/81 
million, while in C the RMP was 1/1 billion. Neither conviction was overturned despite 
blatant transposition of the conditionals which doubtless went unnoticed by the juries. 
 
The questions are, can the committal of the prosecutor’s fallacy ever be deemed ‘safe’, and 
can it ever be the case that transposing the conditional has no impact on a criminal trial? To 
answer these questions, an examination of how random match probabilities are formulated is 
essential. 
 
3.3 The random match probability: 
 
The RMP is a measure of the probativity of a piece of trace evidence – usually DNA, but 
could also be blood type, fingerprints or hair colour etc – where the identity of the suspect is 
unknown. Buckleton et al [6] call a RMP from a crime scene sample of trace evidence, a 
‘coincidence probability’ and explains how one is formulated: ‘Formulate the hypothesis, 
H0: the DNA came from a male not related to the suspect. We then calculate the probability 
of the evidence if this is true. We write the evidence as E, and in this context it will be 
something like: E: The DNA at the scene is type α. We assume that it is known that the 
suspect is also type α. We calculate the probability, Pr of the evidence, E, if the null 
hypothesis H0 is true Pr(E|H0). Assuming that about 1 in a million unrelated males would 
have type α, we assign Pr(E|H0) as 1 in a million. Since this is a very small chance, we 
assume that this evidence suggests that H0 is not true and hence is support for H1. In this 
context, we might define the alternative hypothesis as: H1: The DNA came from the suspect. 
Hence in this case, the evidence supports the hypothesis that the DNA came from the 
suspect’. The RMP itself came from sampling a section of the world population to arrive at 
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single probabilities for single locus pairings – markers which show profiling traits along the 
DNA molecule, as the Nuffield Foundation [16] explains: ‘Ideally, a good sample is 
constituted by a “random sample” of the target population i.e. that group of individuals 
about whom information is sought. In a random sample, every member of the target 
population has an equal probability of being selected as part of the sample. One must ensure 
that the population from which the sample is taken (the sampled population) actually is the 
target population.’ 
 
These loci, assumed to be independent of each other, are then multiplied using the product 
rule to formulate the RMP. Buckleton states that a ‘moderate database of ≈ 200 individuals’ 
is enough to provide robust estimates of the probabilities of single locus pairings. These 
probabilities are not frequencies, but a measure of a degree of belief in the hypothesis of a 
‘match’. Curran [17] recognises that it is hard to understand how databases of 200 individuals 
can provide statistics with probabilities of 1/1 billion, and that the U.S. Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) are known to use such a small sample.  
 
The answer is that a sampling error rate is built into the RMP to allow for an acceptable 
margin of error. Redmayne [18] acknowledges that it is vital to preserve the general principle 
of allowing the benefit of any doubt to lie with the defendant: ‘If match probabilities are to 
be calculated in a situation of uncertainty it is important that those probabilities are 
demonstrably conservative. But, given that several different standards of conservatism have 
been suggested, it is difficult to choose which one best accords with the norms of criminal 
procedure. Just how conservative should the statistical calculations used in criminal trials 
be?’ Curran recommends ‘credibility intervals’ – a means of reducing uncertainty by 
formulating a band of certainty from posterior probabilities and ignoring the higher and lower 
fields to provide, say, a 95% band - are used, while Buckleton suggests a number of ways that 
sampling errors can be calculated, including a ‘factor of ten’ rule – a general application 
whereby RMPs are multiplied by ten to give the defendant the benefit of any doubt. This 
system alters, say, a 1/1billion RMP to 1/100 million to increase the pool of suspects from 
around 7 to 70, thereby reducing the probability of the defendant’s culpability.  
 
The Nuffield Foundation [19] supports the use of confidence intervals to ensure that the 
correct allowances are made for inadequate sampling methods: ‘At the allelic level, the 
question is whether several hundred allele counts are sufficient for calculating ethnically-
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stratified allele probabilities. With appropriate values for allele probabilities, it can be 
shown that no more than several hundred alleles are required to generate robust estimates of 
allele frequencies when genotype probabilities are calculated using sampling and co-
ancestry allowances such as those illustrated below. However, the adequacy both of the 
sampling allowance method and of the number of allele counts should always have been 
formally assessed using a statistical method like the one reported by Curran and Buckleton.’ 
However, the Nuffield Foundation [16] do not support the notion of confidence intervals for 
‘criminal proceedings’ as it would for ‘social sciences’ - possibly for the reason that any 
interval is arbitrarily and/or artificially created, thereby leading to inaccuracy in evaluating 
the probative value of the evidence is represents: ‘...employing categorical levels of 
confidence leads to evidence “falling off a cliff” – i.e., it is excluded entirely - if it falls 
outside the chosen confidence interval, even by a tiny margin. Evidence which may be highly 
probative within the stated confidence interval is arbitrarily allotted a value of zero if a small 
change takes it outside that (arbitrarily chosen) confidence interval. Whatever the merits for 
social science in proceeding in this fashion, it is plainly unsatisfactory for evidence to be 
allowed to “fall off a cliff” in criminal proceedings, especially when it is recalled that 
assessments of statistical significance are merely a way of representing variation in data. 
Consequently, the fact that a particular estimate falls outside one’s preferred confidence 
interval does not necessarily mean that this result is uninteresting or provides an inaccurate 
measure of real world events which are themselves subject to natural variation.’ This 
distinction between criminal proceedings and other disciplines where DNA testing is used, 
must rest primarily on the notion that an unsafe criminal conviction carries a higher risk to 
society than a mistake might do in other spheres. 
 
Perhaps, for this reason, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) [7] adopts the practice of 
capping all RMPs at a low probability band of 1/1billion, regardless of the expert’s RMP 
valuation. Because a RMP of 1/1 billion means that the number of suspects in the pool is 
approximately 7 in the world population, this means that no juror could ever safely convict a 
defendant purely on the strength of the DNA evidence alone, because with more than one 
suspect still in existence, the prosecution can never assert that it has presented sufficient 
evidence so that the jury are able to meet the standard of proof necessary to return a guilty 
verdict. 
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Apart from the 1/1 billion RMP cap, the CPS have stated that DNA evidence is never used 
alone to convict a defendant because there is always other evidence in the case. Despite 
Buckleton’s claim that a RMP of 1/7 billion leads to the Bayesian inference of there being 
only one suspect carrying the evidential profiling traits, the CPS state that it is policy to 
always cap RMPs at 1/1 billion, which further clouds the issue as to whether it is ever 
possible to infer a single match in the world population, after only having sampled 200 
members of it. Fenton and Neil [3] suggest that in a pool of 10,000 suspects, where the 
evidence is a blood type match with a RMP of 1/1,000 that ‘there are around ten suspects’, 
while, similarly, Colmez and Schneps [20] state that matching thirteen loci from two separate 
profiles are ‘considered sufficient to completely determine the identification of an individual’. 
However, there are also various contradictory arguments which undermine this standpoint, 
mainly focusing on the difficulty of ascertaining how many ‘matches’ there are in the world 
population at any given time. To resolve this difficulty, the RMP must be examined in greater 
detail. 
 
3.4 Probabilities are not frequencies: 
 
When calculating a RMP, Buckleton et al [6] distinguishes between ‘probabilities’ – a 
measure of certainty in a given hypothesis - and ‘true frequencies’ – empirically gathered 
data containing ‘a numerator and a denominator, e.g 3 in 25, where we have counted 3 
particular outcomes out of a possible 25’ -, whereby ‘a frequency of a genotype will be a 
probability only if we could conceive of carrying out an experiment of randomly sampling, 
with replacement, individuals chosen from the population of the world at a given instant... 
[and as such]  we cannot directly compare our probability assignments to true values’. The 
difference between the two is that a probability value does not reflect an exact expected 
frequency, but more of a rough estimate.  
 
Since this is an estimate, Buckleton et al accept that ‘this makes it important that these 
inherently untestable probabilities are assigned by the most robust methods’, and suggests 
that the test for this is a ‘fair and reasonable assignment of probability’ which is a more 
practical solution than calculating true frequencies, which would ‘typically require the 
genetic typing of the whole population of the world, and the values would change constantly 
as individuals were born or died’. A probability statement about how many actual matches a 
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RMP would provide (‘typically small numbers’), would not be the same as a frequency 
statement, which as Buckleton et al acknowledges might be ‘0, 1, 2 or more in [the world 
population]’. Therefore, a RMP is merely a statement of certainty relating to the following 
hypothesis pairing: 
 
Hp: ‘That the defendant is the source of the evidence’ 
Hd: ‘That someone else in the world population, alive at the time of the crime, is the source 
of the evidence’ 
 
Although a RMP is merely a measure of uncertainty in this pairing, it must adhere to the ‘fair 
and reasonable’ test governing its formulation, otherwise it is useless. Since P(Hd) refers to 
suspect matches ‘who were alive at the time of the crime’ within the world population, this 
number needs to be properly estimated. Buckleton et al state that while: 
 
(i) ‘DNA allele proportions are expected to remain constant from one generation to the next’;  
 
...they also state that: 
 
(ii) ‘...the allele probabilities in one generation would still differ slightly from the previous 
one, caused by the random transmission of alleles to the new generation.’  
 
The juxtaposition of these two propsitions means that while DNA allele sampling results in a 
fair and reasonable assessment that a particular allele appears to be a constant feature in a 
section of an infinite population, its fluctuation would vary from the mean in the short term. 
This makes intuitive sense. Taking gender as an example, this would be the same as saying 
that the proportion of male-female babies remains constant at 50/50 from one generation to 
the next in the long term, but the probability of there being an exact 50/50 split in the very 
next generation is low. This argument is a species of the ‘Law of Large Numbers’ [21] 
whereby infinite distributions tend to regress to the mean. 
 
The regression to the mean occurs where the sample space is infinite; much in the same way 
that trends in the world population are taken to be. Taking a coin flip example (where it 
assumed that the coin is fair); we can expect an even spread of heads and tails over the 
infinite term, but not over a finite term. In this way we avoid the ‘gambler’s fallacy’ – 
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whereby a single event, taken alone, thought to be dependent on past events actually is 
independent of them. In any finite future space, of say a 10 flips, the probability of seeing 10 
heads is no different to seeing 9 heads + 1 tail, or 8 heads + 2 tails etc. While a run of 10 
heads has a probability of 1/2,048, this is only the case before the first coin is flipped. After 
the first 9 flips, the results are no longer unknown, so their probabilities are 1. Reasoning that 
the past flips were all heads, and so must somehow influence the future flip, is what triggers 
the gambler’s fallacy.  
 
The same is true with DNA allele pairings. Just because a test sample formulates a 
probability of seeing a particular allele in a proportion of the infinite world population, does 
not mean that the proportions will be consistent over a finite period of time within this 
infinite sample group. It could be argued that sampling the world population at the exact time 
of the reported crime would allow a more precise assessment of the probability, but this 
would actually have the reverse effect, since any diversion from any previous test sample 
would provide more credence to the argument that the allele proportions are constant while 
the probabilities fluctuate periodically.  
 
Therefore, once the very first test sample provides the probability of an allele, any future 
sampling of that allele will not provide a more accurate assessment of its proliferation - but 
will only serve to chart its diversion from the mean since the last sampling. Taking the coin 
flip example again, a test sample of flips can provide a fair and reasonable assessment that 
the coin is fair and will return an even spread of heads and tails over the infinite sample space 
(much in the same way that 200 test subjects is enough to provide ‘robust’ estimates of allele 
probabilities in the world population), but any future test sample of the same coin can do 
nothing to change the proportions of heads and tails over the infinite future sample space – 
only the probability of heads and tails within that short time frame. In fact, only by constantly 
and infinitely testing the entire sample space, will accurate values ever be found – a measure 
that the CPS [7] says is ‘not practicable’.  
 
3.5 ‘Average’ (not ‘exact’) numbers of matching profiles: 
 
Let us say that DNA has a RMP of 1/1 billion. If the world population is, say, 6.5 billion 
people at the time of the reported crime, we can expect between 6 and 7 matches. We cannot 
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be sure whether there are 6 or 7, because we don’t know how many, if any, people with 
matching profiles has died since the test sample, nor can we say exactly when in the future a 
person with a matching profile will be born.  
 
Therefore, we say that the number of matches is an ‘average’, much in the same way that for 
every week of a lottery with 14 million possible combinations, and 14 million tickets sold, we 
can expect, on average, 1 winner per week – as is consistent with Buckleton et al’s views, 
there might actually be 0, 1, 2 or more winners. Therefore, the number of matches in the 
world population of any crime scene DNA sample, at any given time, can only ever be an 
average, with diversions from this average to be expected. Even taking a new test sample to 
formulate new probability values will not address this issue, since all it will do is confirm that 
the allele numbers have fluctuated since the last sample, while not addressing the key issue of 
whether the allele proportions have changed. 
 
Buckleton et al suggest that it is possible to calculate a RMP small enough to provide an 
inference of ‘a 1/100th of a suspect’, while Colmez and Schneps, despite stating that a 13 loci 
match might be a ‘certain match’, also argue that in the rape case of People v Puckett [22] 
that a probability of innocence can be calculated. This probability is based on comparing a 
RMP against the prior of the world population and arriving at a posterior of 1/70 in favour of 
the defence hypothesis. But what is a ‘1/100th of a suspect’; and what does a ‘1/70 probability 
of innocence’ actually mean? Actually, a 100th of a suspect first and a 1/70 probability of 
innocence, in the context of the case of Puckett, means the same thing, namely that the 
posterior of the RMP is 1/100 and 1/70, respectively, in favour of the defence hypothesis. 
 
Taking the example of the 1/100 posterior; the RMP needed to arrive at this value is 1/700 
billion (as previously discussed in this chapter, Buckleton et al assert that it is possible to 
calculate RMPs as small as this, even with only 200 test subjects). The case is as follows: 
 
Hp: ‘That the defendant is the source of E’ 
Hd: ‘That someone in the world population, alive at the time of the crime, is the source of E’ 
E: DNA with a RMP of 1/700 billion 
 
LR: P(E|Hp)/P(E|Hd) = 700 billion (assuming a 0 error probability rate) 
Prior P(Hp)/P(Hd) = 1/WP (assuming a world population of around 7 billion people) 
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Bayes’ theorem: 1/WP x 700 billion = 100/1 (posterior) – or 1/100 in favour of the defence 
hypothesis. 
 
A similar calculation is used to arrive at a posterior of 70 – or 1/70 in favour of the defence 
hypothesis – simply by adjusting the RMP. In a finite world population sample space, any 
RMP smaller than 1/WP provides a posterior which implies a single suspect (and in this way 
the identity is certain) but in an infinite world population sample space, where the number of 
matches is only an average, the number of suspects is implied only by means of a binomial 
distribution of results.  
 
3.6 Binomial distributions: 
 
Binomial distributions are used to model the number of successes in a small sample, with 
replacement, taken from larger populations, such as with DNA match testing. 
 
If we wish to consider an example of flipping a fair coin, for which the probability of ‘heads’ 
is P=1/2, how many heads should we expect in 10 flips? Clearly, we expect to get 5 heads. 
But we should not always expect exactly 5 as sometimes we might get 4 or 6, and in more 
extreme circumstances, either 0 or 10. However, what we need to know is how far from 5 
would it be reasonable to get? In other words, what is the probability that we get exactly 5 
heads in 10 flips? The answer is in the following binomial distribution graph: 
 
Fig 3.6 
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As we can see, at the peak of the graph, we expect 5 heads, but the distribution tails towards 0 
and 10 at each end. Regardless of how many coin flips we make, the number of heads we will 
expect to see will always be an average 5. 
 
If, however, we test a sample and know at the outset that we can expect an even distribution 
of successful results, the graph would take a very different shape, as the number of heads we 
would expect to see is exactly 5 from 10 flips. 
 
Taking the lottery example again - where an average single winner per week is expected, due 
to the number of combinations and ticket sales corresponding exactly - the probability of a 
single winner for any given draw is ‘on average, one’. If there is no winner this week, then 
next week we still expect a single winner, but over the two weeks taken together, we would 
expect to see two winners. In this way, the probability of seeing one winner per week adheres 
to the law of large numbers. Therefore, the posterior of 1/100 in favour of the defence 
hypothesis simply means that if the sample group were multiplied by a factor of 100, in the 
same way as making 100 separate lottery draws, we would still expect only one match. Of 
course, we might not actually see a match at all, since this is only an expectation.  
 
Interestingly, the Nuffield Foundation [16] have come to a similar conclusion on the number 
of potential matches but have posited a reason based on ‘familial matches’: ‘Even though a 
random match probability may be extremely small (one in ten billion, say – the world’s 
estimated current population being (only) six billion) it does not warrant the inference that a 
matching DNA profile uniquely identifies an individual. Quite apart from anything else, every 
set of identical twins in the world has the same DNA profile – and the chances of obtaining 
random matches are vastly increased in relation to parents and siblings. With a random 
match probability of, e.g., one in ten billion and a world population of six billion, the 
probability that there is at least one other person with the profile is about 0.46 (and a 
corresponding probability of 0.54 that no-one else does). For six billion people and a random 
match probability of 1 in 260 billion, the probability of at least one other match in the 
population is about 0.02.’ However, the Foundation STILL has not expressly accepted that 
believing that a future match will occur from past events is simply a commission of the 
gambler’s fallacy: ‘The random match probability must not be confused with the probability 
of obtaining another match somewhere in the population. The random match probability is 
the probability of obtaining a match “in one go”, not the probability that at least one other 
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member of the population of interest will produce a match. The probability a particular 
person identified in advance will win a lottery is different from the probability the lottery will 
be won (by someone).’ Incredibly, this explanation is precisely the same conclusion one 
would reach on the gambler’s fallacy hypothesis. 
 
The fallacy that certain matches can be made from RMPs, have been perpetrated for many 
years. For instance, in the 1968 U.S. robbery case of Collins [5], the prosecutor attempted to 
prove that a certain match from evidence could be made by combining naturally occurring 
traits, such as race and hair colour, which are found proliferating across the sample space. 
Finkelstein and Fairley [23] quite rightly refuted this, and formulated a Bayesian approach to 
calculating the true probative value of this type of evidence.  
 
In fact, what Finkelstein and Fairley did not discuss, was the binomial distribution of 
‘average’ results made from trace evidence – a point that was equally missed by Edwards 
[12] when he sought to provide more a more accurate Bayesian view of the evidence in 
Collins, than the prosecution case presented. If they had, then a problem would have been 
exposed – that an increasing accumulation of trait evidence can lead to smaller and smaller 
RMPs, which carry a heavy risk of a Bayesian misinterpretation of the weight of the 
prosecution case against the defendant. To illustrate this problem, let us say that the case 
against a defendant is as follows: 
 
Hp: ‘That the defendant is the source of E1, E2 
Hd: ‘That someone else in the world population, alive at the time of the crime, is the source 
of E1, E2 
E1: Fingerprint profile with a RMP of 1/2,000 
E2: Blood type profile with a RMP of 1/1,000 
 
Using a prior of 1/world population – taken to be approximately 7 billion people - (1/WP), 
BT shows us that P(Hp)/P(Hd) x P(E|Hp)/P(E|Hd) = P(Hp|E)/P(Hd|E) = 1/3,500 in favour of 
the defence hypothesis. Let us now introduce a new piece of evidence to the model: 
 
E3: Male gender profile with a RMP of ½ 
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The posterior becomes 1/1,750 (assuming all evidence types are independent of each other), 
signifying that are 1,750 matches. Now take a fourth piece of evidence: 
 
E4: Racial profile with a RMP of 1/50 
 
The posterior becomes 1/35, signifying that are 35 matches. Now take a fifth piece of 
evidence: 
 
E5: Height profile with a RMP of 1/35 
 
The posterior becomes 1, signifying a certain match. The problem is that for any piece of 
trace evidence with an RMP, the more evidence accumulated, the lower the probability of a 
coincidental match. Of course, once ‘average’, rather than ‘exact’ numbers of matches are 
considered, the balance can shift to the opposite hypothesis to create a more accurate 
assessment of the probative value of the combined evidence. To illustrate this point, now take 
a sixth piece of evidence: 
 
E6: Weight profile with a RMP of 1/10 
 
Our posterior P(Hp|E)/P(E|Hd) = 10, or 1/10 in favour of the prosecution hypothesis. This 
shift to the opposite hypothesis does not mean a certain match, but shows that distribution of 
results has now moved into an ‘average expectation’ over a larger sample space of repeat 
tests. Colmez and Schneps, and Buckleton et al have shown the effect of crossing the 
‘hypothesis boundary’ from prosecution case to defence case, without explaining that in 
neither of the hypotheses does the evidence point to a certain match. By acknowledging 
‘average’ matches we can reconcile Finkelstein and Fairley’s argument that RMPs can never 
provide certain matches, with the idea that there is potentially infinite amounts of trace 
evidence that can accumulate against a defendant in an infinite world, and reject any 
argument that there is a threshold by which a small enough RMP leads to the Bayesian 
inference of a single ‘exact’ match.  
 
By looking at where the hypothesis boundary threshold is, we can say that any combination 
of trace evidence supporting the defence hypothesis = a posterior of <1/2, while any 
combination of trace evidence supporting the prosecution hypothesis = a posterior of >1/2, 
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with the binomial distribution graph curving towards infinity in either direction, thereby 
never reaching certainty for either hypothesis. The point of parity is at ½/½, which signifies 
neutrality in the case (this could also be shown as 50/50, or 1) – not a single match. 
 
3.7 Conclusion and recommendations: 
 
Strictly speaking, although Buckleton et al’s statement that in some cases a committal of a 
prosecutor’s fallacy will have nil mathematical effect, it will still have an effect on a jury’s 
perception of the value of the prosecution case, which means that there is disconnect between 
some mathematical values and the real world values they represent. As has been shown in the 
examples here, these mathematical values can belie the fact that the crucial difference 
between P(E|Hd) where we are dealing with ‘exact’ numbers of matches, and P(E|Hd) where 
we are dealing with ‘average’ numbers of matches, means that the significance of a 
prosecutor’s fallacy can easily be misconstrued due to a misunderstanding of how many 
suspects in the world population carry the identical evidential traits.  
 
The problem arises where we are dealing in average numbers of matches. A jury thinking that 
there are exact numbers of matches could easily misinterpret a RMP of 1/WP, or lower, to 
mean that the DNA evidence points to certain guilt.  
 
The reason for this is that, much like the lottery example, we expect a single ‘winning ticket’ 
on average, but as to whether there will be exactly one winner per week, will be down to long 
term averages, rather than single event predictions. Therefore, any RMP must come with an 
express warning as to the Bayesian inferences which should be drawn from it. The Court of 
Appeal has obviously misunderstood the significance of ‘average’ matches when it ruled that 
there is such a thing as a ‘safe’ prosecutor’s fallacy.  
 
As has been argued here, there is no such thing as an acceptable threshold whereby a 
prosecutor’s fallacy will have a negligible or nil negative impact on the defence case. The 
RMP thresholds in R v Adams & Doheny are arbitrary, and should not be seen as a target by 
which verdicts should or should not be considered ‘safe’. In fact, it could be argued that since 
RMPs are linked to the Bayesian inferences of numbers of matches in the world population 
that a binomial distribution graph should be made available to juries to ensure that they fully 
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understand the significance of what a particular RMP actually means in terms of suspect 
numbers. Since experts like Colmez and Schneps have misunderstood the potential numbers 
of matches from RMPs, it is almost certain that laypeople on juries would make the same 
mistake, without this assistance. 
 
Further, when dealing with ‘acceptable thresholds’, a further danger is that a prosecutor, 
knowing he has reached the Adams & Doheny RMP of 1/27 million or smaller, may commit 
the prosecutor’s fallacy with impunity, knowing that due to the Court of Appeal’s ruling, the 
convictions will be safe even if the defendant has his complaint upheld that the fallacy may 
have been instrumental in leading to his conviction. 
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4 CHAPTER IV: Digest of Legal Cases 
 
4.1 Introduction: 
 
The following is a list of criminal law cases which contain explicit probabilistic reasoning by 
prosecution witnesses and/or counsel in order to establish the guilt of the defendants. This is 
not an exhaustive digest of cases which contain probabilistic reasoning, but this selection 
carries the advantage of (a) having been reported; and (b) containing reasoning 
errors/fallacies/legal judgments which help illustrate and expose many of the problems 
encapsulated in this thesis.  
 
This is the first ever definitive one-stop summary of the key cases which encapsulate the 
heart of the controversy concerning the use of probabilistic reasoning in court. For the first 
time, all of the salient probabilistic issues have been collated in a single document in order to 
identify and illustrate the necessity for a formalised approach to criminal evidence evaluation 
and presentation.  
 
The cases are listed chronologically to demonstrate the history and evolution of courtroom 
probabilistic reasoning, and the way that the courts have reacted to its sporadic attempts at 
introduction, and have the key relevant issues italicised and in brackets below the names of 
each case. Chapter 5 will deal the reasons behind some of the rulings and the current anti-
Bayes stance taken by the Court of Appeal. 
 
What unites all of the cases in this chapter is that they feature probabilistic fallacies and 
errors which could have been resolved by an application of Bayes’ theorem (BT). The cases 
of Collins, Denis Adams (Nos. 1 and 2) Doheny & Adams and T demonstrate that the courts’ 
approach to BT has evolved from a 1968 tentative approval of courtroom mathematics, to an 
almost blanket ban today, following systematic errors in reasoning and presentation. The 
cases of Deen/Gordon, Dallager and Pringle demonstrate that, at one time, the courts 
recognised the importance of the prosecutor’s fallacy as a potentially dangerous way of 
misleading a jury as to the weight of the prosecution case against the defendant, but that 
following the ruling by Philips LJ in the 1997 Doheny & Adams case, have now started to 
allow committals of the fallacy as long as it reaches a certain ‘safe’ threshold; and the more 
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recent cases of Gray and C demonstrate the application of this threshold and the faulty 
reasoning which led to its creation. The cases of George and Clark are included to 
demonstrate that the likelihood ratio (LR) should not be used without a full application of BT, 
to ensure that the jury are not misled as to the prosecution’s ‘ultimate hypotheses’ of 
guilt/innocence. Puckett has been included to demonstrate that no trace evidence match can 
ever prove uniqueness of the sample – a point which was raised in the 1968 Collins case, and 
academic literature following the case, bur never fully resolved.  
 
4.2 People v Collins (USA), 1968: 
(Prosecutor’s fallacy/Inappropriate use of product rule) 
 
Mr and Mrs Collins were arrested for robbery on the basis of eyewitness evidence, who 
claimed to have seen an inter-racial couple work together to steal the victim’s handbag and 
make a getaway in their yellow Lincoln car. The policeman in charge of the case, who knew 
of the Collins’, suspected and questioned them on the basis of their racial orientation and car 
ownership. 
 
The eyewitness evidence was that the women, who did the bag snatching, was white and 
wore a pony tail in her hair, and that the man was black and had a beard and moustache. 
 
At trial: 
 
The prosecuting attorney, Ray Sinetar, had a local mathematics professor, Daniel Martinez, 
give evidence to the jury that non-independent probabilities could be multiplied together to 
give a combined probability figure, using the product rule. Sinetar attributed the following 
values as ‘characteristic individual probabilities’: 
 
A. Partly yellow automobile 1/10 
B. Man with moustache 1/4 
C. Girl with ponytail 1/10 
D. Girl with blond hair 1/3 
E. Black man with beard 1/10 
F. Interracial couple in car 1/1000 
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After multiplying these probabilities together and reaching a figure of 1/12,000,000, the 
attorney assured the jury that it could be sure beyond reasonable doubt that the Collins’ were 
the handbag robbers. The jury convicted the Collins’ and they were sentenced to prison. 
 
On appeal: 
 
Lawrence Tribe, a Harvard mathematician, clerked for a Supreme Court judge as Collins’ 
appeal eventually reached the highest appellate court. Tribe advised the panel that Sinetar’s 
submissions had no basis in sound mathematical reasoning. 
 
The Supreme Court found that B and E could not be seen as non-independent probabilities, 
since the likelihood of having a beard is increased in men who wear moustaches. Also, the 
probability attributed to A was not made with any statistical support, and was merely the 
opinion of a mathematician with no experience of such things. Comment was also passed on 
whether C could ever be a true probability, on the basis that ponytails could be done or 
undone at will. F implies that the two people in the car were a ‘couple’, although their actual 
relationship is unsubstantiated. Also, even if the probability figure of 1/12,000,000 could be 
substantiated, this still does not mean that the Defendants were guilty beyond reasonable 
doubt – the number would simply represent a random match probability of coinciding events. 
On the above reasoning, the convictions were quashed. 
 
Key parts of the court’s judgment: 
 
‘The prosecution's introduction and use of mathematical probability statistics injected two 
fundamental prejudicial errors into the case: (1) The testimony itself lacked an adequate 
foundation both in evidence and in statistical theory; and (2) the testimony and the manner in 
which the prosecution used it distracted the jury from its proper and requisite function of 
weighing the evidence on the issue of guilt, encouraged the jurors to rely upon an engaging 
but logically irrelevant expert demonstration, foreclosed the possibility of an effective 
defence by an attorney apparently unschooled in mathematical refinements, and placed the 
jurors and defence counsel at a disadvantage in sifting relevant fact from inapplicable 
theory.’ 
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‘While we discern no inherent incompatibility between the disciplines of law and 
mathematics and intend no general disapproval or disparagement of the latter as an 
auxiliary in the fact-finding processes of the former, we cannot uphold the technique 
employed in the instant case.’ 
 
‘The prosecution produced no evidence whatsoever showing, or from which it could be in any 
way inferred, that only one out of every ten cars which might have been at the scene of the 
robbery was partly yellow, that only one out of every four men who might have been there 
wore a moustache, that only one out of every ten girls who might have been there wore a 
ponytail, or that any of the other individual probability factors listed were even roughly 
accurate.’ 
 
4.3 R v Deen, 1994 and R v Gordon (Michael), 1995: 
(Prosecutor’s fallacies) 
 
In R v Deen, a rape case in which the prosecution counsel transposed the conditional P(E|H) 
with P(H|E), thereby wildly overstating the prosecution’s case, exposed and fully discussed 
the prosecutor’s fallacy - which has now been cited in numerous later judgments. On the 
basis that Deen’s appeal was allowed and a retrial ordered, an appeal of the rape case of R v 
Gordon (Michael) was heard. In Gordon, the forensic expert, Dr Greenhalgh stated: ‘...the 
probability of a [match] in two unrelated persons is less than one in 159 million... taking into 
account a conservative measure on defaulting, that is reduced to one in 17.1 million.’ After 
Gordon’s trial, new evidence emerged which threw doubt on the reliability of the DNA 
database. On appeal, it was stated that the effect of this new evidence was to throw doubt on 
any useful statistical evaluation of the evidence. As it could not be said with certainty what 
the effect of this additional evidence was, the appeal was allowed and a retrial ordered. In 
relation to Dr Greenhalgh’s evidence at trial, the Lord Chief Justice disparaged the use of 
large random match probabilities presented to juries, by stating: ‘Figures running into 
millions of the kind put before the jury have a dramatic quality which may well exert a strong 
influence upon them.’ This case was one of the first to recognise the strong influence a very 
small prior probability, founded on a single piece of evidence, can have on the evidence in 
the case as a whole. 
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4.4 R v Adams (Denis), 1996: 
(Probabilistic reasoning and presentation errors)  
 
The case of R v Adams (Denis), concerned a rape trial in which a DNA sample was obtained 
from a swab taken from the victim. At trial the defence was permitted to lead evidence of BT 
in connection with the evaluation of the evidence in the case. The appeal, which was raised 
on three grounds, and which the first two grounds failed, rested solely on whether the judge 
misdirected the jury as to the evidence in relation to the BT and left the jury unguided as to 
how that theorem could be used in properly assessing the statistical and non-statistical 
evidence in the case. 
 
At first instance trial: 
 
Professor Donnelly for the defence gave evidence, by agreement, before the prosecution case 
was closed. He said it was logical and consistent for the jury to deal with the rest of the 
evidence in the case in statistical terms and for the jury to do this using the BT. He identified 
four types of evidence which could be evaluated in this way, namely the probability that the 
offence was committed by a local man (which the appellant was), the non-identification 
evidence, the appellant's evidence and the alibi evidence.  
 
Professor Donnelly explained in detail the figures he used in the mathematical model and the 
methodology used to provide the likelihood ratios. The trial judge, in summing-up, 
misdirected the jury when he became confused by the expert evidence and, in particular, 
appeared to have forgotten the answer given by Professor Donnelly expressing the 
probabilities as percentages. Instead, the judge was directing the jury as to how many times it 
was more likely that something had occurred, yet he did not remind the jury of the formula 
given by Professor Donnelly in relation to the percentages.  
 
On appeal: 
 
The Court of Appeal held that: ‘It seems to us that the difficulties which arise in the present 
case stem from the fact that, at trial, the defence were permitted to lead before the jury 
evidence of the Bayes Theorem’ (at page 480), and later stated that: ‘...the apparently 
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objective numerical figures used in the theorem may conceal the element of judgment on 
which it entirely depends... it seems to us that it is not appropriate for use in jury trials, or as 
a means to assist the jury in their task... Jurors evaluate evidence and reach a conclusion not 
by means of a formula, mathematical or otherwise, but by the joint application of their 
individual common sense and knowledge of the world to the evidence before them... as the 
present case graphically demonstrates, to introduce Bayes Theorem, or any similar method, 
into a criminal trial plunges the jury into inappropriate and unnecessary realms of theory 
and complexity deflecting them from their proper task’ (at page 482). Accordingly, the appeal 
was allowed, the conviction quashed and a retrial was ordered. 
 
4.5 R v Doheny & Adams (Gary), 1997: 
(Prosecutor’s fallacy/Inappropriate use of product rule/Failure to explain the meaning of a 
‘random match probability’) 
 
A year after R v Adams (Denis); R v Doheny, an appeal (conjoined with R v Gary Adams) of a 
rape trial in which the evidence primarily relied upon by the prosecution was a blood stain 
left at the crime scene, was based on shortcomings in the DNA evidence and the manner in 
which it was presented to the jury. 
 
Doheny, at first instance trial: 
 
In Doheny, the forensic expert, Mr Dowie, arrived at a random match probability, of the 
blood sample, of 1 in 40million, after multiplying a 1 in 5.7million DNA loci random match 
probability, after a multi locus probe testing, with a 1 in 7 blood type random match 
probability of the Defendant’s blood. In his examination-in- chief, Mr Dowie gave the answer 
to a leading question on the likelihood of any other person than the Defendant leaving the 
blood stain. His response was ‘1 in 40million;’ thereby committing the ‘Prosecutor’s 
Fallacy.’ The question should have been left to the jury to decide on all the evidence whether 
they were sure that it was the appellant who left the crime stain, or whether it might have 
been one of a handful of other persons who might exist in the United Kingdom sharing the 
same DNA profile.  
 
On the conjoined appeal: 
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The ground of appeal, concerned whether it had been legitimate for Mr Dowie to multiply the 
result of the multi locus probe test with the results of the single locus probe tests, and whether 
there is a risk that the multi locus probe test will identify bands which are the same as those 
identified by the single locus probes, or in such close proximity to them that there is a 
likelihood that they will be linked together, so that whenever one is found the other will be 
likely to be present also.  
 
On behalf of the Appellant, Dr Debenham, a molecular biologist, stated in his report: ‘...as 
there is no way of determining in any one multi-locus probe test whether the bands identified 
are clustered with respect to any of the single locus probe alleles it cannot be assumed that 
the tests are independent’ (at page 380). The Crown accepted that the possibility of 
dependence existed. Under these circumstances the conviction was quashed and a re-trial 
would have been ordered if the Appellant had not already served half of his sentence and was 
eligible for parole and/or would have been prejudiced by the long period of time since his 
trial, in which he relied on alibi evidence, which would by now be likely inaccurate if heard 
again. 
 
A submission was made by counsel for Doheny relating to the role of the expert in trial 
proceedings. The Court of Appeal stated: ‘He will properly, on the basis of empirical 
statistical data, give the jury the random occurrence ratio - the frequency with which the 
matching DNA characteristics are likely to be found in the population at large. Provided that 
he has the necessary data, and the statistical expertise, it may be appropriate for him then to 
say how many people with the matching characteristics are likely to be found in the United 
Kingdom - or perhaps in a more limited relevant sub-group, such as, for instance, the 
Caucasian, sexually active males in the Manchester area... It has been suggested that it may 
be appropriate for the statistician to expound to the jury a statistical approach to evaluating 
the likelihood that the defendant left the crime stain, using a formula which gives a numerical 
probability weighting to other pieces of evidence which bear on that question. This approach 
uses what is known as the Bayes Theorem. In the case of R v Adams (Denis) this Court 
deprecated this exercise...We would strongly endorse that comment’ (at page 375). 
 
Adams (Gary), at first instance trial: 
 
 
  
61 
 
Adams (Gary), concerned a forensic scientist, Mr Webber, who had given evidence that he 
had carried out four single locus probe tests of the match, that he had found between the 
crime stain and the appellant's blood sample, which had resulted in eight matching bands, 
producing a random occurrence ratio of 1 in 27 million. 
 
In his examination-in-chief, Mr Webber stated: ‘I can estimate the chances of this semen 
having come from a man other than the provider of the blood sample. I can work out the 
chances as being less than 1 in 27 million’ (at page 383), thereby, as in Doheny, committing 
the ‘Prosecutor’s Fallacy.’ In summing-up to the jury, the trial judge stated in relation to a 
random member of the population who could possibly have left the DNA sample: ‘...on the 
evidence of Dr Webster if you accept it and there is nothing to contradict it, not less than 1 in 
27 million people. That means, I should think, I do not know what the population of the 
United Kingdom is but I should not think there were more than 27 million males in the United 
Kingdom, which means that it is unique’ (at page 384). 
 
On the conjoined appeal: 
 
In dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal stated: ‘Professor Donnelly gave evidence for 
the appellant in this case also. The best he could do was to point out that on that ratio there 
was a probability of about 26 per cent that at least two men in the United Kingdom, in 
addition to the appellant, had the same DNA profile as the crime stain... The complainant 
had, quite comprehensively, identified one man - the appellant - as her assailant: the 
telephone call, his voice, his appearance, his clothing. When to this was added the fact that 
his DNA profile matched the crime stain, no jury could be in doubt that it was he who left that 
stain, whether the statistics suggested that there existed one other man, or 10, or even 100 in 
the United Kingdom with the same DNA profile’ (at page 386). 
 
Lord Phillips, at page 379 stated, per curium:  ‘the more remote the random occurrence ratio, 
the less significant will be the adoption of the “Prosecutor's Fallacy”, until the point is 
reached where that fallacy does not significantly misrepresent the import of the DNA 
evidence. Such was the position on the figures advanced by Mr Davie. Before us, however, 
Mr Davie's figures were not merely attacked, but significantly undermined’ (at page 379). 
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4.6 R v Adams (Denis) No.2, 1998: 
(Probabilistic reasoning and presentation errors)  
 
At first instance retrial: 
 
In R v Adams (Denis) No.2, the previous appeal of which had resulted in a retrial; since in the 
first appeal there had been no argument as to whether BT was admissible and the court had 
only merely per curium suggested that it had grave doubts as to its admissibility, the defence 
team once again invited the jury to use BT to calculate the probabilities of the non-DNA 
evidence being true or false, but on that occasion provided the jury with a questionnaire to 
enable them to make the appropriate calculations.  
 
On second appeal: 
 
The three grounds of this second appeal, advanced by Ronald Thwaites QC, defence counsel, 
were: (i) that as the prosecution had adduced evidence using BT, then the defence should be 
allowed to call their own BT expert to analyse the data and reduce the numbers if found to be 
appropriate; (ii) that BT is logical, sound and approved by expert opinion; and (iii) that BT 
evidence having been admitted, the judge should have directed the jury fully and not 
encouraged them to apply their common sense in contradistinction to the Bayesian approach 
described by Professor Donnelly. 
 
The court gave their ruling on the three grounds of appeal in reverse order. Firstly, on the 
third ground, the Appellant argued that the trial judge should have summed-up Professor 
Donnelly’s evidence and did not treat the questionnaire with sufficient gravity. The court 
disagreed, and stated that this was unreasonable submission in light of the extensive evidence 
presented and the questionnaire provided to the jurors. In addition, that although BT is used 
as a mathematical tool to assist in the decision-making process, the judge did state that it in 
no way precludes the operation of what the prosecution expert, Mr Lambert’ called ‘a 
common sense approach’ to the evidence. The judge stated: ‘If you do not wish to use it that 
is your privilege and your own private decision and no one will criticise you for not using it. 
There is absolutely no compulsion on you to use it at all. It is there if you want to use it and 
follow the instructions given’ (at page 383).  
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Secondly, on the second ground, the court stated: ‘We would not for our part wish to take 
issue with that statement so long as it is applied to appropriate subject matter by persons 
competent to apply it. We have no reason to doubt, as is stated by a number of highly 
authoritative experts, that it is a sound and reliable methodological approach in some 
circumstances. We have, however, the gravest reservations about its use in jury trials in 
cases such as this’ (at page 383).  
 
Thirdly, on the first ground of appeal, the court stated: ‘Of course, it is a matter for the jury 
how they set about their task, and it is no part of this Court's function to prescribe the course 
which their deliberations should take... We do not consider that they will be assisted in their 
task by reference to a very complex approach which they are unlikely to understand fully  and 
even more unlikely to apply accurately, which we judge to be likely to confuse them and 
distract them from their consideration of the real questions on which they should seek to 
reach a unanimous conclusion. We are very clearly of opinion that in cases such as this, 
lacking special features absent here, expert evidence should not be admitted to induce juries 
to attach mathematical values to probabilities arising from non-scientific evidence adduced 
at the trial’ (at page 385). For these reasons, the appeal failed.  
 
4.7 Regina v Sally Clark, 2000: 
(Prosecutor’s fallacy/Probabilistic reasoning errors/Inappropriate use of product rule) 
 
The case of Regina v Sally Clark concerned the death of a mother’s two baby sons, who were 
born and died a year apart from each other and which, the defence proffered, occurred by 
Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (‘SIDS’) or ‘cot death.’ The post mortem on the first baby 
was carried out by Dr Williams, who noticed that there was some bruising and a damaged 
frenulum which would be consistent with a resuscitation attempt. A year later, Dr Williams 
performed a post mortem on the second child and his findings were indicative of non-
accidental injury, consistent with shaking on several occasions over several days, and it was 
considered that shaking was the likely cause of death. In the light of this, further tests were 
carried out in relation to the first child and Dr Williams altered his opinion, concluding that 
the first child’s death had also been unnatural and that the evidence was suggestive of 
smothering. 
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At first instance trial: 
 
At trial, it was the prosecution’s case that the first baby died from smothering and the second 
baby from suffocation after having received a violent trauma to the spine. It was alleged that 
neither death could be considered SIDS, because of the existence of recent and old injuries 
that had been found in each case, nor was there sufficient evidence as to how they had been 
caused. The circumstances of both deaths shared six main similarities which the prosecution 
argued against the defence hypothesis that either death was natural: (1) the babies were about 
the same age at the time of death, namely 11 weeks and 8 weeks; (2) they were each found by 
the appellant unconscious in the same room; (3) both were found at about the same time, 
shortly after having been fed; (4) the appellant had been alone with each child when he was 
discovered lifeless; (5) in each case the Defendant’s husband was either away or about to go 
away; (6) in each case, according to the prosecution, there was evidence of previous abuse 
and of deliberate injury recently inflicted. The defence case was that the appellant did not kill 
her children or do anything untoward, and that they must have died of natural causes. 
 
The Defendant was convicted for the murder of her two children. There were thirteen days of 
evidence in all, and it was not until the defence expert medical evidence was called that it 
became clear that the medical experts called by the defence accepted that neither death was a 
true SIDS death. The principle of SIDS rarity became a central issue, on the basis that the 
prosecution anticipated that that the defence might assert the rarity of two babies 
independently dying of the syndrome, which thereby led to Professor Meadow giving 
prosecution evidence – an exercise which the defence later claimed may have misled the jury 
into treating the possibility of SIDS as a central issue. Statistical evidence was presented at 
trial by Professor Meadow on the likelihood of a mother’s two children dying from SIDS.  
 
Professor Meadow’s original witness statement stated that: ‘Even when an infant dies 
suddenly and unexpectedly in early life and no cause is found at autopsy, and the reason for 
death is thought to be an unidentified natural cause (Sudden Infant Death Syndrome — 
SIDS), it is extremely rare for that to happen again within a family. For example, such a 
happening may occur in 1:1,000 infants therefore the chance of it happening within a family 
is 1:1,000,000. Neither of these two deaths can be classed as SIDS. Each of the deaths was 
unusual and had the characteristics of a death caused by a parent’ (at para 110). Between 
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1993 and 1996, the Confidential Enquiry into Stillbirths and Deaths in Infancy (‘CESDI’) 
produced a major study of 470,000 live births, which concluded that SIDS occurred in 1:8543 
live births, producing a squared ratio of 1:73,000,000 for two coincidental SIDS deaths in one 
family. When counsel for the Crown learnt that Professor Meadow (who, by his own 
admission, is not a statistician) was writing a preface to the CESDI study, they used this 
higher figure when submitting a Notice of Additional Evidence. 
 
On appeal: 
 
The ground of appeal included the Appellant’s submission that Professor Meadow had cited 
erroneous figures to support his report, that Professor Meadow's opinion as to the deaths 
being unnatural was wrongly founded in part on the statistical evidence cited in breach of the 
guidelines in R v Doheny & Adams, and the judge failed to warn the jury against the 
prosecutor's fallacy, as referred to in R v Deen, in relation to the use of statistical evidence. 
 
During trial, Professor Meadow gave evidence that: ‘It gives a chance of 1 in 73 million live 
births and in England, Wales and Scotland there are about, say, 700,000 live births a year, 
so it is saying by chance that happening will occur once every hundred years’ (at para 130). 
In summing-up the evidence, the trial judge warned the jury about the use of statistics, but did 
not adequately, in the Court of Appeal’s opinion, clear away the 1:73,000,000 ratio as a 
distraction, which he should have done. However, since the statistical portion of the trial was 
deemed to have had a minimal impact on proceedings compared with the other adduced 
evidence, the appeal was dismissed and the conviction upheld. 
 
4.8 R v Dallagher, 2002: 
(Prosecutor’s fallacy) 
 
The case of R v Dallagher concerned an ear print left on a window at the scene of the murder 
of a 93 year old woman. The appeal included a ground which the defence asserted was of the 
prosecutor’s fallacy evidence given by the forensic expert, Mr Van der Lugt, who stated 
when asked whether there was a comparison between the crime scene ear print and the 
Defendant’s ear print, that he was: ‘convinced that they are from the same donor’ (at para 
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32). A further expert, Professor Vanezis, less emphatically stated that his conclusion was that: 
‘it was the closest match for the overall fit of the prints’ (at para 33). 
 
The Court of Appeal refused to grant the appeal on the ground of a committal of the 
prosecutor’s fallacy, and Kennedy LJ commented that: ‘...as any juror can appreciate, 
comparisons such as were made in this case cannot be expressed in terms of statistical 
probability’ (at para 34). However, the appeal was granted and a retrial ordered on a different 
ground on the basis of new available evidence. At retrial in 2003, the Prosecution offered no 
evidence against the Defendant and he was immediately acquitted. 
 
4.9 R v Clark (Sally) No.2, 2003: 
(Prosecutor’s fallacy/ Probabilistic reasoning errors/Inappropriate use of product rule) 
 
In Sally Clark’s second appeal, the Appellant contended, on the first ground of appeal that the 
pathologist had withheld vital evidence supporting the defence hypothesis, and on the second 
ground of appeal that statistical information given to the jury about the likelihood of two 
sudden and unexpected deaths of infants from natural causes had misled the jury and 
overstated very considerably the rarity of two such events happening in the same family.  
 
The court criticised Professor Meadow’s evidence-in-chief, who stated that in order to 
visualise a likelihood ratio of 1:73,000,000, the jury should imagine backing the winning 
horse in the Grand National horse race at odds of 80:1 each year for four years running. The 
problem with that approach is that the rest of the evidence in the case, in light of this single 
assertion, is rendered insignificant, regardless of its true value. Since this second appeal was 
also brought on the grounds of withheld defence evidence, the court quashed the conviction 
on the basis that the first Court of Appeal panel would have also quashed the conviction if it 
had known about the withheld evidence. 
 
4.10 Michael Pringle v The Queen, 2003: 
(Prosecutor’s fallacy) 
 
At first instance trial: 
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In Pringle, the Privy Council presiding over a Jamaican rape/murder appeal, found that the 
expert witness, Dr Yvonne Cruickshank, and the trial judge together propounded the 
prosecutor’s fallacy in giving and hearing evidence about the certainty of the DNA crime 
scene match with the Defendant’s DNA when a conversation between her and the judge 
during trial contained the following exchange: ‘His Lordship: And you told me it was 99.999 
per cent certainty? Witness: No. I said to you I would have to say it is with a high degree of 
certainty. His Lordship: Not 99.999… Witness: I said 99.999. In science we say 99.99999. It 
goes on. But we did not address the probability in this. His Lordship: Should I qualify this 
99.999 now? Witness: Not in the context of which we spoke. It will still stand’ (at para 17). 
 
In summing up, the judge referred to Dr Cruickshank’s evidence and stated: ‘So, it is based 
upon these results that she comes to the conclusion that the spermatozoa there came from 
Pringle, that it, that Pringle had sexual intercourse with the deceased’ (at para 18). 
 
On appeal: 
 
On the basis of the fallacy committed between the judge and the expert witness, the Privy 
Council quashed the conviction and remitted the case to the Jamaican Court of Appeal to 
consider whether or not to order a retrial. 
 
4.11 Regina v Kelly Gray, 2005: 
(Prosecutor’s fallacy) 
 
At first instance trial: 
 
Gray concerned a DNA sample left at the scene of a drug deal, which also culminated in the 
Defendant facing charges of grievous bodily harm. One of the grounds of appeal related to 
the evidence given by Miss Doole, the forensic expert, in one of numerous fallacious 
exchanges with prosecuting counsel was asked: ‘The sample on the jacket that you looked at 
and found a profile which matched the defendant's profile — one in 81 million — was a 
sample that was part of the blood, was it not?’ to which she answered: ‘It came from that 
sample of staining’ (at para 20).  
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Also, in summing-up, the trial judge stated: ‘...the probability of that blood coming from 
someone other than [the victim] or unrelated to [the victim] is of the order of one in a billion, 
that is one in a thousand million...’ (at para 20). 
 
On appeal: 
 
In refusing the appeal, Dyson LJ, giving the judgment of the court, admitted that there was 
during the trial ‘a plain commission of the prosecutor’s fallacy’ (at para 20) and also that 
there were: ‘shortcomings in the evidence and summing-up which were not made good’ (at 
para 21). The Court of Appeal decided that the ratios were so large as to not fall foul of the 
guidance in Doheny & Adams, which discussed that the higher the ratios, the less impact the 
prosecutor’s fallacy would have on the proceedings. 
 
4.12 R v George, 2007: 
(Probabilistic reasoning errors) 
 
The case of R v George, related to the firearm murder of the well-known television 
personality Jill Dando, on the doorstep of her home. Firearm discharge residue (‘FDR’) was 
found in the cartridge case and in the victim’s hair. The Defendant was one of a number of 
local suspects interviewed by the Police, and his coat was analysed by the FSS, who 
discovered a single particle (11.5 microns or the equivalent of about one hundredth of a 
millimetre) of FDR in the internal right pocket of the coat. The particle matched the 
constituent elements of FDR found in the cartridge case and on the victim's hair. 
 
At first instance trial: 
 
In the course of the judgment, the court considered the FDR evidence, and stated that the two 
prosecution expert’s (Mr Keeley and Dr Renshaw) opinions were that the fact that only one 
particle of FDR was found was not significant. However, the defence expert’s (Dr Lloyd) 
opinion was that the single particle could have come from casual contamination by the police, 
due to poor evidence gathering procedures, and that to rely on it after one year of the killing 
was ‘incredible.’ The Court concluded that the FDR evidence was capable of supporting the 
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Prosecution case; and that its weight was a matter for the jury. The jury convicted the 
Defendant by a majority of 10:1. 
 
After the trial, Dr Ian Evett, who from 1996 to 2002 worked for the Forensic Science Service 
(‘FSS’) and who had been developing an evidence analysis technique called Case Assessment 
and Interpretation (‘CAI’) - which adopts BT as its mathematical analysis tool, invited Mr 
Keeley, the prosecution expert, to apply the CAI technique to the FDR evidence on two 
different propositions: (1) that the appellant was the man who shot Jill Dando; (2) that the 
appellant was not the man who shot Jill Dando. Mr Keeley estimated that the likelihood of 
his finding no FDR particle had been 99 in 100 on either proposition, the likelihood of his 
finding one or a few particles as 1 in 100 on either proposition and the likelihood of his 
finding lots of particles as 1 in 10,000 (these figures being intended simply to signify ‘remote 
in the extreme’) on either proposition (at para 17). The significance of this was that, in Mr 
Keeley's opinion, the finding that he made of a single particle had in fact been ‘neutral’, 
which he then confirmed to Dr Evett.  
 
On appeal: 
 
The Court of Appeal commented that: ‘It is often the case that a piece of evidence that proves 
nothing when viewed in isolation acquires probative relevance when considered in the 
context of other evidence’ (at para 31) and went on to say: ‘We believe that the manner in 
which Mr Keeley gave his evidence was likely to have left the jury with the impression that 
his view was that, because you could discount each possibility of innocent contamination as 
‘most unlikely’, the likely source of the particle was the gun that had killed Miss Dando: that 
was the only unexplored possibility (at para 39). In discussing the trial judge’s summing-up to 
the jury: ‘He went on to add that tests carried out under the supervision of Mr Keeley showed 
that FDR would more often be found on an individual firing a gun than not ...It is clear from 
these extracts that the summing up that the jury were directed that the evidence of Mr Keeley 
and Dr Renshaw provided significant support for the prosecution's case that the appellant 
had fired the gun that killed Miss Dando’ (at para 51). 
 
The Court of Appeal stated that the FDR evidence did not make up the foundation of the 
prosecution’s case and that there was other circumstantial evidence capable of implicating the 
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Appellant. However, since it would (now) be impossible to determine what weight the jury 
placed on the FDR evidence, the conviction was quashed and a retrial was later ordered. 
 
At retrial: 
 
At retrial, the trial judge excluded the FDR evidence as a consequence of the report made by 
Mr Keeley and Dr Evett, and the prosecution case was run on the basis of the eyewitness 
identification evidence, the police interview, the false alibi and bad character evidence – BG 
had a previous conviction at the Old Bailey for attempted rape, as well as various 
assumptions of false identities among other misdemeanours. However, arguably without the 
vital FDR evidence, the jury acquitted him.  
 
4.13 People v Puckett (USA), 2008: 
(Probabilistic reasoning errors) 
 
At trial: 
 
The case of Puckett was concerned with the 1975 rape and murder of Diana Sylvester. Sperm 
samples from the victim were taken and stored, since DNA testing did not exist at that time. 
An eyewitness gave the identity of a man she had seen at the time and place of the crime as 
‘white, medium height, heavy-set, chubby, curly brown hair, beard, moustache, with a clean-
cut appearance.’ After the arrest of Robert Baker, a local artist who seemed to fit the 
description, but who was released later without charge for lack of evidence, the case went 
cold.  
 
In 2003, the police started taking DNA evidence from cold case files and matching them with 
databases of known criminals. The sample from Sylvester had degraded, so that only five 
whole loci and parts of two or three more could be matched. One candidate was matched: 
John Puckett, a 72 year old man with three counts of rape on his record from 1977. A 
photograph from the 1970’s was produced, which showed distinct similarities with the 
eyewitness’s identification, although Puckett was not arrested at the time of the crime. 
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During the trial preparation, Puckett’s attorney, following an Arizona state-funded research 
project on DNA ‘cold hit’ matches, found that in a database of 65,000 profiles there were 122 
pairs with 9 matching loci and 20 pairs with 10 – which should statistically be expected to 
occur in 1 in 13 billion people in the population, not 20 in 65,000.  
 
The fact that people are surprised that there can be so many such matches reveals a 
fundamental misunderstanding of probability that is also known to be the case in the similar 
‘birthday problem’, whereby for there to be an approximate 50/50 chance of any pair of 
people in a group having an unspecified matching birthday, you only need 23 people in that 
source group. What is easily overlooked when 1/13 billion is stated, is the fact that it is 
‘pairs’ which is being measured, not ‘individuals’. In the birthday problem, there may be 23 
people, but there are 253 pairs of people, and thus the chance of finding a common birthday 
is greater than 50/50.  
 
The argument that Puckett was a victim of the birthday problem, was rejected on the basis 
that in a ‘cold hit’ case, there is a specified profile with which to match the database profiles 
– the birthday problem simply looks for a pair of unspecified matching profiles. 
 
Puckett’s attorney then raised an argument relating to the meaning of finding 5.5 matching 
loci with the victim’s killer and stating that this is a 1/1.1 million RMP. In Puckett’s case, the 
database consisted of 338,000 registered sex offenders from California, which his attorney 
stated as meaning that he had an approximate 1/3 chance of being found as a match – not 
1/1.1 million. The judge excluded this theory, but allowed the 1/1.1m figure to be presented 
to the jury, along with the eyewitness identification and Puckett’s previous convictions. In 
fact what the lawyer should have said is that ‘assuming the real attacker was NOT in the 
database of offenders, then there was still a 1/3 chance of finding a person matching the 
profile in that database’. However, Puckett was convicted and sentenced to life 
imprisonment. 
 
4.14 R v T, 2010: 
(Probabilistic reasoning rejected by the court) 
 
At first instance trial: 
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In R v T, the evidence in question was footwear marks, and the issue at trial was that of the 
identification of the murder suspect. The Defendant was convicted and appealed on the basis 
that the expert, Mr Ryder of the Forensic Science Service (’FSS’), had presented evidence 
unreliably on the likelihood of the footwear marks left at the scene of the incident matching 
those of footwear owned by the Defendant. Mr Ryder had extensive experience of footwear 
marks, having worked as a chemist at the FSS since 1989. His conclusion, as was written in 
his report and consistent later with his evidence-in-chief, was that there is a: ‘moderate 
degree of scientific support for the view that the [Nike trainers] made those marks’ (at para 
41). 
 
Mr Ryder had arrived at his conclusion by adopting the recognised four-part formula for 
analysing footwear marks: (i) sole pattern, (ii) size, (iii) wear, and (iv) damage to the 
footwear. Where it cannot be said with any certainty that a footwear mark definitely did or 
did not match the suspect’s, the term ‘could match’ would be broken down into sub-classes 
by the use of a likelihood ratio, which was adopted by various forensic scientists to promote 
consistency in judgements. It was the likelihood ratio of 10-100 which provided Mr Ryder 
with ‘moderate support’ for his evidential submission (at either extreme ends of the scale, <1-
100 gives a verbal equivalent of ‘weak or limited support, and >1,000,000 gives ‘extremely 
strong support’). 
 
In court, Mr Ryder explained that he used BT to combine the four analysis points and arrived 
at his conclusion. His analysis of the sole pattern (‘P’) was supported by the FSS database 
comprising 0.00006 of all shoes sold in the year. Since the shoe size (‘C’) was judged to be 
11, the Shoe and Allied Trade Research Association provided information which stated that 
size 11 shoes occur in 3% of the population. For wear (‘W’), Mr Ryder concluded that half of 
the shoes could be discounted, and for damage (‘D’), he concluded that almost no further 
shoes could be discounted which had not already been. After combining the figures P(5) x 
C(10) x W(2) x D(<1), he arrived at an overall likelihood ratio of ~100. He did not submit his 
methodology in his report to the court. On cross-examination, Mr Ryder admitted that the 
defence lawyers had provided him with some information with which to calculate P.  
 
On appeal: 
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After the first instance trial, the Appellant’s counsel became aware that likelihood ratios were 
used in Mr Ryder’s calculations and lodged an appeal on the basis that the Court of Appeal 
had already rejected the use of BT for all non-DNA evidence in the cases: R v Adams (Denis), 
R v Adams (Denis) No.2 and R v Doheny. The court analysed the international position on the 
use of BT and, using evidence provided by Mr Baldwin, the Forensic Science Regulator, 
concluded that in the Netherlands, Slovenia and Switzerland, there was evidence that BT is 
used, but not the extent. In New Zealand, BT is used for DNA, glass, paint and fibres. In the 
USA, experts are not allowed to use conditioning information (such as motive and 
opportunity) unlike in England, where this information is said to be a key component in 
calculating ratios, and, as a result, do not use likelihood ratios to determine footwear mark 
evidence. In Australia, many examiners used the USA approach, but some were looking at 
ways of developing an approach based on using likelihood ratio calculations. 
 
The court rejected the Appellant’s broad submission that the verbal scale should not be 
elucidated any further than the statement that the Defendant ‘could have’ left the footwear 
mark. Instead, the court allowed future experts to make a definitive evaluative opinion on 
footwear marks, and although the court was not drawn to listing an exhaustive list of factors, 
it suggested, for instance, cases where there was an unusual size or pattern. 
 
The court recognised that likelihood ratios have been used and accepted for DNA evidence in 
the domestic courts in R v Doheny, and in the New Zealand courts in Lapper v R and in 
Australia in R v Karger, R v GK and R v Berry and Wenitong, and stated that there was no 
authority presented to it where BT had been used for evidence with no ‘proper statistical 
base.’ The court rejected an academic viewpoint that hard data was unnecessary to calculate 
likelihood ratios and that: ‘... all probabilities are subjective and based on a combination of 
personal experience and the available data’ (at para 79), stating instead, that: ‘An approach 
based on mathematical calculations is only as good as the reliability of the data used’ (at 
para 80) and that in this case none of the four-part footwear mark analysis could be said to 
have been determined by ‘certain’ sources, for various reasons, including the small size of 
the database (8,122 shoes, where 42 million are sold every year), counterfeit shoes and Mr 
Ryder’s own subjective uncertainty concerning wear and damage. The court went on to say: 
‘It is important to appreciate that the data on footwear distribution and use is quite unlike 
DNA. A person’s DNA does not change and a solid statistical base has been developed which 
enable accurate figures to be produced (at para 83). 
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A brief mention was given to whether BT evidence should be presented to a jury. The court 
referred to the case of R v Adams, where Rose LJ explained that: ‘whilst Bayes theorem might 
be an appropriate tool for statisticians to establish a mathematical assessment of 
probability... It was inappropriate for use in jury trials for a number of reasons; the jury’s 
task was to assess the evidence by common sense and their knowledge of the world and not 
by reference to a formula’ (at para 89). From Rose LJ’s judgment, the court concluded that: 
‘It is quite clear therefore that outside the field of DNA (and possibly other areas where there 
is a firm statistical base), this court has made it clear that Bayes theorem and likelihood 
ratios should not be used’ (at para 90). The court did, however, recognise that BT was used to 
analyse firearm discharge residue in R v George, but that the court in that case used the 
evidence to form part of the background to the court’s consideration of the overall evidence 
in the case and did not discuss the merits of the approach or if it was consistent with R v 
Adams, R v Adams No.2 or R v Doheny (at para 90). 
 
The court concluded that in an appropriate case, where a footwear mark expert were to give a 
more definitive evaluative opinion than ‘could have made’, that no BT or other mathematical 
model should be used and, in any case, the word ‘scientific’ should be omitted as it may 
mislead the jury. Instead, the report should explain that its subjective findings are based on 
the expert’s experience. Therefore, due to the lack of transparency in how Mr Ryder’s 
evidence was presented to the jury, the appeal was allowed and the conviction quashed.  
 
4.15 C v The Queen, 2011: 
(Prosecutor’s fallacy) 
 
At first instance trial: 
 
In the rape trial of C, where a DNA sample was discovered on the victim’s clothing, the 
judge’s summing-up included the statement: ‘...the prospect of it being someone other than 
him by chance, about one in a billion’ (at para 45).  
 
On appeal: 
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The Court of Appeal DID consider to the judge’s summing-up comment to be an example of 
the prosecutor’s fallacy. However, the appeal court refused to hold that the conviction was 
unsafe.  
 
The reasons given by Leveson LJ were that the judge had given a: ‘largely correct direction;’ 
and that in line with the judgment in R v Adams & Doheny, in which Philips LJ had stated 
that: ‘...the more remote the random occurrence ratio, the less significant will be the adoption 
of the ‘prosecutor's fallacy’, until the point is reached where that fallacy does not 
significantly misrepresent the import of the DNA evidence’ (at para 46); that in C the 
proportions of the ratio were high enough (‘not less than 25 times the 1 in 40,000,000, as in 
Doheny’) to justify not rendering the conviction unsafe. 
 
4.16 Conclusion: 
 
As can be seen with this list of cases, there are some pressing issues which need immediate 
attention, discussion and research. Among other things, some key issues needing further 
discussion and which are subject to research in this thesis are:  
 
• That committal of the prosecutor’s fallacy is a routine problem and needs to be 
formally eradicated. Worryingly, the UK courts have now recently started to accept 
the committal of the prosecutor’s fallacy. This problem has been examined in Chapter 
3. 
 
• That the UK courts have reached irrational and illogical conclusions as to which types 
of evidence are and are not capable of mathematical modelling. This will be examined 
in Chapter 5. 
 
• That, prior probabilities - which lie at the heart of all Bayesian models - have not been 
adequately and comprehensively formalised, discussed or researched. This will be 
examined in Chapter 6. 
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• That, discrepancies in the beliefs of the role of the likelihood ratio can lead to 
incorrect probative value being attached to evidence. This will be examined in 
Chapter 7. 
 
In summary, this thesis will deal with each of these problems, making recommendations for 
reform and, in doing so; seek to reduce the risk of miscarriages of justice due to mistakes in 
evaluation and presentation of criminal evidence. Each of these issues, along with the 
discussion of the pre-trial evaluation of evidence by the CPS, examined in Chapter 8, is a 
crucial step in supporting the research hypothesis. 
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5 CHAPTER V: Bayes and the Law 
 
5.1 Introduction: 
 
Following the examination of the evolution of courtroom mathematics in the last chapter’s 
Digest of Legal Cases, this chapter examines the reasons why the UK courts have arrived at 
their current position of banning the use of Bayes’ theorem (BT) in all but the narrowest 
circumstances, not only in the pre-trial evaluation of the weight of evidence by experts, but 
also in the way evidence is presented in-trial to, and evaluated by, juries. 
 
The chapter begins by examining the background to the controversy, and explains the seminal 
1971 anti-Bayesian stance taken by US writer Laurence Tribe, which has barely been eroded 
by the UK courts over the past forty-plus years. Tribe’s main arguments are dissected, 
discussed and largely refuted within this chapter. 
 
The chapter then examines the fundamental differences between explicit quantitative means 
of probabilistic reasoning as an aid to decision-making, such as BT, against other means, 
such as Wigmorean charts – a method advocated for use by a section of the mathematical 
community, supported by the Nuffield Foundation.  
 
For the first time in any academic study, a parallel is drawn between Tribe’s 1971 stance and 
the Nuffield Foundation’s advice against the widespread use of BT and the UK courts’ 
rulings. In addition, and also for the first time, the arguments within Tribe’s oft-cited paper 
are broken down into its smallest composite parts and are systematically shown to be poorly 
reasoned, illogical and outdated, despite the UK courts dogged insistence in supporting those 
general principles within Court of Appeal decisions, such as R v Doheny & Adams [1] and, 
more recently, R v T [2]. 
5.2 Background: 
 
In criminal trials, the relationship between the fact finder – either a jury or a judge or 
magistrate sitting alone – and a lay witness should be one of healthy scepticism. While the 
witness purports to tell the truth of what he saw/heard/found at the time of the alleged crime, 
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it is the juror’s task to ascribe weight to the evidence and having heard the entire case, decide 
whether the weight of the combined evidence is enough to return a verdict of guilt.  
 
However, the relationship between the juror and an expert witness – especially where 
complex probabilistic reasoning is involved - while ideally no different to that of the 
relationship between the juror and the lay witness - is actually more one of trust and 
confidence in the expert’s skill and experience; or as Annabelle Jones [24] puts it: ‘juries 
clearly attach much weight to the views of learned experts... where the evidence involves 
probability, juries may be likely to follow the lead of the experts’. The expert may have little 
or no first-hand knowledge of the instant case, but he or she has a wealth of knowledge in 
dealing with similar types of evidence, which can be used to devastating inculpatory or 
exculpatory effect for the defendant.  
 
The juror, who also has no first-hand knowledge of the instant case and no means of 
collecting evidence himself, and is likely to have little to no experience in dealing with the 
field of evidence relevant to the trial, in his normal day-to-day life, maybe faced with 
complex and technical expert reasoning, which despite efforts to simplify the language, may 
mean that, at the heart of the matter, he must trust that the science behind the technical detail 
is sound. Law Commission Report ‘Expert evidence in criminal proceedings in England and 
Wales’ [25] acknowledges the problem: ‘…a jury, comprised as it is of lay  persons, may not 
be properly equipped in terms of education or experience to be  able to address the reliability 
of technical or complex expert opinion evidence,  particularly evidence of a scientific nature. 
This being the case, there is a real  danger that juries may simply defer to the opinion of the 
specialist who has been  called to provide expert evidence, or that juries may focus on 
perceived pointers  to reliability (such as the expert’s demeanour or professional status)’. 
 
One type of expert evidence which has periodically pervaded the criminal trial process, 
concerns the use of mathematical reasoning to underpin the probative value of all of the other 
evidence in the case. As previously mentioned in Chapter 3, the advent of DNA profiling, 
where the evidence is presented as random match probability (RMP), has seen the use of 
explicit probabilistic reasoning increase exponentially as DNA evidence has become more 
widely used.  
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However, due to routine fundamental and sometimes basic reasoning errors in the 
probabilistic reasoning process by scientific experts, the national and international legal 
community have largely frowned upon, and have largely banned, the use of probabilistic 
reasoning in court. Cases such as People v Collins [5] in the U.S. and R v Doheny & Adams 
[1] and R v T [2] in the U.K. have evolved an almost total ban on the use of maths in court, 
and, arguably due to some poor reasoning and application of foundation principles, for good 
reason. 
 
The mathematical community, who is largely convinced that probabilistic reasoning is an 
invaluable tool in calculating the true probative value of evidence, has been singularly 
unsuccessful in convincing many of the key members of the legal community of the same. 
The reluctance of the courts to encourage jurors to use a mathematical tool as an aid in their 
decision-making process stems from an overly complex application of probability theory, 
which has been said to ‘deflect the jury from its proper task’ [1]; and additionally, the use of 
probability theory has been banned from expert evaluation of types of evidence said not to 
derive from a ‘firm statistical base’ [2], due to its supposed lack of credibility. The court’s 
acceptance of DNA as firm, as opposed to ‘footwear marks’ etc which are supposedly not, 
has caused much consternation among the scientific community who believe that DNA is no 
firmer than any other type of evidence due to the inherently subjective nature of all 
probabilistic reasoning, regardless of the type of evidence the reasoning process is connected 
with. 
 
The scientific community’s motivation in persisting to attempt to convince the courts to allow 
probabilistic reasoning in legal trials comes from its insistence that probabilistic reasoning is 
rife throughout the criminal justice system, albeit implicitly; so to ensure that the reasoning 
already in existence is transparent and accurate, a formal application of this reasoning is vital 
to ensure that trials are free of errors and fallacies. There is much credence in this stance, 
since there is evidence that fallacies are commonplace in legal reasoning, from the basic 
fallacy of the transposed conditional, or ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’ [15], to more sophisticated 
errors in reasoning due to mistakes and misunderstandings of the fundamental principles of 
probability theory. It is the scientific community’s stance that these errors can never be 
effectively eradicated by banning probability theory altogether, or by educating the players in 
a criminal trial, and so a mathematical model should be used as a tool to increase 
transparency.  
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Worryingly, because of the general and systematic misuse of probability theory by experts, 
there is also the danger that expert evidence has been presented to the jury with inaccurate 
and misleading calculations as to its probative value. Again, a mathematical model will 
expose these errors and fallacies before the evidence even reaches the jury, thereby reducing 
miscarriages of justice and saving valuable time and expense of numerous and lengthy trials 
and appeals. 
 
Bayes’ theorem, (P(H|E) = [P(E|H) x P(H)] / P(E), is one such evaluative probability method, 
designed to show altered certainty in a given hypothesis after observing evidence, and, as 
such, could be a good fit with the criminal trial process. However, since the correct 
application of this deceptively simple theorem is something that the scientific community 
have had little success in reaching a consensus over, it is not surprising that the legal 
community have shown a marked reluctance in adopting the theorem as a blanket decision-
making aid. This is a pity, because in recent years and major advances in probabilistic reason 
software, the claims that the application to juries of Bayes’ theorem is overly complex is now 
without foundation, much in the same way that the modern calculator - as has been suggested 
by Fenton & Neil [3] - has rendered complex mathematical calculations accessible to all.  
 
However, although the solution to the problem of simplifying the calculations has been met 
by modern computers, the emphasis now is on ensuring that the input values placed into the 
mathematical causal model (see Chapter 2) are correct and reflect the correct reasoning 
process. This aspect of probabilistic theory can never be entirely placed out of human hands, 
as the criminal trial is a human process, and the mathematical model is still only a means of 
aiding that process. Mathematical modelling is not designed to usurp the juror’s role, 
whatever critics of courtroom mathematics may think or say. One of the most vehement and 
enduring criticisms arose as a result of a prosecuting attorney’s poor attempts at proving guilt 
by probabilistic means in the 1968 Collins case. The critic, Laurence Tribe, an advisor to the 
California Supreme Court, left a legacy of unresolved issues when he wrote his seminal 1971 
article ‘Trial by mathematics’ [4] as a rebuttal to Finkelstein and Fairley’s [23] ‘A Bayesian 
approach to identification evidence’. 
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5.3 The early objections to the use of Bayes’ theorem in court: 
 
Following the ruling in Collins, Finkelstein and Fairley argued that since statistics will rarely 
conclusively identify a defendant, that a mathematical model is appropriate where statistical 
evidence alone is inconclusive. When other incriminating evidence raises a suspicion, apart 
from the statistical evidence; Bayes Theorem (BT) can be applied to indicate the degree that 
the inconclusive statistical evidence heightens the suspicion.  
 
The 1968 Los Angeles case of Collins concerned a bag robbery perpetrated, according to an 
eyewitness, by a pair of robbers – a white woman, who did the bag-snatching, and a black 
man with a beard and moustache who drove their yellow Lincoln getaway car. At trial, the 
prosecuting attorney, Ray Sinetar, had a local mathematics professor, Daniel Martinez, give 
evidence to the jury that non-independent ‘characteristic individual probabilities’ could be 
multiplied together to give a combined probability figure, using the product rule.  
 
After multiplying these probabilities together and reaching a figure of 1/12,000,000 for a 
random match – which is to say that the observed trait evidence had massive prosecution 
probative value - the attorney assured the jury that it could be sure beyond reasonable doubt 
that the Collins’ were the handbag robbers. The jury convicted the Collins’ and they were 
sentenced to prison. 
 
Lawrence Tribe, a Harvard mathematician, clerked for a Supreme Court judge as Collins’ 
appeal eventually reached California’s highest appellate court. Tribe advised the panel that 
Sinetar’s submissions had no basis in sound mathematical reasoning. The Supreme Court 
found that B and E (see sub-section 4.2 above) could not be seen as non-independent 
probabilities, since the likelihood of having a beard is increased in men who wear 
moustaches. Also, the probability attributed to A was not made with any statistical support, 
and was merely the opinion of a mathematician with no experience of such things. Comment 
was also passed on whether C could ever be a true probability, on the basis that ponytails 
could be done or undone at will. F implied that the two people in the car were a ‘couple’, 
although their actual relationship was unsubstantiated. 
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In any event, even if the probability figure of 1/12,000,000 could be substantiated, this still 
does not mean that the Defendants were guilty beyond reasonable doubt – the number would 
simply represent a random match probability of coinciding events – therefore, this was a 
committal of the prosecutor’s fallacy. On this reasoning, the convictions were quashed. While 
the court ruled that the prosecutor’s mathematical reasoning was shoddy, it did not rule out 
the employment of probabilistic methods in future cases: ‘While we discern no inherent 
incompatibility between the disciplines of law and mathematics and intend no general 
disapproval or disparagement of the latter as an auxiliary in the fact-finding processes of the 
former, we cannot uphold the technique employed in the instant case.’ However, the court 
also held that ‘...no mathematical equation can prove beyond a reasonable doubt... that only 
one couple possessing those distinctive characteristics could be found in the entire Los 
Angeles area’. Finkelstein and Fairley suggested that this ruling was conceptually ‘incorrect’, 
because the court was dealing with an existing finite population, the frequency with which 
couples with the identifying characteristics may be found in that population is identical to the 
probability of selecting one at random. ‘Thus, the court’s assumption that one in twelve 
million is a fair estimate of the probability of selecting such a couple at random necessarily 
implies that it is a fair estimate of the number of such couples in the population.’  
 
Presciently, the combining of prosecution and hypotheses of a ‘coincidental match in the 
world population’ is precisely the mathematical formulation needed to arrive at a random 
match probability (RMP) – the currently preferred measure of the probative value (for a 
definition and discussion of ‘probative value’, see Chapter 2) of trace evidence, such as 
DNA. The foundation for this reasoning is based on the principle, discussed by the Supreme 
Court in Collins, that in criminal trials the notion that a piece of evidence can be attributed to 
a defendant with 100% certainty is irrational: ‘The Collins court was right when it concluded 
that efforts to prove uniqueness usually will be futile. Few, if any, evidentiary traces can be 
demonstrated by statistical analysis to be unique to a defendant. Let us suppose a women’s 
body is found in a ditch in an urban area. There is evidence that the deceased had a violent 
quarrel with her boyfriend, who has a history of violence, the night before. Investigators find 
the murder weapon, a knife which has on the handle a palm print which experts say appear in 
one case in a thousand. We now ask the significance of this finding.’  
 
Finkelstein and Fairley then explained that the prior probability (the estimate of the strength 
of a hypothesis before evidence is presented) is ‘critical’: ‘The statistical problem of the 
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Collins case is that of estimating the very figure which the court took as its assumption, 
namely the probability that a couple selected at random would have the characteristics of the 
accused. That probability represents the frequency of couples meeting the description of the 
one placed at the crime. If a sufficiently precise estimate could be made that the frequency of 
such couples in the Los Angeles area was 1/12,000,000, it would be possible to state within 
reasonable margins for error that there was only one such couple in the Los Angeles area.’ 
Therefore, by combining the prior probability by the RMP, a posterior probability can be 
calculated – this posterior reflects our belief in the hypotheses after evidence is presented, 
and it is this posterior which tells us of our measure of uncertainty of guilt. This uncertainty, 
Finkelstein and Fairley say, CAN - depending on the strength of the evidence in certain cases 
- be reconciled with the criminal standard of proof. 
 
Laurence Tribe, in seeking to refute several of Finkelstein and Fairley’s assertions, stated that: 
‘...mathematical devices may distort or destroy important values that a society means to 
pursue through its legal trials’ (although he conceded that in light of the Supreme Court’s 
ruling that: ‘there is no inherent incompatibility between the disciplines of law and 
mathematics; that if experts can be cross-examined and rebutted, the judge gives cautionary 
instructions to the jury and there is advance notice of the intent to use, coupled with a 
publicly financed expert to protect the accused, then there might seem to be no valid 
remaining objection to probabilistic proof’). The article sought to discuss questions as to the 
use of mathematical tools in the course of a trial; whether parties should be allowed to use 
‘explicitly statistical evidence’; whether judges and juries should be allowed to use these tools 
as an aid to the decision-making process; whether the use of these tools was ‘desirable’ to the 
trial system as a whole and whether there was some means of quantifying the standard of 
proof set at ‘beyond all reasonable doubt’. Tribe then went on to list the four fundamental 
mathematical errors made by the prosecutor in the Collins case as: 
 
(i) that the model was devoid of empirical evidence to support the values given;  
(ii) that in any event, that the product rule should not have been used to multiply the 
dependent factors, thereby giving a far too high probability figure;  
(iii) that in any event, the model did not take into account mistakes or lies of the prosecution 
witnesses; and  
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(iv) that the submission was a classic case of the prosecutor’s fallacy [15], whereby the 1/12m 
random match probability was given as a probability of innocence, which should actually 
have been ½, in light of the 24,000,000 population pool .  
 
Tribe explained that there were three non-discrete types of evidence available for 
quantification: (i) Occurrence – whether proof that a certain number of a type of past acts not 
directly connected with the instant case can have any bearing on the instant case (this type of 
‘proof’ was sought by Dr Meadows, the prosecution witness in the 1990’s case of R v Sally 
Clark [9] who used national statistics of prevalence of sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) 
deaths to infer a probability that the defendant murdered her two children instead); (ii) 
Identity - the main issue in the Collins case, which was as to the identity of the defendant(s); 
and (iii) Intention –whether the evidence that 1 in 20 fires are innocently caused can have any 
bearing on an arson case. 
 
Tribe then conceived of a hypothetical ‘Blue Bus’ case to illustrate how not only could 
‘objective frequency not translate to subjective beliefs’, but also how for policy reasons, it 
would be unfair to expect a party who may be statistically guilty for a majority of claims to 
be held responsible for all of them. In the Blue Bus case, Tribe suggests to consider ‘a case 
where a plaintiff is negligently run down by a blue bus. The question is whether the bus 
belonged to the Defendant. The plaintiff is prepared to prove that the Defendant operates 
four-fifths of all the blue buses in town. What effect, if any, should such proof be given? The 
upshot would be a regime in which the company owning four-fifths of the blue buses, however 
careful, would have to pay for five-fifths of all unexplained blue bus accidents – a result as 
inefficient as it is unfair.’ This hypothetical seeks to highlight the problems in reconciling the 
criminal standard of proof of ‘beyond all reasonable doubt’ (BARD) with probabilities.  
 
In essence, the proposition made here is that since ‘reasonableness’ is unquantifiable, that the 
criminal justice system, possibly for reasons of policy, has sought to create a standard of 
proof which does not carry a permitted margin of error. This argument promotes the idea that 
to allow an acceptable margin of error would expressly acknowledge a weakness in the 
system, which could be exploited. Also, any quantified doubt, should by rights, be attributed 
to the defendant, since ‘society does not tolerate the conviction of some innocent suspects in 
favour of the vastly larger number of guilty criminals’. 
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Tribe also argued that probabilities should be the preserve of possible future events, not 
criminal trials where the alleged event has certainly happened, which of course is a basic 
fallacy, as discussed in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, at one stage, he concedes that BT, as 
Finkelstein and Fairley points out, could provide a solution to combining ‘non-mathematical’ 
(presumably eye witness statements, exhibits, etc) with ‘mathematical’ evidence (such as 
blood types and, in the modern day, DNA, etc).  
 
However, this application of a probability theorem is not without its risks, namely: (a) the 
difficulty in assessing an accurate prior on the non-mathematical evidence; (b) avoiding an 
overpoweringly large prior which will overshadow the other evidence in the case; (c) the 
problem of ‘soft variables’ – the argument that some probabilities cannot be counted, which 
therefore means that the variable does not exist and therefore cannot be inserted into the 
model; (d) the lack of concentration on the right types of evidence, such as mental state or 
motive, which would not be treated by the model; (e) the problems in double counting 
conflicting or dependent evidence. Since legal cases are complex affairs, with evidence 
arising at inconsistent times due to examination and cross examination of witnesses, and 
revelations occurring at unexpected junctures, the application of BT would have to 
necessarily reflect this complexity. Tribe suggests that the necessary adjustment to BT to 
encompass the enmeshing of the evidence is thus: 
 
P(X|E1+E2) = P (E2|X+E1)  /   P(E2|E1)  x  P(X|E1) 
 
This would mean that the theorem could not be applied sequentially as the evidence is 
presented, but would have to be applied in the ‘terribly cumbrous’ form shown above. Of 
course, we now know that Tribe’s model here is an ill-defined three-node Bayesian network 
(BN) where E1 and E2 are parents of X. A properly defined BN would eradicate risks of 
dependence and circular reasoning where more than one piece of evidence is presented. In 
fact, Edwards [12] presented a BN for the Collins case as long ago as 1991 as follows: 
Fig 5.3 
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Edwards explains the structure of the Bayes net as asserting ‘non-independence between 
colour and facial hair. But it assumes conditional independence between skin colour and car 
colour, and between skin colour and facial hair of the male and hairstyle of the female. These 
conditional independence assertions could be refuted by evidence, requiring addition of arcs 
to the net. One may also potentially need more nodes. If the defence had cast doubt on the 
credibility of the eyewitness, that testimony would require addition of one or more nodes’. 
However, even with the potential for adding nodes, what can be seen here is that the BN is 
not only a simple graphical representation of what could be considered a complex case with 
many pieces of evidence, but it helps the jury understand the potential for dependencies and 
‘double counting’ of certain evidence leading to unfair weight being attached to a case. 
 
On other policy considerations: Tribe argued that a mathematical model would bring about an 
end to the presumption of innocence, since the juror would have to arrive at a prior of guilt 
before evidence is presented. And as far as ‘dehumanisation of justice’ is concerned; Tribe 
make the statement that the jury’s job is partly ritualistic – that a mathematical model can 
never replace the need for humans to be part of process which settles conflicts peacefully 
according to the needs of society. 
Driver of car is 
black 
Driver has facial 
hair 
Getaway car is 
yellow 
Mugger has 
blonde ponytail 
Victim mugged by 
Caucasian female 
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The final part of Tribe’s article critiques a proposed new way of quantifying the criminal 
standard of proof. The ‘Jury Decision Model’, created by Kaplan and Cullison, suggests a 
method for aiding a jury’s decision to convict by replacing the current ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’ standard with the concept of ‘utility’, whereby the juror weighs up the balance 
between acquitting a guilty person and convicting an innocent one.  
 
By comparing preferences between convictions or acquittals for what the juror considers a 
‘guilty’ or ‘innocent person’ (depending on the facts of the particular case), the juror creates 
two scales: (i) ‘conviction of a guilty person’ (most desirable) to ‘conviction of an innocent 
person’ (least desirable), and compares this first scale with: (ii) ‘acquittal of a guilty person’ 
(least desirable) with ‘acquittal of an innocent person’ (most desirable) – the parameters of 
each scale set between 0 and 1.. The method is that the evidence in the case will lead to a 
degree of comfort for the fact finder to place a point in each scale. For example, if the case 
concerns a brutal murder, the degree of risk to society of freeing the defendant is high – this 
may weigh a decision towards conviction where the prior belief is 50/50.  
 
Tribe argued that in some cases where the juror is only, say, 75% convinced of the 
defendant’s guilt, this would lead to a conviction, which falls far short of the current BARD 
standard, and would be undesirable. Tribe also argued that decisions are not so easily scaled 
between the two sets of parameters given by Kaplan and Cullison, since if a crime is 
considered by a juror as ‘unimportant’, he may set the preferences to convict at 0, regardless 
of the evidence. 
 
Tribe’s main objections to the use of probabilistic reasoning in court are numerous, and have 
received either criticism or support from academics and the legal community regularly and 
consistently until the present day. The main areas of contention, still largely unresolved, can 
be summarised as follows: 
 
(i) That an accurate and/or non-overpowering prior cannot be devised. 
(ii) That not all evidence can be considered or valued in probabilistic terms.  
(iii) That some evidence cannot be mathematically valued and therefore be inserted into the 
model, due to the existence of ‘soft variables’. 
(iv) That no probability value can ever be reconciled with BARD. 
 
  
88 
 
(v) That due to the complexity of cases and non-sequential nature of evidence presentation, 
any application of BT would be too cumbrous for a jury to use effectively and efficiently. 
(vi) That probabilistic reasoning is not compatible with the law, for policy reasons. 
 
The interesting thing to note is that regardless of whether there is any credence to Tribe’s 
claims – and mathematical academics have been refuting them for years – the mathematical 
community has never weakened the legal community’s stance on allowing mathematical 
reasoning in court. In fact, the ruling in the fairly recent case of R v T [2] has shown that the 
judiciary’s distrust of probabilistic reasoning has moved from a ban on the overt use of BT by 
juries and other fact finders during the trial process, to banning the behind-the-scenes use of 
BT by experts, while in the solitude of their own laboratories, when arriving at quantified 
values for presentation of evidence to juries. But where did this seeming revulsion derive 
from? If each of Tribe’s main objections are examined, and the academic response to these 
objections are equally measured, it may shed some light on the issue. 
 
5.3.1 (i) That an accurate and/or non-overpowering prior cannot be devised: 
 
Finkelstein and Fairley recognised that the formulation of an accurate prior probability was 
crucial to the integrity of the probabilistic model in the Collins case, which sought to prove a 
‘certain match’ between the crime scene trace (in that case an eyewitness statement of the 
suspect’s physical characteristics) and the defendants’ own physical characteristics, as they 
asserted that the ‘approach in Collins makes the number of suspects critical’. Regardless of 
whether ‘uniqueness’ or ‘traits’ are sought to be proved by a mathematical model; what is 
essentially meant here is that if a model purports to provide a posterior based as a result of the 
reduction of a large pool of suspects, the original reference group must encompass the 
suspect but not be so large that the model loses fails to prove the point it was designed for. As 
they continue: ‘Setting a generous upper bound will usually defeat the proof’.  
 
Therefore, the problem is that a fine balance needs to be struck between introducing too many 
suspects into the reference class, and too few. It was stated that this decision was wholly 
‘arbitrary’, since it was difficult to make an objective assessment as to what would be a 
sufficient geographical area to draw the pool of suspects from. Ward Edwards [12], in 
discussing the best way to formulate the correct reference class, and therefore achieve a 
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logical prior, in Collins, explains: ‘The prior probability in this case would be the probability 
that a random man/woman couple who could have been at the time/place of the crime and 
who might have an interest in committing it would be guilty. In this instance, 10,000 (which 
seems very high) couples might exist, giving a 0.0001 prior.’ As can be seen here, the prior is 
based on a guess of the upper boundary of how suspects there are likely to be, to prove the 
given hypothesis (in the Collins case, at least) that the suspect is the person(s) seen by the 
eyewitness(s) at the scene of the alleged crime. 
 
Richard Friedman [26] argues that in cases where identification of the suspect is a main issue, 
and there is trait evidence linking the suspect to the alleged crime scene, that Finkelstein and 
Fairley’s approach of using a reference class is not only correct but is consistent with trial 
practice. He recognises that there MAY be some credence to Tribe’s argument that a 
reference class prior means that the model starts with a value larger than zero – which means 
that at the outset of the case, the defendant already has a degree of guilt attributed to him 
before any evidence has been observed – a fact which sits uneasily with those who believe 
that all defendants should commence their case with the presumption of innocence valuing 
their guilt at 0.  
 
However, the problem with a prior of 0, is that all evidence conditioning the prior results in a 
posterior of 0 (as Chapter 2 has shown). A result that is not possible, according to those who 
believe that all probability is subjective (and therefore subject to uncertainty to whatever 
degree). Friedman calls this class of doubters ‘Bayesioskeptics’, which arguably pitches two 
camps:  those who believe in Bayes theorem, and those that don’t – a distinction which is not 
accurate, since (a) the pro- and anti-Bayes supporters may agree on some aspects of 
probability theory and not others; and (b) that it implies that there is such a thing as a 
‘Bayesian’ – purportedly a cultish group who have different values, ideas and principles to 
those ‘who do not believe’.  
 
This artificial distinction is not helped by Richard Friedman: ‘Application of the conventional 
probability theory to subjective probability assignments is the essence of Bayesianism’; or by 
Ward Edwards: ‘Bayesians consider probabilities to be an appropriate metric for any 
uncertainties about an empirical proposition on which the outcome of a decision depends, 
and consider all contexts in which decisions are made to be appropriate for their use.’ Even 
the Nuffield Foundation [16], one of whose aims is to promote better relations between the 
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legal and mathematical community, state: ‘Although the Court of Appeal has denounced 
attempts to encourage jurors to attempt Bayesian calculations, especially in relation to non-
scientific evidence, many forensic scientists are confirmed or unconscious Bayesians and 
routinely employ likelihood ratios in the course of generating expert evidence ultimately 
adduced in court.’ This sort of distinction can do nothing to create a collaborative and 
friction-free working environment. In fact, there are even some academics [27] in the 
mathematical community who advocate the use of a ‘Bayesian approach’ to probabilistic 
reasoning, without recommending the ‘full application of Bayes’ theorem’. This confusing 
stance must be hard to follow for those non-mathematicians who are unaware that the 
distinction between Bayesian calculations and Bayes’ theorem is artificial at best, and 
misleading at worst. 
 
Friedman’s problem with the current formula for generating priors in identification cases is 
summed-up as follows: ‘Bayesioskeptics have contended that the presumption of innocence is 
inconsistent with a non-zero prior probability of guilt. A zero prior probability of guilt 
represents a belief in innocence that cannot be shaken no matter how strong the evidence. I 
believe this argument is wrong, but I do not believe the easy answer that has been offered by 
Bayesians is quite satisfactory. The easy answer in a criminal case is to say that the 
presumption means that, before any evidence is presented, the fact-finder should treat the 
defendant as no more likely as anyone else, or, in a variant, as equally likely as anyone else, 
to be guilty. I have at least four problems with this test: 
(i) It is indeterminate: there is no obvious single reference population. 
(ii) The defendant may contend that he is substantially less likely than the ‘mean’ 
member of the population to have committed the crime. 
(iii) Information that the fact-finder may legitimately bring into court, without the 
need for evidence, may suggest that the defendant is more likely than most other 
members of the population to have committed the crime; consider, for example, 
the outset of a case in which the jury knows nothing but that the charge is armed 
robbery and that the name of the defendant is John (suggesting that he is male 
and therefore more likely to have committed armed robbery than the average 
member of the population). 
Friedman’s argument is therefore in support of BT, insomuch as the ‘Bayesioskeptics’ stance 
that ‘a model is impossible to create’ is wrong; yet he says that the ‘Bayesian’ formulation of 
a prior from reference class populations is also wrong. Friedman has not recognised that the 
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prior probability is based upon the witness’s (whether expert or lay) own combination of 
hypotheses. After all, the prior must be based on some evidence, even if it is evidence of the 
world-at-large, rather than evidence of the case itself.  
 
The mathematical community have argued that the prior is immaterial, as it will be personal 
to the fact finder and not open to scrutiny – after all, the use of BT is designed to illustrate the 
impact of evidence on priors, not to scrutinise the prior itself. Ronald Allen [28] has a 
problem with this approach though: ‘Bayes' theorem requires the formation of a prior 
probability of any proposition to be updated. How that is to be done within the law has 
proven elusive. Moreover, the purely subjective view that any prior is as good as any other 
leads to radical indeterminacy and has no obvious connection to accurate adjudication. A 
non-subjective view suffers from the lack of any relevant data. Before hearing the evidence, 
how would any juror have any non-subjective basis to form a probability of, say, O.J. 
Simpson's guilt?’ Allen’s argument is therefore that subjective probability is incompatible 
with criminal trials, and objective probability (or assigning values to the fact finder; the very 
anathema of Bayesian reasoning) is pointless, due to its lack of personal reflection to the task 
at hand. In other words, Allen’s view is that Friedman is wrong – probabilistic reasoning and 
the law are wholly incompatible, regardless of the methodology. 
 
Friedman suggests that BT can be used by a juror merely to ‘check’ on his own reasoning 
process: ‘The rule expresses the commonsense proposition that if a piece of evidence is more 
likely to arise given an hypothesis than given its negation, the evidence makes the hypothesis 
more likely. In the second model, an observer might at any time make a set of probability 
assessments that are inconsistent. If the inconsistency is a glaring one, the cognitive 
dissonance will be apparent, and the observer will adjust the assessments to bring them more 
closely into line. This adjustment might involve altering any probability assessment, 
including a prior probability.’  Johan Bring [29] argues that Friedman’s suggestion that BT 
could be used merely as a tool for elucidating reasoning, without a requirement of 
formulating a prior pre-trial, is illogical: ‘Friedman does not seem to be too strict about the 
requirement that the prior should be assessed before hearing the evidence. He suggests that if 
a fact-finder is unhappy with her posterior she might go back and change, for example, her 
prior. So, if the result from the Bayesian calculation does not correspond with our intuitive 
belief we could alter some components in the Bayesian calculations until the Bayesian 
answer corresponds with our intuitive belief! What then, is the point of Bayes' theorem?’ 
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Bring’s stance is that if BT should be used to provide answers as to the probative value of the 
evidence in a case, the fact finder should not be allowed to simply adjust the model to suit his 
beliefs – since the model should elucidate beliefs.  
 
There is much credibility in this argument – how would a fact finder know if the intuitive 
belief he has is a product of a fallacy, if BT doesn’t illustrate it for him? However, Friedman 
could simply be seen here to be side-stepping any difficulties surrounding the formulation of 
an accurate prior, by advocating the mathematical model as a means to quantify, visualise and 
aid the juror’s reasoning process. This objective towards transparency must surely be 
supported by the legal community.  
 
To sum-up, the general consensus seems to be that those sceptical of the use of probabilistic 
reasoning in legal trials have used the controversy surrounding the prior as a lynchpin in 
entirely dismissing the approach as inappropriate. The supporting camp must do better in 
showing that the prior probability can be formulated without the model providing inaccurate 
values – the very thing that the model is designed to eradicate from the fact finder’s normal 
(non-probabilistic) reasoning process.  
 
Up until this point, the argument is unresolved. Tribe’s position is that a prior cannot be 
formulated, as is Allen’s and Bring’s. Friedman states that a prior can be formulated, but the 
current use of reference classes in cases where the probative value of identity evidence is 
being calculated, is flawed. In effect, although the argument has become more sophisticated 
and nuanced, we are no further on in this matter than Tribe’s original 1971 objection. 
Therefore, the problem with priors will have to be fully addressed later in Chapter 6.   
 
5.3.2 (ii) That not all evidence can be considered or valued in probabilistic terms: 
 
The Nuffield Foundation, in its most recent practitioner guide [30], accepts that there is no 
such thing as individualised evidence: ‘‘Individualisation’.  This type of opinion relates to the 
issue of the individualised source of recovered material, or trace, and is usually an 
expression of a personal conviction.  Examples of individualisation include: 
- This shoe made the mark at the scene 
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- The piece of broken button recovered from the complainant’s bed came from the 
broken button that remains on the jacket of the suspect 
- The fingermark is that of the left thumb of the suspect.’ 
 A key feature about evidence in a legal trial – rather than evidence in, say, medical testing – 
is that the witness is not the fact finder, as Nuffield recognises: ‘Even though an opinion of 
personal conviction may well be based on vast experience and proven competence, they are 
very difficult, if not impossible, to justify on strictly logical grounds.  To arrive at an opinion 
of an individualisation, the expert would need to be sure that it was impossible to obtain the 
observations if any other alternative proposition were true...Events that are impossible have 
probability zero.  However, in situations like the above, zero probabilities are very difficult to 
justify.  The probabilities may indeed be very small; approaching zero, but it would be 
incorrect to say ‘It is impossible’.  In these situations, the opinion of an individualisation is a 
personal, albeit possibly highly expert, conviction.’ In medical testing, the witness (normally 
the doctor or other expert) views the testing procedure and the results firsthand, whereas in 
criminal proceedings, the fact finder must NOT be someone connected with the case. 
Therefore, every piece of evidence comes with some doubt as to its provenance, necessitating 
some kind of mathematical model to chart the uncertainty. (Interestingly, there could be some 
similarity between medical and legal cases in that the true fact finder in medical testing could 
be seen to be the patient him/herself, and the doctor as the witness – with the patient making 
the decision whether or not to accept the doctor’s findings and embark on the treatment 
offered – which means that regardless of the discipline, the uncertainty in evidence is always 
inherent and present.) 
 
Finkelstein and Fairley [23] recognised that it is rarely likely that a fact finder will believe 
100% the evidence observed by him: ‘The Collins court was right when it concluded that 
efforts to prove uniqueness usually will be futile. Few, if any, evidentiary traces can be 
demonstrated by statistical analysis to be unique to a defendant.’ Of course, Finkelstein and 
Fairley were underplaying their assertion – in fact, there will never be a situation where a fact 
finder has rationally eradicated ALL of his uncertainty in a piece of evidence. Therefore, if 
one accepts that all evidence carries an element of uncertainty, it MUST follow that evidence 
is probabilistic, and is somehow capable of being represented by an ascertained tangible 
value less than 1. 
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One of the fundamental difficulties, for those not familiar with using quantified numerical 
values to elucidate reasoning normally associated with non-quantified statements of belief – 
such as ‘I’m pretty sure it will rain today’, is that there is tendency to think that numbers are 
too precise and do not adequately deal with issues of uncertainty in the same way that words 
do. ‘Pretty sure’ is a familiar term to most people, but ‘58% sure’ is only within a few 
people’s comfort zones. The supporters of BT are comfortable converting ‘pretty sure’ into a 
percentage, but non-supporters state that this conversion can be misleading and in some ways 
impossible to make.  
 
This debate has led to two distinct and opposing camps forming. The supporting camp 
believe that all evidence is capable of being converted to numerical values in preparation for 
insertion into a model, while the non-supporting camp believe that quantified values can 
never fully convert into a fact finder’s true beliefs due to an inherent unquantifiable element 
present in some kinds of evidence. What makes some kinds of evidence ‘unquantifiable’, and 
not others, is open to debate, but the issue is not helped by ill-defined criteria for what makes 
some evidence reliable, and therefore quantifiable. The Court of Appeal in the case of R v T 
[2] certainly have been led by some members of the mathematical community, on this point, 
to believe that the distinction exists, but this is by no means a universal, or perhaps even 
majority view. 
  
Perhaps, one way of delineating the difference between ‘reliable’ (and therefore quantifiable 
and capable of model insertion) and ‘unreliable’ evidence, is to ascertain whether the reliable 
evidence has any inherent qualities. Finkelstein and Fairley examined a distinction between 
what they termed ‘statistical’ and ‘non-statistical’ evidence by stating: ‘The court reversed 
the Collins’ conviction because it felt that the powerful statistics would fool a jury into 
overlooking the possibility that the basis for the calculations could be in error. The court was 
obviously right. However, correct statistical methods will usually have an effect opposite to 
that feared by the Collins court. Findings based on such statistics should generally weaken 
non-quantitative testimony based on the same evidence. Statistical observation is of attributes 
that can be objectively measured; it cannot hope to have the richness of information involved 
in ordinary or educated recognition.’ With this approach, Finkelstein and Fairley are 
advocating that quantified evidence IS too precise and because of this, is less convincing to a 
fact finder.  
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Ward Edwards [12] disagrees with this stance: ‘One major argument against the use of 
probabilities in court is that probabilities are inherently and inappropriately precise because 
they are numbers. Any empirical scientist will assert that virtually any number derived from 
observations is imprecise. A careful scientist reporting an empirically derived number, such 
as a person’s height, will report it as y ± z, where z is a number measured in the same units 
as y reflecting measurement error, typically a standard deviation or a half-range. Physical 
measurements typically lead to values of z much smaller than y; a report of height might be 6 
± 0.5 feet; the error is normally counted from repeat measurements, carried out by the user 
or manufacturer of the measuring equipment. Apart from measurement errors, errors can 
also occur in counts where you cannot be sure you have counted all cases you set out to 
count, or where a count depends on categorization and there is a borderline case. The point 
is that no empirically derived number is either inherently precise or imprecise. How precise 
it is depends on its nature and the process that links it to observations. In this respect 
numbers do not differ from words.’ As can be seen with this argument, Edwards is actually 
arguing that uncertainty arises in all walks of life – whether data is witnessed first or second 
hand. In fact, Edwards is arguing that all evidence is ‘subjective’, which is to say that there 
must at some point in the witness’s mind a ‘leap of faith’ made between what is empirically 
shown and what he believes – in other words:  
 
1. A metre stick can only ever be measured against other metre sticks, and who is to say that 
they are correct either?  
2. Even in the case of a single metre stick, the minute discrepancies which may arise between 
the object and the observer, and other observers, also need quantifying rather than ignoring. 
 
Edwards, explains: ‘The type of evidence typically called ‘statistical’ is based on 
measurements obtained empirically. No-one doubts the relevance of such evidence, though 
Tribe does not support the view that numbers are the natural way to report it. The argument 
is about it sufficiency. All of evidence about identity is of this kind. Tribe seems to be saying 
that if such evidence is inherently insufficient, then identity is not establishable in court. In 
Tribe’s ‘blue bus problem’ how do we know that the errant bus was blue, or even that it was 
a bus? To modify the hypothetical, a reliable colour blind witness’s testimony that the vehicle 
was bus is conclusive, but he can say nothing about its colour. But buses have distinctive 
number plates and he wrote down the result. To reproduce Tribe’s hypothetical; we could 
specify that blue buses and only blue buses have 123 as the first three digits of their license 
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plates, and that the witness saw those three digits, but not the last three. To specify a 
condition that surely would meet Tribe’s requirement for individualised information, we 
could have the witness report the full license number 123456, which is indeed the license 
number of a blue bus... Where does ‘statistical’ evidence stop and some other kind begin? 
The answer to this question must be arbitrary.’ By showing a fundamental flaw at the very 
heart of Tribe’s Blue Bus case, Edwards displays a healthy scepticism for any data which is 
said to be empirically sound.  
 
Therefore, if all evidence is uncertain, it is better to be upfront and honest about the 
uncertainty by modelling it, rather than simply banning a model on the basis that some 
uncertainty within it exists, since as Tillers and Gottfried [31] state: ‘Probability theory 
assumes the existence of uncertainty. (One might say that probability theory takes uncertainty 
seriously.) The entire point of using probability theory is to talk coherently about 
uncertainty—not to eliminate uncertainty.’ Edwards’ argument renders the Blue Bus case 
invalid and it exposes Tribe’s deeply fundamentally flawed probabilistic reasoning, as he 
seems to support the notion that some evidence can be taken as fact.  
 
It is perhaps this foundation thinking that separates the subjectivists from the ‘frequentists’ 
(those who believe that empirically derived information is the only useful tool in valuing 
data). The legal community, as evidenced in cases such as R v T [2], seemingly reject this 
subjectivist approach to probability. Richard Friedman [26] also recognises Tribe’s flaw: ‘As 
regards the ‘blue bus hypothetical’ (that the Blue Bus Company owns 80 per cent of the buses 
in town. Should the Blue Bus Company be liable?): The 80 per cent figure is not a 
probability, but only a datum. Probability assessments are made by observers on the basis of 
all the data received -which include information about what is not received. Sometimes the 
data received are so crisp and strong that they narrowly confine the range of probability 
assessments that most rational observers could make, but that is not this case. Failure of 
either side to produce more evidence might lead a rational fact-finder to assess a probability 
substantially higher or lower than the 80 per cent figure.’ Therefore, once evidence is 
presented to the fact finder, it will be his task to assign a probability value of his own. In fact, 
Friedman’s argument exposes another flaw in Tribe’s reasoning: that Tribe has obviously 
disregarded that it is the fact finder’s role to assign his own subjective value to evidence, not 
the witness’s - regardless of whether the evidence is quantified or not. 
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Tillers and Gottfried [31] champion subjectivist probability by arguing that while some 
probability may be grounded in empirically gathered (‘reliable’) data, some is not: 
‘Probabilities are not the same thing as statistically grounded probabilities. Yes, modern 
statistical analysis does involve the probability calculus. But, as the word ‘statistics’ implies, 
statistical analysis involves and requires systematic collection of data or observations, data 
and observations that can be summarized in the form of statistics. It is possible to talk—and 
talk coherently—about odds or probabilities without systematically gathering data, compiling 
statistics or analysing systematically gathered collections of data. In short, although it is not 
possible to do statistics without doing probability, it is possible to do probability without 
doing statistics.’ The important thing to note is the authors are suggesting that probabilistic 
reasoning is not to be confused with the gathering of, and inferences drawn from, ‘reliable’ 
information.  
 
The court in R v T seemingly have disregarded this distinction when ruling that probabilistic 
reasoning must only be adopted to draw inferences from data drawn from ‘a firm statistical 
base’. This distinction between probability drawn from ‘reliable’ information, and probability 
drawn from what can only be termed ‘unreliable’ information may be part of the reason why 
the Court of Appeal in R v T felt that subjectivist probability has no place in the courtroom. 
The authors use of the words ‘systematic collection of data and observations’ implies that if 
the negative were true, that there would be no system in place – in effect cutting to the very 
heart of the problem; as the legal community are plainly rigidly committed to the creation and 
maintenance of tangible systems.  
 
It is possible that making the distinction between statistics and probability has led to 
confusion with the distinction between ‘reliable’ and ‘unreliable’ information. In the Nuffield 
Practitioner Guide No.1 [16], a current published guide to the use of probabilistic reasoning 
in legal trials – purportedly bridging the divide between the legal and mathematical 
communities – the distinction is made thus: ‘Statistics are concerned with the collection and 
summary of empirical data. Probability is a branch of mathematics which aims to 
conceptualise uncertainty and render it tractable to decision-making. Hence, the field of 
probability may be thought of as one significant branch of the broader topic of “reasoning 
under uncertainty”.’ This supposed endorsement of the use of probabilistic reasoning for 
decision-making would do little to dispel the legal community’s fears that non-statistical 
information is reliable. In fact, the idea of ‘empirical information’, which means ‘systematic 
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collection and recording’, would likely lead any casual observer to believe that subjectivists 
simply ‘pluck figures out of the air’ – an idea which is unsurprisingly unpalatable within the 
legal community.  
 
The Nuffield Guide No.1 makes the distinction between subjective and objective 
probabilities: ‘Probability can be “objective” (a logical measure of chance, where everyone 
would be expected to agree to the value of the relevant probability) or “subjective”, in the 
sense that it measures the strength of a person’s belief in a particular proposition...It is not 
always possible to obtain a good estimate for a population relative frequency based on 
sample data: relevant datasets may be incomplete or non-existent. In these circumstances, 
relative frequencies may be replaced by estimates based on an expert’s personal experience 
and knowledge of the type of evidence in question.’ Again, it is the distinction between ‘good 
estimates’ which are based on sample data, rather than simply ‘estimates’ based on an 
expert’s personal experience and knowledge which may be another factor in the Court of 
Appeal’s decision to ban BT in court proceedings.  
 
In addition, this stance is completely at odds with Robertson and Vignaux’s [32] seminal 
1998 recommendation that there should, in principle, be no difference between the way we 
evaluate traditionally quantified evidence (such as DNA) and other types:  ‘While DNA 
evidence may be highly "statistical", other scientific evidence, such as fibre analysis, is less 
so. Nor is there any reason in principle why less quantitative evidence such as eye-witness 
identification should not be subjected to statistical analysis.’ Biedermann et al [33] also 
support the view that subjectivist probability is compatible with the legal trial system: ‘...the 
subjectivist view appears to be the most adequate approach for addressing an individual's 
situation of making judgements under uncertainty. Accordingly, probability assignment in 
individualisation processes is not a case of disputing facts, but a case of declaring 
probabilities that sincerely represent the experts' actual states of belief.’ It is again arguably 
the lack of cohesion between members of the mathematical community which fosters such 
little confidence in it when it attempts to promote its ethos to exterior factions such as the 
legal community. 
 
One thing that can, and has been, agreed upon by the mathematical community, is that 
probability must be used to ascertain the value of evidence alleged by the prosecution to have 
derived from the crime scene. This so-called ‘trace evidence’ can never be attributed with 
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100% certainty to any defendant. The reason for this is that because certain physical traits 
proliferate around the world population and are shared by some members - and the means of 
judging ‘matches’ is based on matching certain traits within the sample, with the defendant’s 
own traits.  
 
Therefore, whether the matching process is based on objective probability (so-called 
‘empirically measured’ data) – or subjective probability (estimates based on experience and 
knowledge) – the end result is that all trait evidence carries a degree of uncertainty and this 
uncertainty carries a tangible value. This view was expounded by the Nuffield Foundation in 
their Practitioner Guide No.1: [16] ‘The ensuing decades have witnessed a growing 
realisation that all scientific evidence is probabilistic and no current forensic technology 
supports unique identification of individuals. DNA is different only insofar as it wears its 
probability on its sleeve, whereas other sciences and technologies have tended to conceal 
their probabilistic foundations in ostensibly binary concepts such as ‘match’/‘no match’.’ In 
Nuffield Practitioner Guide No.2 [19], DNA testing is placed into a special category of 
sciences which expressly uses probability as a tool to display the probative value of a crime 
scene trace: ‘One of the most distinctive features of DNA profiling, as compared with older 
and hitherto more established branches of forensic science and forensic medicine, is that 
DNA evidence is explicitly probabilistic. An expert witness does not – or at any rate, 
certainly should not – identify a particular individual as the donor of the genetic material 
from which a DNA profile was produced. This is because the standard DNA profile is 
produced from only a small sample of the donor’s entire DNA. Thus, even if DNA itself is 
assumed to be unique to each individual, more than one person could still share the same 
DNA profile, e.g. more than one person could be ‘a match’ to crime scene DNA... In fact, 
DNA profiling will never be able to produce a verifiably unique match to a particular 
individual, because the evaluation of DNA evidence is always, in part, a question of 
probability.’ This means that since in Guide No.1, the Nuffield Foundation state that all 
scientific evidence is probabilistic, this means that all evidence is probabilistic – what makes 
evidence ‘scientific’, as they suggest, must be arbitrary. Even fingerprint matching, once the 
‘acme of forensic identification’ [34]  is now seen as probabilistic.  
 
Fenton and Neil [3] state that where there is probability, there is a natural propensity towards 
making fallacies – they recommend Bayes’ theorem as a means by which the risk from 
miscarriages of justice, due to fallacious reasoning, can be reduced through education in the 
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workings of Bayes’ theorem: ‘There is unanimity among exponents of BT, that a basic 
understanding of Bayesian probability is the key to avoiding probabilistic fallacies.’ 
 
There is, however, an alternative to express quantification of probabilistic evidence, which 
may provide an answer to those who are sceptical of using Bayes’ theorem in the courtroom. 
The Wigmorean method uses a similar causal model to illustrate the relationship between 
pieces of evidence in a complex case – but without quantifying the nodes - thereby 
circumventing the argument that some evidence is incapable of quantification. What the 
Wigmorean method DOES purportedly do, is help the fact finder formalise his reasoning 
process.  
 
5.3.2.1 The Wigmorean method: 
 
The Nuffield Foundation, in its third guide [35], describes the Wigmorean method as: 
‘...nothing more (or less) than an attempt to summarise the logic of inferential reasoning in 
graphical form, tailored to specific intellectual (analytic and decision) tasks. It is, in other 
words, a practical heuristic for litigation support designed specifically to assist those who 
need to formulate, evaluate or respond to arguments inferring factual conclusions from 
mixed masses of evidence to improve the quality of their intellectual output,’ and the key 
difference between the Wigmore method and Bayes’ theorem thus: ‘Bayes nets share 
superficial similarities with Wigmore charts, in that both employ graphical symbols to 
represent inferential relations in a visually vivid and useful form. However, there are 
important differences between them. Bayes nets are expressly probabilistic and can be used 
to calculate the strength of an inference as well as mapping logical relations between 
propositions.’ Therefore, while the Wigmorean method is still causal in nature, it does not 
seek to elucidate what the inherent probabilities represented by the causal nodes actually are. 
 
The Wigmorean method has been used for many years. Kadane and Schum [36] used the 
method to chart the evidence in the controversial Sacco and Vanzetti case, which to this day, 
has academics debating the flaws in the reasoning which may have led to a miscarriage of 
justice for the now-executed defendants. ‘Once produced, the charts resemble the Bayes' nets 
and directed acyclic graphs which have been  developed more recently by those interested in 
the analysis of evidence, a fact which suggests just how far ahead of his time Wigmore was. 
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Once the evidence has been charted the authors move beyond Wigmore by undertaking a 
probabilistic analysis of the evidence. Here their favoured tool is Bayes' theorem which is 
used to produce likelihood ratios for the evidence in the various inferential chains leading to 
a conclusion.’ As can be seen in Mike Redmayne’s above critique of Kadane’s use of the 
charts, he accepts that although the Wigmorean method is ostensibly used as means of 
charting causal links in evidential chains, it is not until Bayes’ theorem is used to formulate 
likelihood ratios does the model become ‘probabilistic’.  
5.3.2.2 The key difference between the Wigmorean method and Bayes’ theorem 
 
In fact, it could be said that the main difference between Wigmore and Bayes is that the lack 
of likelihood ratios means that the Wigmorean method carries no possibility of formalising or 
checking the accuracy of the pairs of hypotheses which make up a likelihood ratio. Both 
methods rely on the formulation of pairs of hypothesis, but only Bayes theorem provides a 
rigid framework for ensuring that the hypotheses pairings are accurate. If express values are 
not given, how can the fact finder be absolutely sure that the witness (whether expert or lay) 
and himself are ‘speaking the same language’? If an eyewitness states that he is ‘fairly 
certain’ that the defendant is the suspect, how can the fact finder compare this statement with 
other evidence from the same eyewitness that he is ‘almost sure’ that the co-defendant is not 
the suspect? Surely if percentage values were expressly given for each statement, the fact 
finder would be able to make a clearer calculation of the probative value of both pieces of 
evidence?  
 
The Nuffield Foundation HAS recognised this key limitation in the Wigmorean method: ‘The 
logic of inferential reasoning depicted in a chart is objective and must conform to the dictates 
of rationality, but the charting exercise as a whole is subjective in this important sense: the 
quality and utility of any given chart and keylist turns crucially, not only on the amount and 
quality of material information available for analysis, but also on the analytical skill and 
imagination of the person constructing the chart. Thus, it is said that a chart is “a map of the 
[charter’s] mind, rather than a map of the world”. Different people will construct different 
charts from the same facts and evidence; and no two charts (probably, not even two charts 
produced by the same analyst at different times) would be entirely alike in every nuance or 
finer detail.’ [35] This potential disparity between the witness’s and the fact finder’s view of 
the case could be catastrophic for the wronged defendant.  
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While the supporters of Wigmore over Bayes acknowledge the importance of formalising the 
evidential reasoning process, in order to reduce potential miscarriages of justice, the furthest 
they are prepared to go to adopt formalisation is to have the witness ‘write down’ his thought 
processes. The flaw in this approach, as far as the Bayes’ supporters are concerned, is that 
there is no more precise language than the language of numbers - which means that a model 
WITHOUT numbers may be even more imprecise than no model at all. 
 
This lack of quantitative reasoning – relying on words rather than numbers – is definitely 
problematic. As the Nuffield Foundation itself acknowledges: ‘One further significant 
limitation of the Wigmorean Chart Method is that it represents only the structure of 
inferential reasoning, and not the relative strength of particular inferential arguments or the 
probative value of particular pieces of evidence... The problem was that Wigmore’s symbols 
for “provisional”, “strong”, “doubtful” and “weak” probative force were simply reports of 
his own subjective impressions, with no standardised metric or internal logical structure.’ 
[35] This admission of the limitation of the Wigmorean method would likely lead an 
impartial reader into believing that the Nuffield Foundation is a strong advocate for 
quantitative reasoning for all evidence in legal trials.  
 
However, as will be shown here, nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, it may even 
be argued that since the Foundation is so influential in its rarefied position of ‘bridge’ 
between the legal and mathematical communities that it is highly likely that the appellate 
courts in decisions such as R v T have been influenced by the Foundation’s lack of support 
for Bayes’ theorem in reaching its conclusion to ban the use of the theorem by not only juries 
but also by experts in the privacy of their own laboratories. The Foundation has shown a keen 
interest in the use of the Wigmorean method: ‘We can all still learn from Wigmore if we are 
prepared to listen to what he has to teach... The extraordinary flexibility of Wigmorean 
method merits emphasis. Anybody concerned with fact finding, fact analysis, or formulating, 
challenging or evaluating arguments about facts can easily adapt the method to their 
particular requirements. All standpoints and professional roles can be catered for, within or 
outside the legal process.’ [35] While no-one could reasonably object to the recommendation 
of any visual aids to decision-making, including the Wigmorean method, there is an 
underlying problem that may potentially go unnoticed; that the method could be promoted in 
favour of other quantitative methods.  
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The first indication of the Foundation’s feelings towards the suitability of some types of 
evidence for quantitative evaluation can be seen here (this comes from the Foundation’s first 
practitioner guide): ‘It should be borne in mind, however, that although most evidence 
adduced in criminal proceedings does not come with a pre-assigned quantified numerical 
value attached (e.g. what is the probability that an eyewitness identification is accurate? Or 
the probability that a confession is true?), much forensic science evidence (including DNA 
profiling) is predicated on quantified probabilities and is consequently directly amenable to 
Bayesian calculations’ [16]. The statement that DNA is ‘directly amenable to Bayesian 
calculations’, arguably shows some support for an argument that DNA is somehow more 
reliable than eyewitness identifications and confessions.  
 
In fact, the Foundation seems to show an innate distrust for representing probabilities in a 
range, regardless of whether the evidence is DNA or another type, such as with confidence 
intervals, in any legal proceedings: ‘However, confidence intervals and related judgements of 
statistical significance are not appropriate measures of the value of evidence in criminal 
proceedings, for several important reasons. First, the selection of a confidence level is 
subjective and arbitrary. Why 95%? Why not 99% or 99.9%, or for that matter 75% or 70%? 
Levels of confidence which are conventionally regarded as satisfactory in social science 
research have no bearing on the level of confidence ideally required for epistemically 
warranted verdicts in criminal proceedings.’ The use of the words ‘epistemically warranted 
verdicts in criminal proceedings’ shows that the Foundation has no faith in things that they 
say cannot be ‘known’.  
 
By implication, the argument that confidence intervals are not compatible with knowledge 
shows the Foundation’s lack of confidence in probability theory as a whole. Confidence 
intervals are designed to capture knowledge, yet the Foundation seems to use this aim against 
the science. Fenton and Neil [3] argue that confidence intervals should not be the preferred 
method of reducing uncertainty anyway. Their approach is to use a full Bayesian approach 
based on subjective prior assumptions about the sample space. They argue that any other way 
of approaching uncertainty will lead to a ‘contrived way that confidence intervals are 
generated and interpreted’, due to their fundamental basis being founded on wrong and 
irrational assumptions concerning the uniformity of infinite sample spaces and sampling 
techniques within them. 
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The Foundation then argues that where something is not ‘known’, it would be best not to give 
quantitative values in case these values are misconstrued as ‘fact’: ‘There is the worry that 
impressionistic judgements of inferential strength, once concretised in charted symbols, may 
assume a solidity they scarcely warrant, becoming de facto fixed points in the chart 
impervious to reconsideration and potentially skewing further analysis. All in all, it seems 
best to keep the chart(s) and keylist free of impressionist judgements of the strength of 
inferences and the probative value of evidence.’ [35]. This is a barely-concealed attack on the 
use of probabilistic reasoning. Since ‘impressionistic judgments’ means ‘subjective 
probability’, then this passage is clearly saying that they should not be used in court, for fear 
that a juror may attach too much weight to the value and not feel that the weight is subject to 
cross-examination. This principle must be at the very heart of the Court of Appeal’s 
reasoning in R v T. 
 
Now that it has been shown that there are distinct similarities between the legal community’s 
and the Foundation’s negative views on the use of subjective probabilities in court, there can 
be also seen a certain support, from the Foundation, of the courts’ decisions in cases such as 
R v Doheny & Adams and R v T to not only ban probability theorem from legal proceedings, 
but to ensure that it never returns. One method of ensuring this is entrenching a principle of 
non-use of mathematical reasoning which will prove hard to dislodge. The Foundation 
explain the problem faced by the court in Doheny & Adams: ‘In the leading case of Adams 
(Denis), the Court of Appeal, twice, went out of its way to condemn any attempt to encourage 
jurors to employ formal mathematical models when evaluating evidence presented at trial. 
This is entirely consistent with orthodox legal theory stipulating that jurors should arrive at 
their verdicts using their ordinary common sense reasoning: it is precisely their ordinary 
common sense, untainted by specialist knowledge, which qualifies jurors as “expert” 
decision-makers on the common law model... A growing number of forensic scientists is 
already utilising Bayes nets as a way of understanding the meaning of the evidence for 
themselves, typically by modelling alternative possibilities consistent with analytical results, 
so that they can then pass on this better understanding to the police, prosecutors or defence 
lawyers instructing them... None of this implies that jurors in criminal trials need to know the 
first thing about Bayes nets. The Adams principle is entirely unaffected.’ The problem here is 
that there is no such thing as an ‘Adams principle’.  
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The case of Adams was heard in 1998 – and the case was presented with many errors in a 
highly complex way. There have been massive strides in advancing the science and creation 
of software to reduce complexity – this is the luddism which Roberts has said shouldn’t exist: 
‘The point is to use litigation-support tools effectively, being mindful of their limitations, 
rather than to discard a tool simply because it has limitations – a luddite strategy which 
would result in throwing much more than Bayes Theorem into the fire.’ [35] The major 
problem here is that mathematical reasoning is somehow divorced from common sense – 
while mathematical reasoning may not be ‘common’, it cannot be said that it is not 
correlative with common sense.  
 
As the Foundation reiterate: ‘Fact-finding in criminal adjudication is, generally speaking, 
accomplished by ordinary common sense reasoning rather than through the application of 
mathematical formulae, as the Court of Appeal emphatically reiterated in Adams’. [16] It is 
this two-fold support for the court’s decision which makes it almost impossible for future 
mathematicians to make a case for BT: Firstly, that it is not common sense; and secondly that 
since it has been promoted badly in the past, that it should not be used in the future. Further, 
the Foundation sees no merit in trying to resolve these issues, by educating jurors in the use 
of probability theory: ‘It would in theory be possible to teach jurors to calculate likelihood 
ratios in the same way that many forensic scientists currently do. This would, of course, be a 
major departure from traditional trial practice, and the Court of Appeal strongly deprecated 
any developments in this direction in R v Adams where the defence had attempted to instruct 
the jury in the use of Bayes’ Theorem: 
[This indented passage is taken from the R v Adams judgment] “[W]e regard the 
reliance on evidence of this kind… as a recipe for confusion, misunderstanding 
and misjudgement, possibly even among counsel, but very probably among judges 
and, as we conclude, almost certainly among jurors. It would seem to us that this 
was a case properly approached by the jury along conventional lines…. We do 
not consider that [juries] will be assisted in their task by reference to a very 
complex approach which they are unlikely to understand fully and even more 
unlikely to apply accurately, which we judge to be likely to confuse them and 
distract them from their consideration of the real questions on which they should 
seek to reach a unanimous conclusion. We are very clearly of opinion that in 
cases such as this, lacking special features absent here, expert evidence should 
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not be admitted to induce juries to attach mathematical values to probabilities 
arising from non-scientific evidence adduced at the trial.”’ 
The Nuffield Foundation continues: ‘Those of a Bayesian disposition might be tempted to 
interpret these remarks as a victory for the dark forces of ignorance over the light of science. 
This would be hasty and excessively pessimistic conclusion. Juries are empanelled in order to 
inject common sense reasoning into criminal adjudication. But this does not mean that 
criminal trials are a forensic free-for-all. Both the content of the information presented to 
juries, and the manner of its presentation, are carefully regulated by the law of criminal 
evidence and procedure. To this extent, the jury’s common sense reasoning is constrained 
and channelled in conformity with the rule of law.’ [19] This ‘support’ for the Court of 
Appeal’s judgment and pre-emptive strike on those who seek to disagree with it, is a clear 
statement of intent that BT should never be introduced back into the trial process.  
 
The last sentence in this passage is very telling, and an extremely strong statement: ‘...the 
jury’s common sense reasoning is constrained and channelled in conformity with the rule of 
law.’ This implies that the jury’s use of BT would break the moral foundations of the legal 
system. 
 
This argument that most types of evidence should not be quantitatively valued could not be 
more clearly put by the Foundation than in the following statement: ‘Judgements of probative 
value are fundamentally qualitative and only incidentally or secondarily quantitative. The 
testimony of a single independent and reliable eyewitness will often defeat five dodgy alibi 
statements; just as one compelling argument trumps fifty flimsy make-weights. The 
aggregated assessments of probative value required to determine whether a normative 
standard of evidential sufficiency has been satisfied, e.g. whether the prosecution has proved 
its case “beyond reasonable doubt” (or so that the fact-finder is “sure” of the accused’s 
guilt), must by extension be qualitative at their core.’ [35] What is being stated here is that 
even if DNA is expressly quantitative, that even that type of evidence will never be enough to 
convict a defendant.  
 
This is precisely Tribe’s point made in 1971, and is essentially the Foundation’s position 
today, which means that there is no pro-probabilistic reasoning academic viewpoint in the last 
half-century which has interfered with this key principle. 
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In fact, the Crown Court Bench Book ‘Directing the Jury’ [37] advises that in complex cases 
a written ‘Route (or Steps) to Verdict’, which are a ‘logical series of questions couched in 
words which address the essential legal issues’, including a ‘summary of evidence’,  should 
be provided by the trial judge to the jury, based on the following recommendation: ‘The judge 
is not obliged to repeat every byway taken by the evidence, but is entitled to assess what is 
important and what is peripheral’. The book provides an example of summing-up for a 
sample of DNA evidence: ‘Mr B is able to say that the chance of finding another match with 
a person in the UK population unrelated to the defendant is 1 in 1 billion. The population of 
the UK is about 60 millions. It is for you to decide whether in the circumstances of this case 
that effectively excludes anyone else’. The problem here is that the judge is effectively and 
inadvertently combining two pieces of evidence: (i) the DNA sample; and (ii) the reference 
class (or ‘location evidence’) that the defendant belongs to – the population of the UK – 
thereby advising the jury that the pieces of evidence have a bearing on each other. While this 
may or may not be true, there is no advice given as to HOW the evidence may be combined. 
In Chapter 6 of this thesis, it is demonstrated by Bayes’ theorem that the traditional method 
of combining trace evidence with location evidence, adopted in cases such as R v Doheny & 
Adams [1], is wrong, yet the Bench Book provides no means of allowing the jury to 
autonomously formulate the correct means of combining evidence, thereby entrenching the 
error. The Route to Verdict in its unquantified form, and the Wigmorean method, are 
therefore similar in approach and equally flawed. 
 
While the Foundation seems prima facie to support the use of BT to address some of the 
limitations of the Wigmorean method, with the following statement: ‘Bayesian Networks 
(often shortened to “Bayes nets”) are similar to Wigmore charts, in that they attempt to 
model inferential reasoning (including compound or catenated inferences – inferences upon 
inferences) through formal models represented graphically by a simple collection of symbols. 
The major difference is that Bayes nets calculate quantified probabilities for alternative 
propositions, that is to say, they purport to measure probabilistically the probative value of 
evidence or the strength of evidential support for particular arguments or entire legal cases. 
Bayes nets therefore answer directly to a significant limitation of Wigmorean method, i.e. the 
inability of Wigmore charts to provide much if any guidance on quantitative issues of weight, 
probative value or degrees of inferential strength needed to satisfy legal burdens of proof’ 
[35]. The problem is that because the Foundation has already stated that evidence should not 
be evaluated quantitatively, that this limitation on the Wigmorean method is immaterial. In 
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other words, while BT can potentially remedy the defect in the Wigmorean method, it cannot 
be used, which means that the probability of ever having probabilistic reasoning introduced 
into the legal trial system must be low. 
 
It is perhaps now easy to see how some key members of the legal community have been 
reluctant to introduce probabilistic reasoning into the trial process. At the outset, a number of 
probabilistic reasoning mistakes (in evaluation AND presentation of evidence), in historic 
cases gestated the notion that law and probability are incompatible.  
 
There were careful arguments for and against the introduction of a model which may redress 
some of these issues, but the crux of the problem, is that the Nuffield Foundation (ostensibly 
set up to decrease the divide between supporters and naysayers of probabilistic reasoning in 
court by providing simple, transparent information amenable to both legal and mathematical 
communities), has effectively supported the naysayers. This has happened in a logical 
process: 
 
1. By suggesting that ‘some types’ of evidence are amenable to quantitative analysis. 
 
2. By advocating the Wigmorean method of non-quantitative evidence analysis. 
 
3. By inventing the ‘Adams Principle’; this seeks to entrench the idea that BT should never 
be used by juries. 
 
4. That while acknowledging that BT is a useful tool in presenting some evidence, such as 
DNA, it should not be used for other types. 
 
5. That since the court in R v T has delineated between these two types of evidence, that this 
effectively gives rise to the invention of the ‘R v T Principle’; another example of an attempt 
to entrench an idea that BT should not be used even as a means of presenting the probative 
value of evidence to juries. 
 
6. By not seeking to educate juries or legal practitioners in the operation of BT; that this 
situation can never change unless outside help is found. 
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7. By not acknowledging that there have been many advances in science since the case of 
Adams; that the legal community would unlikely trust that the mistakes made in 1998 would 
not happen again. 
 
In short, the court judgements and the findings of the Nuffield Foundation, an organisation 
trusted by the legal community, has effectively given weight to the argument that 
probabilistic reasoning should not be introduced at any stage of the legal trial process, unless 
it is used by expert witnesses to present the probative value of DNA and similar types of 
‘reliable evidence’. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this is precisely the position in the British 
criminal justice system today. 
 
Amazingly, The Nuffield Foundation [35] still believes that there is a fundamental difference 
between the uncertainty in an event that has not happened yet and one that already has: 
‘Causation is another recurrent area of confusion. When interpreting Bayes nets, it is 
tempting and quite natural to think of one node exerting a causal influence on another, or 
others, at the end of the arc. However, the relationships represented by Bayes nets are 
explicitly characterised as probabilistic rather than causal relationships. Some probabilistic 
relationships are causal, but most are not. For example, the probability of its being 25 
degrees Celsius at the weekend is causally related to the probability that I will get sunburnt 
when I go to the beach on Saturday. However, the probability that the perpetrator has blond 
hair has no causal relation whatsoever with the probability that Adam, who has blond hair, is 
the perpetrator. The vast majority of probabilistic relationships depicted by Bayes nets are of 
the second, non-causal, Adam’s blond hair variety, rather than variants of the first, causal, 
my sunburn kind.’ This kind of argument might lead to an assumption that Bayesian 
probabilistic reasoning has no place in criminal trials, since a trial concerns ‘non-causal’ 
relationships between the event and the defendant. Of course this stance is simply yet another 
way of saying that some things in life are objectively certain and some are not. Fenton and 
Neil [3] dispute this argument on the basis that: ‘Uncertainty is the same whether the events 
have happened or not and whether they are unknown or not’. This must be the correct view. 
  
5.3.3 (iii) That some evidence cannot be mathematically valued and therefore be 
inserted into the model, due to the existence of ‘soft variables’: 
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This argument rests not on the premise that evidence should be presented probabilistically, 
but whether it possibly can, as Allen [28] argues: ‘Even the simplistic version of Bayes' 
theorem reproduced above requires the articulation of a likelihood ratio. In some cases 
involving relative frequencies or obvious situations, this may plausibly be formed, but many 
cases will not involve either relative frequencies or obvious situations.’ The capability of 
evidence to be presented probabilistically is a controversial subject because it cuts right to the 
core of the age-old issue of whether probability is objective or subjective in nature.  
 
If probability is thought to be subjective, there would not be a database in the world big 
enough to convince the subjectivists that the information contained therein is accurate, since 
many errors can have crept in during collation, as Aitken and Taroni [38] recognise: ‘In some 
circumstances a negative (non-match) result may be reported where the two samples have a 
common source, and hence should provide a positive (match) result. This is a ‘false negative’: 
the result reported is negative, but that result is false. A ‘false positive’ report, conversely, 
occurs when a positive (match) result is reported, when the two samples in reality have 
different sources and therefore should have been reported as a non-match. False negative and 
false positive reports can arise for a host of reasons (the details of which need not concern us 
here) including contamination of samples, laboratory testing error and misinterpretation of 
test results.’ The problem with subjective probability is that it is ultimately uncertain between 
individuals. Since a ‘leap of faith’ is required for one person to believe that something is 
probabilistically so, this faith is unlikely to transmit well between individuals – in other 
words, what one may trust with his own eyes, the other does not necessarily trust unless he 
witnesses the same event.  
 
However, if probability is thought to be objective, it asserts what a reasonable person would 
believe to be true. Objectivists rely on databases of information, which are taken to be reliable 
as the ‘best’ means of judging the truth of a proposition. The problem with objective 
probability is that it relies heavily on information which has been empirically tested, collated 
and stored, which means that information which has not been rigorously subjected to this 
treatment cannot become part of the database. It is this type of information, which has not 
been tested, which are called ‘soft variables’ – or as Tribe puts it: ‘...if you cannot count it, it 
does not exist’. The crux of the problem, therefore, is: ‘Do soft variables exist?’ 
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The Court of Appeal in the case of R v T believes that only DNA and other types of evidence 
said to derive from a ‘firm statistical base’ are capable of probabilistic modelling; which 
means that it believes that DNA is empirically sound. Evidence such as footwear marks is not 
empirically sound because there is not a recognised national footwear mark database. There 
are, however, a number of experts who have experience in dealing with footwear mark 
evidence, but these people’s professional views are not backed up by objectively sound 
databases, which means that their opinions are simply that; opinions.  
 
These opinions should not be allowed to be transposed into numerically quantified values for 
fear that these values become ‘too solid’, as the Nuffield Foundation puts it: ‘There is the 
worry that impressionistic judgements of inferential strength, once concretised in charted 
symbols, may assume a solidity they scarcely warrant, becoming de facto fixed points in the 
chart impervious to reconsideration and potentially skewing further analysis.’ Whether or not 
this ‘worry’ has any basis in truth, the fact remains that there is an obvious correlation 
between the Nuffield Foundation’s reasoning and the Court of Appeal’s views. In R v T the 
evidence in question was footwear marks, and the issue at trial was that of the identification 
of the murder suspect.  
 
In court, Mr Ryder, the prosecution expert, explained that he used BT to combine the four 
analysis points of the footwear mark found at the crime scene and arrived at his conclusion. 
His analysis of the sole pattern (‘P’) was supported by the FSS database comprising 0.00006 
of all shoes sold in the year. Since the shoe size (‘C’) was judged to be 11, the Shoe and 
Allied Trade Research Association provided information which stated that size 11 shoes 
occur in 3% of the population. For wear (‘W’), Mr Ryder concluded that half of the shoes 
could be discounted, and for damage (‘D’), he concluded that almost no further shoes could 
be discounted which had not already been. After combining the figures P(5) x C(10) x W(2) x 
D(<1), he arrived at an overall likelihood ratio of ~100. He did not submit his methodology in 
his report to the court.  
 
On cross-examination, Mr Ryder admitted that the defence lawyers had provided him with 
some information with which to calculate P. ‘It is important to appreciate that the data on 
footwear distribution and use is quite unlike DNA. A person’s DNA does not change and a 
solid statistical base has been developed which enable accurate figures to be produce...It is 
quite clear therefore that outside the field of DNA (and possibly other areas where there is a 
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firm statistical base), this court has made it clear that Bayes theorem and likelihood ratios 
should not be used.’ As can be seen from this judgment, DNA has been elevated, through 
international recognition of its development as a ‘certain’ science, above that of more 
‘impressionistic’ types of evidence. While Jackson et al [39] argue that ‘... all probabilities 
are subjective and based on a combination of personal experience and the available data’, 
one of the factors which could be viewed as repugnant to the court is that Mr Ryder had used 
defence information to calculate P.  
 
This means that not only did the footwear mark evidence values not come from an empirical 
source, it did not derive from the expert’s own knowledge and experience either. Of course, it 
is a valid argument to suppose that asking other individuals opinions adds to the stock of 
communal knowledge and experience, but this information was arguably no more than casual 
conjecture – after all, what motivation could there possibly have been for the defence to have 
provided either (a) accurate values; or (b) values which were not deliberately skewed against 
the prosecution case?  
 
The Nuffield Foundation [16] are even sceptical of empirically gathered information in 
databases, whatever the type of evidence: ‘It must be stressed, however, that statistical 
inferences are ultimately only as good as their underlying data, which in turn depends upon 
(1) the appropriateness of the research design (including sampling methodology) and (2) the 
integrity of the processes and procedures employed in data collection.’ This scepticism is 
easily transmutable into blanket distrust for probabilistic reasoning in court, by a legal 
community who look to the mathematical community for guidance in such matters: ‘Experts 
in particular fields may be willing and able to advise on the relative strengths and 
weaknesses of particular reference samples, or may operate with their own assumptions. 
Ultimately, however, it is for the legal system to determine whether such data adequately 
support particular inferences for the purposes of criminal adjudication.’ By opening the door 
to the potential problem in this way, not offering a solution, and then leaving it to a non-
expert community to formulate their own opinion as to which evidence is appropriate for 
modelling, it is no wonder that the non-expert courts would feel safer rejecting the entire 
science rather than entertaining any future possibility of finding a middle ground. 
 
Is not all knowledge and experience simply based on opinion, if not derived from firsthand 
knowledge of an event? After all, even a ‘firm statistical database’ is only as firm as the 
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opinion of the person creating it. Tillers and Gottfried [31] are very forthright on the 
argument that a database cannot exist which is large enough to eradicate all uncertainty: ‘The 
notion that soft variables cannot be quantified is a myth. For example, I can and do make 
uncertain judgements about how my neighbour will feel next time I see her—and, if asked, I 
can and will tell you what I think are the chances that I am right. There are, of course, more 
systematic critiques of the notion of the unquantifiability of soft variables, but it is not useful 
or possible to review them here. Suffice it to say that there is an entire family of approaches 
to probability—they can be called personal or subjective probability—that rest on the 
assumption that ALL (or almost all) probability judgements are expressions of personal and 
subjective probability estimates. Proponents of this sort of interpretation of the probability 
calculus maintain (roughly) that there are no ‘objective’ probability estimates or ‘hard’ 
variables that disclose their relevant statistical probabilistic properties entirely without the 
corrosive intervention of subjective human judgement.’ This is clear denial of the existence of 
hard or soft variables, yet the Nuffield Foundation [16] seem intent on taking the opposite 
view: ‘‘Relevant “data” are of different types. Towards the harder end of the spectrum, 
experts may be able to draw on extensive surveys, databases or experimentation. At the softer 
end of the spectrum, the only available relevant data may be the expert’s personal 
experiences and memories of previous casework... Irrespective of their quality and status, 
data enables the expert to assign a likelihood (or probability) for particular findings that is 
necessarily personal and subjective, even in relation to ostensibly “hard” data.’ In effect, the 
Foundation’s argument can be summarised shortly; that subjective probability derives from a 
logical and legitimate school of thought, but it is not necessarily appropriate for use in legal 
trials. This is obviously a complete contradiction, and easily misinterpreted by the legal 
community.  
 
In fact, Redmayne et al [40] support some aspects of the Court of Appeal’s decision in R v T - 
namely that the calculations used should have been made explicit - even if they reject the 
court’s main conclusions: ‘There is, in fact, much to welcome in the Court of Appeal's 
judgment in R. v T, starting with the court's commendable determination to subject the 
quality of expert evidence adduced in criminal litigation to searching scrutiny.’ Of course, 
this is a noble stance, since efficiency and transparency in the criminal trial process is key to 
a just system; but the underlying problem is that of whether this ‘searching scrutiny’ would 
uncover any less quality in the evidence of an expert using skill and experience, than one 
relying on a database that he had no control over creating? Further, even if he did create the 
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database, what level of scrutiny could there possibly be which would ever be enough to create 
certainty?  
 
Even if many different individuals supported the empirical soundness of a database, this does 
not mean that the information contained therein is not subject to individual interpretation of 
results. Friedman [26] argues that ‘Different fact-finders may rationally make different 
probability assessments if for no other reason than that they approach a problem with 
different bases of information from the outside world. Thus, whatever the value of Bayesian 
methods as opposed to classical statistical methods in scientific inquiry, in litigation I believe 
that a subjectivist approach to probability is the only one that can offer any hope of assisting 
in the analysis of juridical proof.’ Of course, one answer is to say that if even DNA is 
uncertain due to uncertainty of the so-called ‘firm database’, then maybe probabilistic 
modelling should not be used for even THAT type of evidence.  
 
The Nuffield Foundation [19] lists the various potential weaknesses in DNA profiling: ‘The 
probative value of a DNA profile, quite irrespective of its notional weight, hinges crucially on 
a series of prosaic assumptions, including the following: (i) genetic material from which a 
DNA profile could be generated remained at the crime scene, without irremediable 
degradation or contamination; (ii) the physical sample was collected properly at the crime 
scene (or from the suspect, victim, or whatever); (iii) the sample was successfully transported 
to the laboratory without interference or contamination; (iv) at the laboratory the sample 
was analysed using appropriately calibrated and properly functioning machinery, in 
accordance with appropriate scientific protocols; (v) the results of the tests were accurately 
observed and recorded; and (vi) at no stage during laboratory testing procedures did the 
sample become contaminated with other genetic material, wrongly labelled, switched with 
other samples, etc.’ However, simply because there are weaknesses in a science, this does not 
mean that the baby should be thrown out with the bathwater. Fenton et al [11] propose that 
the only way to deal with uncertainty is not to ignore it, but to model it. 
 
The ‘event tree’ which pertains to the following discussion can be found in Chapter 2: ‘In 
order to demonstrate how a simple match evidence case quickly scales to become too 
complicated for intuitive comprehension, we present an analysis of a basic case of match 
evidence that includes negative and positive testing errors. When we allow for the possibility 
of testing errors, the following relevant information must be considered: 
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- Prosecution hypothesis (H1): “The defendant is the source”  
- Defence hypothesis (not H1): “The defendant is not the source”  
- Evidence E1: “The source profile is tested to be of type X”  (note: we can no 
longer assume the source profile actually is type X) 
- Evidence E2: ”The defendant profile is tested to be of type X (note: we can no 
longer assume the defendant profile actually is type X) 
 
Because of the probability of false positives we cannot assume from the above evidence that 
either the source or the defendant have type X. Instead these assertions are also unknown 
hypotheses: 
 
- Source type hypothesis (H2): “The source profile really is type X” (true or false) 
- Defendant type hypothesis (H3): “The defendant profile really is type X” (true 
or false) 
 
What we have, therefore, is a problem involving five ‘variables’ H1, H2, H3, E1, E2 which 
can all be true or false (in order to do the necessary Bayesian reasoning). But this means 
there are 32 different scenarios representing the different possible true/false combinations 
(although some are and some are not observed, such as the evidence being false, and some 
are logically ‘impossible’, such as the defendant is the source and the source is type X while 
the defendant is not type X). 
 
NB. Scenarios for the prosecution likelihood include all scenarios that stem from 
the branch H1=true, which assumes the prosecution hypothesis (defendant is the 
source): 
 
- Scenario 1 (this is the ‘normal’ prosecution scenario) in which H1, H2, H3, E1 
and E2 are all true.  
- Scenario 2 (this is an often ignored prosecution scenario) in which H1 is true 
(the defendant is the source) but the defendant is not actually type X. Both the test 
of the defendant and source, however, incorrectly result in an X.  
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NB. Scenarios for the defence likelihood include all scenarios that stem from the 
branch H1=false, which assumes the defence hypothesis (defendant is not the 
source): 
 
- Scenario 3 (this is the ‘normal’ defence scenario) in which the tests are correct 
but the match is coincidental.  
- Scenario 4 this is the defence scenario in which the defendant is incorrectly 
tested to be type X.  
- Scenario 5 this is the defence scenario in which the source is incorrectly tested 
as type X.  
- Scenario 6 this is an often ignored defence scenario in which both the source 
and defendant are wrongly tested to be X.’ 
 
With Fenton et al’s approach, the uncertainty inherent in even DNA testing – currently 
thought of by the Court of Appeal as a sufficiently ‘certain’ science (presumably meaning 
that it is not subject to scrutiny such as is proposed here) – is brought to the attention of the 
fact finder.  
 
The problem with the Court of Appeal’s judgment in R v Adams and R v T is that this scrutiny 
will never be afforded DNA evidence, since Bayes’ theorem has been barred from use by 
juries. This is, as Redmayne et al [40] observes: ‘hardly in keeping with the Court of Appeals 
ringing endorsement of transparency.’ 
 
To sum up; Fenton et al’s argument that even DNA or similar types of ‘database’ evidence 
should be subjected to Bayesian evaluation, due to uncertainty inherent in ‘false positive’ 
matches, means that soft variables cannot exist. If they did, this would mean that the 
corollary, ‘hard variables’, also exist – which as can be seen here, cannot be true.  
 
Therefore, the only logical answer is that all evidence carries uncertainty, but this uncertainty 
must be modelled in order that the fact finder is made aware of the weaknesses in presented 
evidence, and can deal with these weaknesses either by acknowledging them and reconciling 
personal beliefs with them, or by rejecting the witnesses’ accounts of his/her uncertainty. In 
this way, the fact finder’s role in the legal trial is preserved. 
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5.3.4 (iv) That no probability value can ever be reconciled with ‘Beyond all reasonable 
doubt (BARD)’: 
 
The criminal justice standard of proof, set universally at ‘beyond all reasonable doubt’ 
(BARD) acknowledges that the trial system is inherently uncertain, as Laudan [41] states: 
‘Although the juror must be ‘fully convinced’ of guilt, the standard is not set at 100% - a 
level of proof which no-one believes is available’. Any system which relies on proving a 
hypothesis through evidence is uncertain, but in the criminal justice system this uncertainty is 
magnified due to the fact finder never being allowed to be a witness to any part of the event 
under scrutiny – this is why jurors are asked pre-trial what they know of the case at hand, in 
order that they must be precluded for having been tainted by any firsthand knowledge.  
 
BARD acknowledges that allowing a small amount of uncertainty into the criminal trial 
evidence will not discourage a fact finder from returning a rightful guilty verdict; as the 
Nuffield Foundation [19] recognises: ‘There is no such thing as absolute, complete, 
unimpeachable and non-revisable certainty in the empirical world. Human decision-making, 
in other words, occurs under conditions of unavoidable uncertainty. This is clearly reflected 
in orthodox conceptions of the criminal standard of proof as ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, not 
beyond all doubt, or every conceivable doubt, etc.’ The value of ‘reasonableness’ is, in its 
very nature, unquantifiable. However, the problem is that any model which returns a value 
for guilt at below ‘1’, is expressly stating that the BARD standard has not been reached, 
which means that theoretically the model carries an inherent flaw.  
 
Laudan explains that society will not accept any ‘explicit’ admission that the criminal justice 
system is flawed in this way: ‘To give a probability figure for the threshold would devalue 
the standard. Any specification of a degree of belief necessary for a finding of guilt (such as 
95% confidence) involves an explicit admission that wrongful convictions will inevitably 
occur. A confidence of 95% signifies that one in twenty innocent defendants will be wrongly 
convicted. Any identification of a threshold would explicitly acknowledge that the system 
officially condones a certain fraction of wrongful convictions, which would supposedly 
threaten the ordinary person’s faith in the criminal justice system.’ Friedman [26] explains 
that society’s unwillingness to accept explicit flaws stems from fundamental principles of 
‘utility’: ‘Blackstone's [c.1760] injunction that it is better to let 10 guilty persons go free than 
to convict one innocent person may well be a substantial understatement. This utility 
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assessment leads to the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard in criminal cases.’ Utility is 
based on pragmatism, or in other words ‘making the best of the situation’.  
 
Laudan explains that there is implicitly a balancing act performed to ensure that flaws in the 
system are kept to a bare minimum: ‘Every increase in the standard of proof makes it harder 
to convict the truly guilty. Unless the overwhelming majority of those who come to trial are 
genuinely innocent, raising the standard will make false convictions more likely than they 
would otherwise be. A very high standard is bad news in terms of a crime deterrent or 
retribution for wronged parties. Once we have settled on a socially acceptable ratio of true 
acquittals to false convictions, we know what we are looking for in a standard of proof. A 
standard set at 91% would ensure ten true acquittals for every false conviction....If the 
standard is set at 90%, the question to a juror would be: ‘is your assessment of the likelihood 
of the Defendant’s guilt higher than 90%? If so you must convict.’ Instead of specifying that 
the juror’s level of confidence in guilt should depend on whether a robust proof has been 
offered, the criminal law makes the standard parasitic on the juror’s level of confidence in 
the Defendant’s guilt. We have proof, so long as jurors are strongly persuaded of the guilt of 
the accused. This gets things precisely backwards. This would be like saying to a 
mathematician that they have proof of a theorem if they are convinced the theorem is true; or 
to an epidemiologist that they have proof of a causal link between A and B if they are 
convinced such a link exists.’ This balancing exercise between acquitting a guilty person and 
convicting an innocent one was addressed by Tribe in 1971 in criticising the Kaplan/Cullison 
‘Jury Decision Model’ as a possible formulaic alternative to the current ‘jury guessing’ 
method of deciding guilt.  
 
Friedman explains that a utility model, such as that proposed by Kaplan and Cullison, would 
help improve transparency in the decision-making process: ‘Suppose for simplicity that we 
are limited to two options - finding for the plaintiff or finding for the defence. Then, at least 
as a first approximation, it seems that a wise guide to decision is to choose the option that 
has the greater expected utility. Expected utility will depend on the relative probabilities that 
the facts support the plaintiff and the defence and on the utilities attached to each possible 
decision given each possible actual state of affairs.’ In this way, when a value lower than 1 is 
provided by the model, it will reflect the true decision-making process of the fact finder. It is 
this aid to transparency which makes the utility model so attractive, because no longer can it 
be said that uncertainty is unquantifiable.  
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The only difference between a utility model and a jury-guess decision is that this uncertainty 
is elucidated. This surely must be in line with the legal community’s desire to encourage 
transparency in every stage of the justice process. The only issue now is ‘where below ‘1’ 
should the line be drawn’? 
 
Edwards [12] asserts: ‘I suggest that posterior odds of 100:1 might be an appropriate, though 
demanding, operationalisation of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt... The adoption of, say, 100:1 
posterior odds cut-off would not result in one in a hundred convicts actually being innocent. 
Prosecuted cases will rarely fall at the cut-off; most will be beyond it. Cases that, in the 
prosecution’s prior assessment, will not reach the cut-off presumably would not be 
prosecuted. We cannot know exactly how many innocent convicts such a definition would 
lead to, but we can be sure that it would be very much less than 1 in a 100. A change in the 
cut-off from 100:1 to 1000:1 would make a difference only in cases for which the posterior 
odds fall in that range – presumably a very small subset of the total set of cases.’ Of course, 
the problem with this approach is that the ‘very small subset of cases’ suggested by Edwards 
is arbitrary and still will not sit well with those who consider a repugnant ‘trial by 
mathematics’ a natural progression from setting objective posterior cut-offs.  
 
However, not every member of the legal community is resolutely against broaching the issue 
of an objective posterior limit. Tillers and Gottfried [31] explain that in the U.S., Judge 
Weinstein has advocated the use of an objective posterior to reduce arbitrariness in legal 
decision-making: ‘As Weinstein suggested in Copeland III, one possible powerful argument 
for some sort of numerical quantification is the importance of the uniformity of legal 
standards. Weinstein correctly suggested that differential legal standards are particularly 
disturbing when they appear in the criminal justice system. If numerical quantification of the 
burden of persuasion in criminal trials can reduce differences in the operational meaning of 
the standard of persuasion in criminal trials, a powerful argument in favour of numerical 
quantification is at hand.’ Franklin [42], in also discussing Judge Weinstein’s views, does not 
advocate a positive number, but argues that any decision falling BELOW a particular 
threshold should not return a verdict of guilt: ‘An appropriate numerical standard to choose 
as an absolute minimum follows from Judge Weinstein’s suggestion in ‘Copeland III’ (United 
States v. Copeland, 369 F. Supp. 2d (E.D.N.Y. 2005) of 20% for a ‘reasonable probability’, 
and hence of 80% for its inverse or complement ‘clear, unequivocal and convincing’ 
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evidence. Since proof beyond reasonable doubt is well above clear, unequivocal and 
convincing evidence, it follows that proof beyond reasonable doubt means ‘well above a 
probability of 0.8’. Any suggestion from a jury that 0.8 or less is adequate can be ruled out, 
while the qualification ‘well above’ will avoid any suggestions that something just above 0.8 
is in fact adequate, and will not obstruct any later attempts to quantify the standard more 
exactly.’ What is interesting here is that Franklin acknowledges that the debate over 
posteriors must start somewhere. By suggesting a lower ‘safe’ threshold, the debate can move 
beyond a polarised ‘yes’/’no’ argument on introducing an objective cut-off, to a more 
nuanced debate about exactly where in the scale the cut-off should lie.  
 
What cannot be denied is that juries often struggle with the concept of BARD, if left alone to 
value it. Judges in the UK sometimes refer to the standard as a ‘moral certainty’, which is 
arguably no more helpful than the current standard. Tillers and Gottfried [31] argue that 
attempts are routinely made to explain the criminal standard of proof and provide some sort 
of framework for establishing the value of reasonable doubt: ‘Prosecutors and judges often 
use jigsaw puzzle analogies to explain the assessment of circumstantial evidence, which the 
appellate courts do not usually frown upon, as long as the analogy does not refer to specific 
numbers of missing pieces. In one of those cases, the trial judges instructed the jury to 
compare circumstantial proof beyond a reasonable doubt to a ‘1000 piece puzzle with sixty 
pieces missing’. This issue of fact finders being given an objective cut-off, rather than they 
themselves formulating their own, seems to be at the very centre of the argument against a 
utility model.  
 
The answer is to accept that the cut-off is subjective to each and every fact finder, and to 
allow them the opportunity to use the model to simply aid them in deciding whether their 
own posterior arrived at correlates with their views on the guilt of the defendant. Laudan 
explains that this subjectivity of BARD cannot be denied: ‘A study by Cohen and Christensen 
in 1970 interviewed English judges and jurors about the level of probability that should be 
required for conviction in a criminal trial. Among judges, a third located it between 0.7 and 
0.9, with almost all of the rest putting it above 0.9. Among jurors, 26% were willing to 
convict on probabilities lower than 0.7, and a 54% though that above 0.9 should be required 
for conviction. The idea that the standard of proof is set at such different points on the scale 
by judges and jurors should be a grave worry.’ Redmayne [18] agrees: ‘The approach of 
judges in the United Kingdom to instructions on the meaning of beyond reasonable doubt 
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now appears to be to avoid attempts to “define that which is almost impossible to define”. 
Academics, though, have not felt so daunted by the criminal standard. Indeed, at least one 
attempt has been made to obtain a numerical expression of beyond reasonable doubt. 
However, such attempts ignore the fact that reasonable doubt is an inscrutable, subjective 
standard which exists largely within the mind of the fact-finder in a particular case.’ 
 
The Crown Court Bench Book ‘Directing the Jury’ [37] advises judges that the standard of 
proof in criminal cases is as follows: ‘Standard of Proof: The prosecution proves its case if 
the jury, having considered all the evidence relevant to the charge they are considering, are 
sure that the defendant is guilty…  Note: Being sure is the same as entertaining no 
reasonable doubt’. Since ‘sure’ means ‘no reasonable doubt’, is this a variation on ‘beyond 
all reasonable doubt’, and, if so, what is the difference? 
 
Archbold Criminal Pleading Evidence and Practice [43] states that there is no difference 
between the ‘sure’ test and BARD test; at paragraph 4-444: ‘…before the jury can convict 
they must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt (or be sure) of the defendant’s guilt’; but in 
R v Summers [44], Lord Goddard C.J. merely stated that it was better to tell the jury that 
before they convict they must be ‘satisfied so that they are sure’ of the guilt of the accused, 
on the basis that some judges had found ‘difficulty in explaining what was meant by 
“reasonable doubt”’. 
 
In R v Bracewell [45], the trial judge summed-up the expert witness, Dr Green’s, evidence 
thus: ‘You will remember ladies and gentlemen that your duty is not to judge scientifically or 
with scientific certainty. You judge so that as sensible people you feel sure and even say that 
what might not satisfy Dr. Green as a scientific certainty, might with propriety, satisfy you so 
that you felt sure. Do not be misled. There is no such thing as certainty in this life, absolute 
certainty. You ask yourselves the simple question upon the whole of the evidence do I feel 
sure?’ On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the direction was correct: ‘That direction, in 
our judgment, correctly draws the distinction between what might be described as scientific 
proof on the one hand and legal proof on the other’. This is a vital distinction – not only did 
the trial judge direct that the ‘sure’ test was subjective (‘…so you felt sure’), but the Court of 
Appeal endorsed the difference between expert evidence (‘scientific proof’) and the jury’s 
degree of belief (legal proof’) in that evidence. 
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It can therefore be seen that whether the standard of proof is ‘no reasonable doubt’ or 
‘beyond all reasonable doubt’, the jury must be left to decide whether the evidence is enough 
to convict. The criminal standard of proof test is therefore ultimately subjective to the jury. 
 
To sum up; again it is obvious that Tribe’s argument against a ‘trial by mathematics’ – in this 
case due to BARD being irreconcilable with quantified probabilistic reasoning – cannot be 
sustained. The standard of proof is subjective and down to each fact finder individually to 
establish, using their own pragmatic concept of ‘utility’, if the threshold has been reached. 
While objective quantification of the standard is undesirable on policy grounds, it cannot be 
said to stop fact finders using the posterior as a means to start the decision-making process.  
 
If on the evidence in a case a juror discovers, after using a model, that the posterior is 95% 
and wishes to return a verdict of ‘guilt’, it does not mean that five in every hundred convicted 
people in prison are innocent. It simply means that on the facts of that particular case the 
juror decided that guilt was the appropriate verdict. In other cases, a juror facing a posterior 
of 95% may decide on utility grounds that the defendant should be acquitted. Either way, it 
cannot be argued that the use of a model would not be a useful tool in evaluating the strength 
of prosecution cases, and would provide useful information about the decision-making 
processes and reasoning of the fact finder in criminal trials.  
 
Essentially, the problem with the ‘Blue Bus’ case, is not that the bus company would be 
unfairly found guilty even though there was a weak/no causal link between itself and the 
alleged event, but because the legal notion of the standard of proof  is wrong. Tribe’s stance 
on this point actually creates MORE uncertainty than it resolves. 
 
On a final note, in a jury of twelve members, the minimum majority required for a successful 
verdict is 10-2. This equates to a maximum of 83% certainty, even if the ten who return a 
verdict of guilt are each 100% certain of guilt (an outcome which is vigorously refuted here, 
as 100% certainty is impossible to achieve). While it is controversial to accept that 83% 
should be considered as a viable threshold across the whole range of the jury, the point made 
is that even under the current system, a degree of uncertainty is built in. 
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5.3.5 (v) That due to the complexity of cases and non-sequential nature of evidence 
presentation, any application of Bayes’ theorem would be too cumbrous for a jury 
to use effectively and efficiently: 
 
In technological terms, Tribe’s 40 year old argument - that a jury’s use of Bayes’ theorem 
(BT) would be ‘too complex’ for ease of application - MUST be outdated. Even if the 
judgment in R v Adams [46] a quarter-century later in 1996, which held that: ‘...[W]e do not 
consider that [juries] will be assisted in their task by reference to a very complex approach 
which they are unlikely to understand fully and even more unlikely to apply accurately, which 
we judge to be likely to confuse them and distract them from their consideration of the real 
questions on which they should seek to reach a unanimous conclusion’, is still binding on 
lower courts today, it cannot be true that modern computers cannot eradicate much of the 
cumbrousness, in order that applying BT to even complex cases becomes easy and 
commonplace.  
 
Advances in technology, used to lighten much of the mathematical load. was recognised by 
Edwards [12] as long ago as 1991: ‘The proposal that trial lawyers should exploit Bayesian 
tools makes a lot more sense now than before. Bayesians are aware that conditional 
independence is rare, that in its absence, judgements of likelihood ratios must be replaced by 
more difficult judgements of conditional probabilities and that Bayesian tools used to be too 
cumbersome for routine use. That has changed, thanks to influence diagrams and Bayes nets. 
The assessment task, of conditional probabilities, can be given an orderly structure, the task 
of specifying relevant Bayesian equations can be made invisible to the user, and Bayesian 
arithmetic can be automated by the use of INDIA and HUGIN computer programmes.’ Of 
course, the issue in Adams, five years after Edwards’ recommendations, was not of the jury’s 
use of the mathematical tool, but the confusing (if not error-filled) way in which the witness 
presented the evidence.  
 
These days, much of the presentation would be handled through Bayes’ nets (BNs). Bring’s 
1997 argument that [29]: ‘I think the eminent work by Kadane and Schum on the Sacco and 
Vanzetti case proves that Bayes' theorem can be an interesting method of studying evidence 
but that it is impossible for normal fact-finders to use these methods in practice’ must also be 
out of date. Friedman [26] acknowledges that BNs are more than up to the task of handling 
the relationships between complex evidence and multiple hypotheses: ‘Some Bayesioskeptics 
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emphasise the computational complexity created by the Bayesian approach. I think the 
argument is wide of the mark, for several reasons: 
(i) The world is indeed a complex place, but that does not reflect a problem with 
Bayesian analysis. On the contrary, any theory that could not in principle 
represent the complexity surrounding us would have limited value; 
(ii) I say ‘in principle’ because the theory need not be applied in its most powerful 
gear. On the contrary, it is a flexible template. It can take into account as much 
complexity as its user is able to handle; 
(iii) I think the computational complexity, though great, may not be as great as it 
appears. The storytelling Bayesian approach that I have outlined above is far 
simpler than an item-by-item approach. It requires a limited number of 
probability assessments, and does not demand that the observer cross-check for 
consistency all the probabilities that she might assess given multiple items of 
evidence; 
(iv) One model requires simply that an observer adhere to the following rule: If 
P(E|H) > P(E|NH), then O(H|E) > O(H), and the greater the proportional 
difference between the first pair the greater the proportional difference between 
the second pair. This rule follows immediately from Bayes' theorem. 
One could comply with this rule without complying with the theorem, but usually the rule 
would tend to lead to results rather close to results prescribed by the theorem. While 
Friedman advocates that BT is not too complex a theory for use by jurors: ‘I think the Adams 
court was off base in suggesting that Bayes' theorem has no place in the courtroom....’ he 
does argue that the ‘inner workings’ of the theorem are not important to be divulged: ‘On the 
other hand, as I have already indicated, I tend to think that it is not helpful to take a jury 
through an iterative use of Bayes' theorem, even in a case like Adams in which the evidence 
was very sparse.’ This is the cornerstone of the argument for the modern implementation of 
BT – a stance which has led Fenton and Neil [47] to support the ‘Electronic Calculator 
Theory’: ‘However, we disagree with the Royal Statistical Society’s stance that: ‘...statistical 
evidence is presented only by appropriately qualified statistical experts, as would be the case 
for any other form of expert evidence’, nor do we suggest that lawyers and juries should be 
trained to do the calculations themselves, as suggested by Robertson and Vigneaux in ‘Don't 
teach Statistics to Lawyers!, in Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on 
Teaching of Statistics’ and  ‘Explaining Evidence Logically’. Instead, we suggest that BNs 
should be used in the same way as an electronic calculator is used to provide everyday 
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calculations.’ With this theory, BNs, and the software that applies them, are used much in the 
same way that an electronic calculator has become a commonplace tool, used by non-
mathematicians.  
 
There is much to be said for this approach – certainly, it can said that laypersons do not 
question the circuitry or foundation principles of the calculating capabilities of the modern 
calculator, so why should there be an innate distrust of BN software? Fenton and Neil explain 
how a jury would be directed to use the BN software [3]: ‘After a BN model was used to 
calculate the value of the evidence, the lawyer in a criminal trial might say: ‘What we have 
demonstrated to you is how we revise our prior assumption when we observe a single piece of 
evidence. Although we were able to explain this to you from scratch, there is a standard 
calculation engine (accepted and validated by the mathematical and statistical community) 
which will do this calculation for us without having to go through all the details. In fact, 
when there is more than a single piece of evidence to consider it is too time-consuming and 
complex to do the calculations by hand, but the calculation engine will do it instantly for us. 
This is much like relying on a calculator to do long division for us. You do not have to worry 
about the accuracy of the calculations; these are guaranteed. All you have to worry about is 
whether our original assumptions are reasonable. But we can show you the results with a 
range of different assumptions.’ The lawyer could then present the results from the BN model 
and explain that the results exactly match the results in an event tree. First, the lawyer shows 
the results with no evidence entered, then the DNA, then, the eyewitness evidence, then the 
alibi, showing how the values change with each piece of evidence. A range of values could be 
used to give upper and lower parameters within which the jury would work. It would then be 
for the jury to decide whether the assumptions in the model are reasonable.’ This argument 
supports Edwards [12] views from 1991 who suggested that in a ‘four-tier’ BN node, the 
lowest tier would be inaccessible to the user and would contain the necessary algorithmic 
software which would act as the ‘engine’ of the BN. This discussion has been more fully 
introduced in Chapter 2. 
 
Of course, the problem of complex application of a simple theorem is not the only problem in 
play here. The other problem of ‘complexity’ concerns the accuracy of values placed INTO 
the model. Can a juror be trusted to clearly elucidate his own reasoning simply and effectively 
enough to be able to place accurate figures into the calculator.  
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Taking the Electronic Calculator Theory to its natural conclusion, where a juror may know 
that adding three items to two items can be transferred to a calculator’s key pad efficiently as 
3+2=5, can a juror just as effectively transfer knowledge of a complex case with multiple 
pieces of evidence to a similar keypad. Would he know what values to key in? Ronald Allen 
[48] says no: ‘The point is that the problems humans typically face at trial are inferentially 
complex, too complex to permit the use of any version of Bayes' theorem as either an 
algorithm or a heuristic.’ Allen then argues that not only can complex cases be filled with 
many different pieces of evidence, there may also be contradictory hypotheses which may 
cause confusion in a juror not instructed on how to use a calculator: ‘The conventional legal 
argument assumes that there are only two relevant hypotheses: guilt and not guilt. In many 
instances, there are multiple competing hypotheses. In that case, the complexities increase 
significantly.’ In any case, Allen goes on to say that even after the case has been fully 
presented by both prosecution and defence teams, the calculator would need to be constantly 
updating the reasoning process: ‘During deliberations, in some cases, maybe in many, new 
theories will emerge. When they do, the probability space must be reconfigured, and there is 
no algorithmic way of doing so.’ Would this constant use of an electronic device deflect the 
juror from his proper task, as was warned about in R v Adams (Denis) [46]: In that case the 
Court of Appeal held that: ‘It seems to us that the difficulties which arise in the present case 
stem from the fact that, at trial, the defence were permitted to lead before the jury evidence of 
the Bayes Theorem,’ and later stated that: ‘...the apparently objective numerical figures used 
in the theorem may conceal the element of judgment on which it entirely depends... it seems to 
us that it is not appropriate for use in jury trials, or as a means to assist the jury in their 
task... Jurors evaluate evidence and reach a conclusion not by means of a formula, 
mathematical or otherwise, but by the joint application of their individual common sense and 
knowledge of the world to the evidence before them... as the present case graphically 
demonstrates, to introduce Bayes Theorem, or any similar method, into a criminal trial 
plunges the jury into inappropriate and unnecessary realms of theory and complexity 
deflecting them from their proper task.’ In that case, a rape trial where the identity of the 
suspect was at issue and, much like in the US case of Collins, the prosecution case included 
probabilistic reasoning to illustrate the probability that the defendant was the suspect, the 
prosecution expert, Professor Donnelly, explained in detail the figures he used in the 
mathematical model and the methodology used to provide the likelihood ratios.  
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The trial had ruled that BT was available for use by the jury and stated: ‘If you do not wish to 
use it that is your privilege and your own private decision and no one will criticise you for not 
using it. There is absolutely no compulsion on you to use it at all. It is there if you want to use 
it and follow the instructions given.’ However, the trial judge, in summing-up, misdirected the 
jury when he became confused by the expert evidence and, in particular, appeared to have 
forgotten the answer given by Professor Donnelly expressing the probabilities as percentages. 
Instead, the judge was directing the jury as to how many times it was more likely that 
something had occurred, yet he did not remind the jury of the formula given by Professor 
Donnelly in relation to the percentages.  
 
However, let us say that Professor Donnelly and the trial judge had applied BT in a simple 
and formulaic way and then left the jury to deliberate. Can it be said that the jury, in the 
privacy of the deliberation room, could be trusted to apply BT correctly even with modern 
software and the correct judicial directions proposed by Fenton and Neil, and supported by 
Jowett [49]  ‘It should be acceptable simply to provide the results of Bayesian arguments 
arrived at using tools such as Hugin. Experts would then testify that the tool has been used 
correctly.’ Allen’s argument that the model would need constant updating may mean that an 
expert would need to be on hand in the deliberation room to assist – which could mean that 
the essential privacy and potential autonomy of jury deliberations would be compromised. 
 
To sum up; if the assertion of Allen [28] , that computer complexity is the greatest threat to 
the implementation of BT in court, is correct: ‘The primary problem is that Bayes' theorem 
cannot be implemented in a typical trial, for a number of reasons such as computational 
complexity’, and it is accepted that with fairly recent great strides having been – and still 
being – made in Bayesian software programmes, then Allen can no longer sustain one of his 
main objections to BT. In fact, nowhere in Allen’s published works is any consideration 
given, serious or otherwise, to the workings or operation of a BN. 
 
However, what cannot be ignored is that in some highly complex cases, it must be accepted 
that once a jury is left to deliberate, that it cannot be acceptable to have a third party assist 
with re-configuring the software to encompass scenarios not autonomously considered by the 
jury itself. Therefore, while fairly simple cases which do not need outside interference by an 
expert into the deliberating jury’s domain may be suitable for an application of BT, the line 
must be drawn at cases which compromise the autonomy and privacy of the jury’s role. Of 
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course, this does not mean that the software should not be made available to the jury for its 
own use, but that the instruction period must end before deliberation. 
 
5.3.6 (vi) That probabilistic reasoning is not compatible with the law, for policy 
reasons: 
 
The argument that probabilistic reasoning is not compatible with law for policy reasons is 
based on the idea that it would be somehow repugnant to society to reconcile the idea of 
quantitative mathematical proof with the age-old system of unaided jury deliberations.  
 
Allen [48] argues that since legal trials encompass more than simply a quest for truth about a 
given hypothesis, that a probabilistic model can do nothing to create hypotheses: ‘If the law is 
not Bayesian, what is it? The probability debates have proceeded as if the law deals only with 
uncertainty; in fact, it deals as much, maybe more, with ignorance. The typical litigated case 
is not like assessing the probability of obtaining a certain number of heads of an evenly 
weighted coin, given a certain number of flips of that coin. It is not, in short, a case of 
uncertainty (given the definition above). It requires instead determining which one of a very 
large range of possibilities actually occurred at the time in question in the face of missing, 
disputed and contradictory evidence. The typical litigated case is like the urn of ignorance.’ 
In short, this argument is closely aligned to the ‘soft variables’ argument discussed above, 
which discusses the idea that if a probability cannot be counted, it does not exist.  
 
However, what Allen is really arguing here is that a mathematical model can never truly 
perform the task it is purported to be designed for – namely that of proving guilt. This task 
must be performed by a jury, which although may be a flawed model, is the best model 
available. Allen explains the impossibility of reconciling BT with the jury’s task: ‘Reconsider 
the standard use of Bayes' theorem. It conditions guilt on the evidence, but guilt is a legal 
conclusion. It is not a fact, nor a theory about facts that can be reduced to probabilities. It is 
a description of an act taken by a legal actor.’ The problem with this approach is that Allen 
considers that ‘guilt’ is unquantifiable, much like a ‘feeling’ or an ‘emotion’.  
 
These human qualities, Allen argues, are a necessary part of the criminal justice system. Of 
course, since feelings and emotions are part of the flawed human condition, it would be 
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wrong to pin a value on them for fear of losing something in the translation. Tillers [50] does 
not adhere to this view: ‘The generally unproductive and sterile debate about whether there 
should be a trial by mathematics was founded on two misunderstandings: (i) A widespread 
failure to appreciate that mathematics is part of a broader family of rigorous methods of oft-
called ‘formal’ reasoning; and (ii) A widespread failure to appreciate that those 
mathematical and formal analyses can have a large variety of purposes.’ What Tillers argues 
here is that mathematical reasoning is simply a branch of any type of human reasoning, which 
must include jury deliberations.  
 
Friedman [26] supports Tillers view that probabilistic reasoning is simply a quantitative 
version of what is already present in the mind of the juror, which means that banning it would 
be futile: ‘Recent research suggests that fact-finders tend to view an entire body of evidence, 
attempting to determine a story that most plausibly accounts for all of it. Some 
Bayesioskeptics have viewed this model as conflicting with a Bayesian view of evidence. I do 
not believe there is any genuine conflict. I do not believe that fact-finders can, should or do 
go through such a serial updating of probability, given each new piece of evidence. How, 
then, can a Bayesian approach operate on a whole body of evidence? Suppose the fact-finder, 
in choosing between H1 and H2, has four pieces of evidence, E1 having arisen beforehand 
and E2, E3, and E4 having arisen afterwards. Then the fact-finder may compare competing 
stories, one for H1 and one for H2 that account for all of the evidence. This is a story-telling 
model, but it is also Bayesian.’ This approach must be correct. The difference between 
Friedman’s argument and Allen’s therefore, is that Friedman is willing to delve into Allen’s 
‘urn of ignorance’ and tease out the hypotheses from within. This strive for a formulaic 
approach to legal reasoning conforms to the legal community’s strive for transparency and 
acknowledges flaws and tries to do something about them, rather than simply accepting they 
exist and ignoring them. 
 
Allen tries a different approach: ‘In science, the problem of priors is supposedly satisfied by 
what are called convergence-to-certainty and merger-of-opinion results. Over time, as 
evidence is produced, opinions will converge on the truth no matter where the initial starting 
points happened to be. But, this bears no relationship to jury decision making. Fact-finders 
do not run further tests to sort out the theories. They have to make decisions based on what 
they have. This point is a dramatic demonstration of the apparent failure of the Bayesian 
enthusiasts to attend to the foundations of their own theory. It is just these theorems involving 
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convergence-to-certainty that allow a plausible case to be made about the use of Bayes' 
theorem in scientific inference, because they connect the subjective to the objective. Over 
time the stability of nature will wash out the subjective starting place of humans. What is the 
analogous connection between the subjective and the objective in the law?’ This argument 
follows Tribe’s original claim that to allow probabilistic reasoning into court would lead to a 
‘trial by mathematics’, thereby leading to a usurping of the jury function.  
 
In Allen’s argument, the ‘subjectivity’ in a model - vital to preserve the jury’s role - would be 
lost, and the machine’s objectivity (no doubt programmed by a small group of experts, now 
in charge of all trial deliberations) would be left to prove guilt. Of course, this scenario may 
be far-fetched, but it is a problem which has already been addressed. The human fact finder’s 
role is a vital one in the criminal justice process. Over the past 40+ years since Tribe’s article, 
computers have pervaded every aspect of human existence, from assisting medical 
procedures to going to war. The argument that using computer technology to assist in 
decision-making tasks would somehow usurp the human element has been found to lack 
foundation. As long as BT is merely used as an aid in the juror’s decision-making process, 
there can never be a ‘trial by mathematics’. 
 
5.4 Conclusion: 
 
As has been shown here, there is very little in Tribe’s 1971 paper which stands up to either 
(a) scrutiny; or (b) the test of time. While the science of trace evidence matching has evolved 
towards the commonplace introduction of the RMP to the trial process, the UK courts 
reluctance to embrace explicit quantitative probabilistic methods to meet those demands must 
be examined, due to its irrationality. 
 
In doing so, the parallels between the Nuffield Foundation’s anti-Bayesian stance towards 
most types of evidence and the UK Court of Appeal rulings, are marked. In effect, the 
contents of Laurence Tribe’s 1971 paper remain almost untainted by those rulings, despite 
massive advances in the deeper understanding of the basic principles of probability theory – 
taking it within the knowledge of more than just a handful of practitioners – and advances in 
computer science - to handle the complexity of Bayesian modelling – which should logically 
have made the introduction of BT into the criminal trial process as prolific as the RMP itself. 
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However, for reasons explained and alluded to in this chapter, this has not happened, and the 
UK courts for one reason or another have decided that BT remains a niche area of discipline, 
amenable to only the narrowest of circumstances. 
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6 CHAPTER VI: Priors 
 
6.1 Introduction: 
 
The focus of this chapter examines how to formulate the correct prior for any given 
hypothesis. This is not an easy task, yet there has never been an in-depth academic study into 
the mechanics of the ‘legal’ prior - which is surprising, given the central role it plays in any 
probabilistic model. 
 
The first part of this chapter explains the background to the problem, and broaches the subject 
of whose task it is to assess the prior. Since a forensic study of the inner-workings of the prior 
are necessary to pinpoint the problems and controversies inherent in assessing the prior, a full 
definition of the prior, and how one is formulated, is given. 
 
The chapter continues by addressing the value ‘K’ (which is mathematical notation for 
‘context’), in order to explain that any mathematical model must consider the context of the 
hypothesis and its connecting evidence to ensure that the model provides accurate 
information relevant to it. Again, this is an area which is barely discussed among the 
mathematical community - only touched upon by Fenton & Neil [3], and never discussed by 
the legal community - which is also surprising given that it is a vital component in any 
probabilistic reasoning process. 
 
After the discussion and explanation of ‘K’, there is a discussion about trace evidence – of 
which DNA falls within this type – and an examination of the random match probability 
(RMP) which is now routinely used as a tool for presenting this type of evidence to the jury. 
This discussion leads to the unveiling of the revolutionary ‘1/World Population’ (1/WP) prior 
for all types of trace evidence – a prior which has never been considered before, and which 
should counter all arguments against the courtroom use of Bayes’ theorem for cases where 
the identity of the suspect is the key issue. 
 
The chapter then provides illustrations of how evidence can be combined in a single model, 
by breaking down decision-making stages into composite parts in order to expose 
misconceptions and errors in the way that juries might combine evidence which overlooks the 
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importance of ’K’ - thereby allowing evidence to be ascribed inaccurate weight, which will 
naturally increase the risks of miscarriages of justice. 
 
Finally, the chapter provides basic examples of Bayesian networks (BNs) which may offer a 
solution to the problem, and provides crucial support for the research hypothesis. 
6.2 Assessment of the prior: 
 
If the probabilistic reasoning community are successful in their bid to implement probabilistic 
modelling in criminal trials, it must prove to the legal community that the model in no way 
interferes with the jury’s role of ascribing weight to evidence and returning a verdict. [51] 
‘The important point is that assessment of the prior odds is the jury's task’. [18] The model 
works simply on a principle of combining prior probabilities with evidence, to calculate a 
posterior probability. And therein lies the first problem. How does a juror formulate a prior 
without observing any evidence?  
 
Johan Bring [52] identified the issue of the difficulty in arriving at a rational single point 
prior, and Fenton & Neil [3] sought to resolve the problem by suggesting that a juror choose a 
‘range prior’ encompassing and most closely fitting his own view of the weight of a single 
piece of evidence. This range prior was originally suggested by Finkelstein & Fairley [23] as 
a way to avoid a third party assigning single point values to a juror, thereby avoiding any 
accusation of interference.  
 
Ronald Allen [28] justified the use of subjective priors in non-legal sciences, such as medical 
testing, due to the scientifically collaborative nature of these disciplines, but suggested that in 
criminal law, the same collaboration is not in attendance due to the juror’s lack of knowledge 
of the case, that therefore the ‘convergence-to-certainty’, or ‘merger-of-results’ principles 
which are prevalent in medical testing and act as the necessary bridge between the subjective 
and objective, are not present in criminal trials. What this means is that regardless of how 
much subjectivity is superficially afforded the juror, ultimately the model in criminal trials is 
objective due to the juror’s lack of opportunity to autonomously formulate his own prior from 
data which he has some degree of control over. James Berger [53] advocates the use of 
objective Bayesian analysis in narrow appropriate situations, but the legal community will, 
quite rightly, not allow any mathematical model to interfere with the jury’s autonomous role. 
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The legal community’s reluctance to accept probabilistic reasoning in criminal trials can be 
traced at least as far back as 1968 and the Los Angeles robbery case of People v Collins. [5] 
Laurence Tribe [4], in his post-case critique of the prosecutor’s mathematical reasoning 
(where it is inarguable that the prosecutor committed the prosecutor’s fallacy [15] among 
other fundamental mistakes), argued that the prior was a potentially controversial area due to 
the jury’s difficulty in arriving at (a) an accurate figure; and (b) a number which would not 
overpower other types of ‘more impressionable’ evidence.  
 
In the 1996 case of R v Adams (Denis) [54], the expert witness for the prosecution suggested 
that the prior should be formulated from a geographical sub-population, or ‘reference class’, 
which when combined with the random match probability (RMP) of a piece of DNA 
evidence found at the crime scene, would provide an overall posterior probability of guilt. 
Due to the overly complex method of presenting the probabilistic reasoning, the court ruled 
that Bayes’ theorem (BT) would ‘deflect the jury from its proper task’ and that BT should not 
be recommended for use to a jury as a matter of course. However, this formulation of a prior 
from geographical sub-populations, or ‘location evidence’, has been accepted by the 
scientific community, including Fenton & Neil who recently confirmed and recommended 
combining evidence of sub-populations with DNA RMPs to provide inferences of guilt. This 
is echoed by Buckleton et al [6] who believe that DNA is a valuable tool in establishing guilt, 
but only when used in conjunction with other types of evidence, including location evidence.  
 
The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), which brings cases based on strength of prosecution 
evidence, also recommend that DNA should be used in conjunction with location evidence, 
such as ‘a starting point might be the British population’, or ‘the sexually active male 
population of Manchester’, and recommends that ‘…to do this, the scientist would ‘need to be 
given a guide with regard to the size and nature of the population to consider’ [7]. It suggests 
that in a rape case in Huddersfield ‘an old woman from Beijing’ sharing DNA profile traits 
with that of the crime scene trace would likely be summarily excluded from enquiries, on the 
basis that the probability of her being the suspect was so low as to be rationally disregarded. 
This indicates that the CPS value DNA evidence, but would likely only bring a case on an 
amalgam of different types of evidence - with DNA only being a single type and therefore 
incapable of sustaining a guilty verdict on its own. 
 
 
  
135 
 
The question is can DNA be combined with other types of evidence? This question is directly 
related to the enquiry of what the appropriate priors are for different types of evidence, and 
whether these priors can be combined to calculate a single holistic posterior value of guilt. 
Redmayne [18] argues that values of ‘other types’ of evidence should provide the prior for a 
combination model, before DNA is introduced: ‘The prior odds should be assessed on the 
basis of any other evidence against the suspect before the DNA evidence is introduced.’ 
However, is this actually possible? 
 
6.3 What is a ‘prior’? 
 
BT is a method for updating our beliefs about a given hypothesis. By combining evidence 
with our prior belief, we become more certain in the hypothesis until we feel ready to make a 
decision related to that particular hypothesis. If my hypothesis is that ‘the weather requires 
me to carry an umbrella’, the evidence of rain clouds in the sky may lead me to a decision to 
take an umbrella with me when I go to work. Our prior beliefs are usually formulated from 
our view of the world as a whole, which is, in turn, created by our own subjective 
experiences. In this way, BT is very personal to the fact finder who is using it as an aid to his 
decision-making.  
 
Fenton & Neil argue that this subjectivity is present in all probabilistic reasoning, since 
ultimately any information said to be ‘objectively accurate’ is only as accurate as the data 
collection and results interpretation methods implemented. Ward Edwards [12] even argues 
that a person’s height is subject to individual interpretation due to the subjective reliance 
placed by the fact finder on the integrity of the measuring tape. This ‘leap of faith’ is the 
foundation of the subjectivist view on probability and has not been adequately rebutted [47] 
by frequentists, such as members of the Court of Appeal in cases such as R v T [2], who argue 
that it is theoretically possible to have an ‘objectively certain’ database.  
 
Since BT is used to reduce uncertainty in a given hypothesis, it has been suggested [3] that it 
is a good fit with criminal trials. This is theoretically true. BT is a simple formula which, if 
used appropriately, can increase transparency in the decision-making process and reduce 
miscarriages of justice by eradicating probabilistic reasoning errors and fallacies. The 
problems, however can arise where the prior probabilities have not been correctly formulated 
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and communicated. This element of communication, normally irrelevant in non-legal 
disciplines, is vital in criminal trials, because the trial fact finder – the juror – and the 
evidence collector – the witness - are not the same person.  
 
Therefore, the probative value (the definition of ‘probative value’ can be found in Chapter 2) 
of a piece of evidence can be misconstrued or misinterpreted if the witness does not 
adequately explain to the juror what the evidence is and what it means to the case as a whole. 
For example, a bloody knife in a murder trial could either be evidence of the defendant’s 
‘inculpability’ as a murderer, or of his ‘exculpability’ as a murderer - if it has been used as 
evidence of his job as a non-murderous butcher. Simply laying the knife on the exhibit table 
and asking the juror to make up his mind as to the meaning of the knife’s presence in court is 
fraught with the risk of misinterpretation. The same can be said about DNA evidence. In the 
conjoined appeals of R v Adams & Doheny [1] the ‘random match probability’ (RMP) was 
introduced as means of presenting the probative value of DNA found in a crime scene trace.  
 
The concept, is that the ‘probability of seeing the evidence if the prosecution hypothesis of 
‘guilt’ P(E|Hp) is correct’, is then divided by the ‘probability of seeing the evidence if the 
defence hypothesis of ‘innocence’ P(E|Hd) is correct’, to arrive at the probative value of the 
evidence. Since, in Doheny, the DNA was stated by the expert as being prevalent in 1/27 
million random people in the world population, the actual number of matches would be 
around 250 people, giving a posterior probability of guilt of ≈1/250. However, the 
prosecution expert witness transposed the conditional – confusing P(E|Hd) with P(Hd|E) – 
thereby wildly overstating the prosecution case - which the jury believed and agreed to be a 
posterior probability of innocence at an extremely low 1/27 million, and convicted the two 
defendants on the basis of the prosecutor’s fallacy (as discussed fully in Chapter 3) that: 
 
P(Hd|E) = The probability of the defendant being innocent, given the evidence, is 1/27 
million (a very low probability of innocence) 
 
...which was confused with: 
 
P(E|Hd) = The probability of seeing the evidence, given that the defendant is innocent, is 
1/27 million (a high probability of innocence) 
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This misinterpretation of the RMP was simply made on the basis that the prior probability of 
guilt was not properly communicated between witness and jury. If it had, then the BT 
calculation of: P(E|Hp) /  P(E|Hd)  x  P(Hp) / P(Hd)  =  P(Hp|E) / P(Hd|E) would have been 
unnecessary. This miscommunication relates to the hidden value ‘K’ in this, and any, 
probabilistic model. 
 
6.4 The value ‘K’: 
 
Fenton and Neil’s argument that all probability is subjective is underpinned by a principle 
that ‘probability assigned to an uncertain event A is always conditional on a context K, which 
you can think of as a set of knowledge and assumptions.’ This value of K is inherent in all 
probabilistic values and is present in BT, but often overlooked or taken for granted. The 
‘odds’ form of BT, with K expressly stated, would be:  
 
P(Hp|K,E|K) / P(HdK,|E|K) = P(E|K,Hp|K) /  P(E|K,Hd|K)  x  P(Hp|K) / P(Hd|K) .  
 
Of course, because of its cumbersome nature, K is cancelled out across the formula and taken 
to exist ‘behind the scenes’. Problematically, K, once removed from the formula, is often 
forgotten.  
 
In criminal trials, this silent value K is highly valued due to the symbiotic relationship 
between the two fact finders, witness and juror; but in non-legal disciplines, the fact finder is 
usually a single person, who is innately aware of K and instantly factors-in its value wherever 
necessary. If K was expressly communicated by the witness to the jury at the outset of 
criminal trials, the prosecutor’s fallacy would not exist, although it is easy to see how 
mistakes can happen: Taking the prosecutor’s fallacy as an example of how a RMP might be 
interpreted: 
 
Hd: The defendant is not the source of E 
E: DNA with a RMP of 1/1 million 
P(E|Hd) = 1/1 million 
 
This can be interpreted in two different ways: 
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1. ‘The probability of seeing the DNA evidence if the defendant is not the source is one in a 
million’ 
2. ‘The probability of seeing the evidence if the defendant is not the source is one in every 
million people’ 
 
The addition of the words ‘every million people’ in the second example make the difference 
between a strong prosecution case and a weak one, yet unless these words are expressly 
communicated by the witness to the jury, it is easy to see how a juror might confuse the 
examples and attribute an inaccurate value to the evidence. In essence, an abstract value of 
1/1 million if presented without value K, is highly prone to misinterpretation.  
 
The Nuffield Foundation [16] recognises the importance in communicating value K to the 
jury when presenting evidence: ‘When one grasps that evidence (including expert evidence) 
is adduced by the prosecution or defence to answer a particular question, it follows that the 
meaning and value of that evidence cannot be determined without first identifying the 
original question. One cannot assess whether evidence is successful in proving a matter in 
issue until one knows what the issue is and how the evidence relates to it. This observation 
might sound banal; but it is not. In fact, nearly all of the reasoning errors are either 
variations on, or are at least exacerbated by, an elementary failure to identify, with sufficient 
care and particularity, the question which the evidence is capable of answering.’ This nexus 
between ‘the question’ and the ‘answer’ is K. If it is not expressly communicated, the 
probative value of the evidence is open to the risk of fallacious reasoning: ‘Even if the 
expert’s evidence is accurate and clear, there remains the challenge of successfully 
communicating the true probative potential of [DNA] evidence to the trial judge and to 
jurors. Lay jurors are likely to need some guidance in making sense of evidence expressed in 
terms of probabilities.’ [19] The Nuffield Foundation [35] make a direct reference to the 
importance of K: ‘If the meaning and probative value of evidence depends on a background 
of contextualising information and the analytical framework used to interpret it – and it does 
– then the only way in which a lawyer or court can hope to grasp the meaning and probative 
value of scientific evidence is to acquire at least a rudimentary knowledge of the analytical 
framework employed by the scientist in arriving at her conclusions.’ This ‘background of 
contextualising information’ is the very foundation of K. 
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6.5 How is a prior formulated? 
 
Since a prior is simply a probability of two competing hypotheses compared with each other, 
it is obvious that the hypotheses themselves must be considered in probabilistic terms before 
a prior is formulated. Of course there is a difference between finding a prior for P(H) and 
finding a prior for P(E|H), but value K is conditional on BOTH P(H) and P(E|H). While this 
sounds trite, it is often forgotten that all evidence begins with a prior, and the approach is the 
same whether the prior is being considered for P(H) or P(E|H).  
 
The Nuffield Foundation, in its third practitioner guide [35] for the application of probability 
to criminal trials explains how the prior for a piece of crime scene ‘trace evidence’ is formed: 
‘The probabilities for [the node] depend on the extent to which the characteristics, 
positioning, etc of the crime-scene mark are indicative of its association with the offence. For 
example, a footprint on the external sill of a second floor window is, all else equal, more 
likely to have been made by a burglar than a footprint left on the external front doormat 
(which could have been made by the postman, a door-to-door salesman, a house guest, etc). 
Assigning such subjective probabilities is necessarily a function of the forensic scientist’s 
knowledge, expertise and experience...’ In this example, P(E|Hp) = the ‘probability of seeing 
the footprint if the suspect is a burglar’ may be, say, ½; while the ‘probability of seeing the 
footprint if the suspect is a postman’ may be, say, 1/1000.  
 
What is important to note is that the probabilities are based on the expert witness’s 
knowledge of the world, as the Foundation explains: ‘Expert opinion testimony routinely 
rests on such subjective impressions, as is perfectly evident whenever an expert is asked to 
speculate how common some particular feature or characteristic of interest is (e.g. how many 
people have curved spines or walk with a limp), or how often he encounters that feature, say 
brittle bones or retinal damage, in his clinical practice, etc. Once the evidence has been 
observed, the competing hypotheses are compared with each other in a ‘likelihood ratio’ 
(LR), P(E|Hp)/P(E|Hd), which can be used to show the ‘probative value’ (ie the weight of the 
evidence towards one of the competing hypotheses) of the evidence. 
 
The process of converting knowledge of the world into probabilities is not an easy one. The 
Foundation [30] explains the complexity of the task: ‘For each technique, the scientist is 
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required, as a first step, to think through all the potential observations and analytical results 
that may be obtained were that technique to be employed.  Then, probabilities for obtaining 
these outcomes are assigned given that the prosecution proposition ‘HP were true’ and given 
relevant aspect of the case circumstances, i.e. the conditioning information.  Next, the 
scientist has to adopt a completely different mind-set and assign probabilities for the 
outcomes if the alternative proposition ‘HD were true’... The process of assigning 
probabilities for the outcomes can be a complex one.  The scientist will be combining 
knowledge and understanding from her own personal experience and from data and results 
contained in published experiments and surveys.  There may well be numerous factors for the 
scientist to take into consideration, including the probabilities of transfer, persistence and 
detection, probabilities of obtaining ‘matching’ results, and probabilities of background 
occurrence and variability of materials.  Different experts may arrive at different values of 
probabilities, reflecting their own experiences and knowledge of the evidence type as well 
reflecting different ways in which they have adjusted and used data from published studies.  
However, if the experts’ probabilities were based solely on the same published data, then 
their probabilities should be very similar.  The source and reliability of an expert’s 
probability can, rightfully, be explored and challenged in court.’ Therefore, while the 
probabilities are subjective and personal to the expert, and open to scrutiny in examination 
and cross-examination in court, it cannot be argued that the prior has not already been 
formulated by the expert before arriving at a probative value for the evidence. The probative 
value of the evidence posited by the expert is therefore directly related to the expert’s own 
personal prior. 
 
Let us take DNA evidence as an example. As the Nuffield Foundation [30] state: ‘[In a case 
of DNA analysis], the proposition pair then being considered would be of the form: 
 
Hp: The DNA came from the suspect 
Hd: DNA came from an unknown person, unrelated to the suspect 
   
Assume that, on analysis, a full profile matching the suspect was obtained.  The probability of 
obtaining this match, conditioned on the prosecution proposition, would be approaching a 
value of 1, i.e. it is practically certain that a match would be obtained. On the other hand, the 
probability of obtaining this match, assuming the alternative proposition were true, would be 
of the order [of say] 1 in a billion. This gives a likelihood ratio of the order 1 billion and the 
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scientist could conclude that the matching profiles provided extremely strong support for the 
view that the DNA came from the suspect rather than from some other, unknown, unrelated 
person.’ The interesting thing to note here is that the two competing hypotheses have already 
been formulated from the expert’s knowledge of the world and the science of DNA testing, as 
the Nuffield Foundation [19] recognises: ‘DNA profiles are assessed by reference to a pair of 
competing propositions formulated by the forensic scientist (or anybody else undertaking a 
similar evidentiary assessment), following established protocols and utilising her case-work 
experience and knowledge of the instant case.’ By comparing Hp with Hd, we know that this 
particular DNA sample is going to be presented to the jury as a RMP.  
 
By comparing one person with other people in the world population, we have an implied 
assertion from the expert that the probability presented will take the form of a ‘coincidental 
match’ probability, and from this the jury can decide whether the probability is so low as to 
rationally rule out the probability that the defendant’s DNA profile match was merely a freak 
coincidence. Redmayne [18] explains the theory: ‘Once a match has been declared the expert 
must make a decision as to the significance of the match by calculating the match probability. 
Essentially, this involves assessing the probability of the match having occurred by chance. 
For this to be calculated, the scientist will need some knowledge of the frequency with which 
the alleles represented on the autoradiograph occur within a population’. This knowledge of 
‘frequencies occurring in a population’ forms the prior probability for a RMP. 
  
The Nuffield Foundation [30] explains that DNA is not the only type of evidence which may 
be converted into probabilities: ‘Pairs of propositions can be generated for each issue, taking 
into account the prosecution allegation and the assumed defence position.  Some examples 
are given here: 
 
1. HP – This knife is the implement that was used to cut the washing line 
    HD  - Some other implement was used 
 
2. HP – This is the shoe that made the mark in the garden at the time of the incident 
    HD  - Some other shoe made the mark 
 
3. HP – Mr. S is the person who broke the dining room window at the time of the incident 
    HD  - Mr. S did not break the window 
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4. HP – Mr. S had sexual intercourse with the woman during the incident 
    HD  - Some other man had sexual intercourse with her 
 
In each of these proposition pairings, including the third if it is assumed that someone broke 
the window, the evidence is presented as a RMP – which is to say that the jury must decide 
whether the defendant is the suspect or whether his matching profile is merely a coincidence. 
In effect, the DNA evidence RMPs, and RMPs of other types of evidence, are materially the 
same - which is to say that when dealing with trait evidence and traces of those traits, all of 
these types of evidence contain the same basic priors with the same value K throughout. 
 
6.6 Can the Likelihood Ratio (LR) be in any way ‘divorced’ from the prior? 
 
K can only be preserved by ensuring that the LR is closely allied to the prior. It is important 
to show that the LR cannot be divorced from the prior, to show that different types of 
evidence cannot easily be combined without compromising K. 
 
Traditionally, it has been thought that the probative value of a piece of evidence can be 
measured by how much the LR of that evidence changes the prior to a posterior probability.  
 
In criminal trials, the closer to P(E|Hp) the evidence is valued, the more probative effect 
towards the prosecution case it has. If the prior for a piece of DNA evidence, presented as a 
RMP, is 1/WP (which is to say that everyone in the ‘world population’ of around 7 billion 
people has an equal chance of being the suspect, before the evidence is presented) and the 
RMP is 1/1billion, the posterior is 1/7 – which is to say that the LR of the evidence is 
[(PE|Hp) = 1 / P(E|Hd) = 1/1billion] 1billion: 
 
[Prior] 1/7 billion x [LR] 1billion = [Posterior] 1/7 
 
This makes intuitive sense, because after the evidence is presented, the probability of the 
defendant being the suspect is one in seven – the likely number of matches within the 
reference class. However, there is so much information involved in this fairly simple formula, 
that can it be said that the LR is not entirely based upon the prior probability? In other words, 
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can we formulate the LR without a prior probability, which, if not, means that it is not 
actually ‘independent’ of the prior?  
 
Some key members of the mathematical community, including the Nuffield Foundation [30]: 
believe that priors are to be formulated without reference to the evidence in the case, which 
leads to a divorcing of the LR from the prior: ‘We stress that the function of assigning prior 
probabilities is subsumed within the jury’s fact-finding responsibilities and naturalistic 
reasoning; assigning prior probabilities should not be a matter for the expert, although they 
may be able to provide expert information that assists the triers of fact.’ How much ‘expert 
information’ is provided, will lead to a successful communication of K as long as the jury 
working assigning the probative value of the evidence has subsumed the expert’s prior 
entirely. If this has not taken place, the value K will be compromised and the probative value 
of the evidence will not be successfully evaluated. A simple example of this would be where 
during a brawl involving three people, one man is killed by a knife cut. One of the two 
surviving men is found to have blood on his clothes whose DNA matches the victim. If K is 
ignored in this case and instead the RMP is relied upon for P(E|H) (where H is ‘defendant 
innocent of the knife attack’) then the answer will be completely wrong, because P(E | H) is 
actually close to 1, since grappling with the victim after the knife cut would produce the 
transference of blood, regardless of which attacker had cut him. 
 
Aitken and Taroni [38], supported by the same Foundation, confirm the position: ‘In criminal 
adjudication, the values of the prior odds and the posterior odds are matters for the judge 
and jury, in accordance with the normal division of labour in forensic fact-finding. The value 
of the likelihood ratio, however, is a matter for the forensic scientist or other expert witness, 
as it is an assessment of the objective probative value of their evidence.’ If we take this 
argument to its natural conclusion, it is plain that Aitken and Taroni favour a model which 
allows a LR to be formulated by an expert pre-trial, and then this LR is applied by a juror to 
his own prior. By combining a juror’s own prior – which is derived from evidence, not of the 
case, but of the world-at-large – this means that two different types of evidence are at risk of 
being combined, without sufficient heed to ensuring that K is preserved throughout the model 
as a whole. What the authors may be advocating here is that K is preserved for each 
individual piece of evidence. However, this will not allow evidence of different types to be 
combined in any meaningful way. 
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One of the main problems with an approach which might allow only discrete types of 
evidence to be combined and presented is that the jury may misinterpret the probative value 
of the evidence in relation to the case as a whole. This is understandable, since the jury’s 
primary task is not to evaluate single pieces of evidence for its probativity towards a given 
hypothesis, but to return a verdict on the case based on the overall comparison of  the 
ultimate Hp and Hd.  
 
The Nuffield Foundation [16] acknowledge this primary task, but still do not explain how 
posterior probabilities towards the ultimate competing hypotheses of ‘guilty’ and ‘not guilty’ 
are formulated: ‘Expert witnesses must not trespass on the province of the jury by 
commenting directly on the accused’s guilt or innocence, and should generally confine their 
testimony to presenting the likelihood of their evidence under competing propositions. 
However, experts are not absolutely precluded from stating posterior probabilities relating to 
intermediate facts proving or constituting the offence, if invited to do so by the court and 
providing that such statements are appropriately qualified and contextualised.’ Even if the 
expert offers a suggestion of a posterior probability for the ultimate hypotheses, it is 
important to understand that this is not a ‘trespass on the province of the jury’ so much as a 
vital communication of K. Of course, the jury have the autonomous decision of accepting or 
rejecting the expert’s weight of evidence, but this must be done through examination and 
cross-examination of the witness to allow the jury to scrutinise the values inherent in the 
model. 
 
Confusingly, while the Nuffield Foundation [19] recognises the importance of the 
communication of the experts’ views on the competing hypotheses which gave rise to the LR 
for a particular piece of evidence: ‘Presentation is pivotal. Common sense tells us that the 
way in which evidence is presented to the fact-finder might be more or less conducive to its 
appropriate evaluation. Some forms of presentation may be relatively clear and informative, 
whilst others might be especially prone to misinterpretation or to confusing or misleading the 
fact-finder’... the contradiction arises where the Foundation refuse to acknowledge the fact 
that the experts’ views are effectively giving rise to a formulation of K. This is highly 
problematic for the unwary, because on the one hand it seems as if the mathematical 
community are adhering to key probabilistic principles by acknowledging and discussing 
their importance (albeit impliedly), but at the same time omitting putting these principles into 
practice.  
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There can be no clearer admission of this mistake than in the following passage in the 
Nuffield Foundation [35] guidance: ‘Bayes Theorem does not supply prior probabilities 
(except insofar as these are posterior probabilities which, in their turn, rest on prior 
probabilities which Bayes Theorem did not supply). The entire edifice, in other words, rests 
on subjective human judgements of “prior” probability – and the final calculations of 
probative value produced by Bayes nets can only be as good, or bad, as the initial human 
inputs.’ The Foundation’s assertion that BT does not supply prior probabilities is at the very 
heart of the problem. If the expert is not supplying prior probabilities to the jury when 
presenting evidence, the jury is left floundering, without K to protect it. Further, the whole 
concept of ‘probative value’ is founded on ‘proving a case in its entirety’ – something which 
cannot be done without a full Bayesian approach to the case. 
 
This is a very strange state-of-affairs. On the one hand, the mathematical community seem 
very astute at designing probabilistic models (albeit without the use of a full BN) which 
evaluate complex cases with many competing hypotheses and many types of evidence, but on 
the other hand, there seems to be a grey area where the community have overlooked a basic 
tenet of probabilistic reasoning: ‘context’.  
 
What makes the situation even stranger is that not only is the importance of context routinely 
mentioned, but it is seemingly rarely, if ever, applied. That such a fundamental mistake as 
this has been made by groups as experienced in probabilistic reasoning as the Nuffield 
Foundation [35], is almost beyond comprehension: ‘The probabilities for [the node] are the 
prior probabilities of guilt or innocence before taking account of [the evidence]. Of course, 
the forensic scientist is not entitled to make such determinations – these are questions for the 
jury – but this presents no difficulty, because what we are interested in, when modelling the 
probative value of scientific observations, is the likelihood ratio not the prior or posterior 
probabilities. We could stipulate any value for the prior probability of guilt without affecting 
the ratio of the likelihoods for the evidence. One value is as good as any other for these 
purposes.’ At one stage, the Foundation [30]: suggests that the expert’s prior might be 
‘wrong’.  
 
This is clearly very confusing for the unwary, who might assume that a prior could never be 
wrong (although it may come under scrutiny during the trial) if it derives from the expert’s 
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subjective beliefs: ‘In order to offer a posterior probability, the expert must have considered, 
consciously or otherwise, quantitatively or qualitatively, a value for the prior probability of 
the fact in issue.  The risk here is that the expert’s prior probability may be inappropriate in 
the circumstances of the case: it may be purely speculative, it may not be informed by the 
case circumstances; it may be biased to one or other side of the argument’. To understand 
precisely the problems which occur when different types of evidence are combined a 
practical study must be made. For this, it is probably easiest to take evidence such as DNA, 
which is generally presented in expressly probabilistic terms, and attempt to combine it with 
‘other’ types of evidence to see the outcome. 
 
6.7 DNA testing: 
 
In DNA testing, where the identity of the suspect is a principal issue, the RMP is generally 
used to establish the probative value of the evidence. The RMP compares the following two 
competing hypotheses, which must be a true negation of each other, and therefore mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive [10]: 
 
Hp: ‘That the defendant is the source of the evidence’ 
Hd: ‘That someone else in the world population, alive at the time of the crime, is the source 
of the evidence’ 
 
We know that Hp and Hd are mutually exclusive and exhaustive, because someone in the 
world population must have left the crime scene trace, and this hypothesis pairing covers all 
possible eventualities. By comparing P(Hp) with P(Hd) we have our prior. Since P(Hp) = 1 
and P(Hd) = the world population (‘WP’) - taken to currently be approximately 7 billion 
people - we can say that the prior P(Hp)/P(Hd) for all DNA evidence presented as a RMP is 
1/WP/1-[1/WP].  
 
This is not controversial, and has been endorsed by Buckleton et al [6], who suggest that ‘true 
profile frequencies will take the values n/world population’. Aitken and Taroni also endorse 
this approach: ‘As a starting point we suppose, simplistically, that before any evidence is 
heard, ‘innocent until proven guilty’ means that every person in the relevant population is 
equally likely to be guilty. If the relevant population were taken to be the population of the 
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whole world it is fairly straightforward to think of evidence that will eliminate most of the 
people in the world from serious consideration as potential suspects.’ The legal community 
should also be satisfied that the 1/WP prior satisfies the ‘innocent until proven guilty’ 
principle, since before evidence is heard, the defendant has a uniform probability of equal 
guilt with that of the rest of the world population. It is simple to check the accuracy of this 
prior by applying BT:  
 
Hp: ‘That the defendant is the source of E’ 
Hd: ‘That someone else in the world population, alive at the time of the crime, is the source 
of E’ 
E: DNA with a RMP of 1/1million 
 
1/WP (prior) x 1 million (where P(E|Hp) is taken as 1, if we assume a 0 error probability rate) 
= 1/7,000 (posterior). 
 
The posterior probability reflects our belief in P(Hp) as 1/7,000, which is consistent with 
there being 7,000 people in the world population who share identical DNA evidential profile 
traits. Therefore Tribe’s argument that it would be difficult for a juror to formulate an 
accurate prior is without foundation.  
 
Finkelstein and Fairley [23] argue that the prior should not be too large for fear that 
inferences drawn from it would be inaccurate. This argument also has little foundation, as it 
can be seen here that the ONLY rational prior for DNA presented as a RMP, is 1/WP. Of 
course, this value is only accurate if value K, which is at the foundation of this reasoning, is 
communicated to, and accepted, by the juror. Aitken and Taroni [38] have confirmed the 
approach as follows: ‘[W]e only require prior assessment of relative measures of the different 
propositions of the defence. These [a]re called “prior ratios”, and in the context of forensic 
DNA investigation one of the prior ratios was interpreted as the number of times more likely 
the “average” full sibling (of the siblings considered) is of being the donor of the DNA, than 
the “average” unrelated individual (of the unrelated considered), before consideration of the 
forensic DNA evidence. The assessment of these prior ratios, along with the number of 
objects or individuals pointed out by each of the defence propositions, enables the value of 
evidence to be expressed as a single formula. Thus, we try to consider the complete set of 
alternative donors of the DNA (both close relatives and unrelated individuals to the suspect) 
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and how the differing match probabilities between these may affect the case against the 
suspect.’ In fact, from this assessment of the prior, leading to a RMP (and then an LR, of 
course) of a piece of DNA match evidence, we can even go so far as to make the following 
key RMP evidence proposition: 
 
‘A RMP treated by the probabilistic model reflects the overall number of suspects who share 
an equal probability of guilt’. 
 
One further issue which must be discussed before moving forward, is the assumption that 
P(E|Hp) = 1. In other words that where the DNA trace has been found at the crime scene, it is 
assumed that the probability of seeing the trace if the prosecution hypothesis (‘that the 
defendant is the source of the DNA trace’) is true, = 1, or 100% certainty. This is a huge 
assumption to make and is not realistic. In their article, ‘Subjectivity and bias in forensic 
DNA mixture interpretation’, Itiel E. Dror and Greg Hampikian [55] discuss the results of 
empirical research which suggests that DNA mixture interpretation is subjective and can 
produce opposite conclusions amongst qualified analysts on the basis of extraneous context. 
 
Dror and Hampikian recognise a long line of research which has established that seeking and 
interpreting information based on a set of existing beliefs can produce biased results. In the 
field of fingerprinting, the same forensic experts may arrive at different conclusions when 
identical evidence is presented within different extraneous contexts. DNA, in contrast to other 
forensic disciplines, has come to be regarded as the gold standard of forensic science and held 
to be objective and immune to subjectivity bias. In fact DNA has been elevated to the status 
of a ‘laboratory-based science’ along with toxicology and drug analysis, as apart from other 
disciplines which are ‘based on expert interpretations of observed patterns – fingerprints, 
writing samples, bite marks etc’. 
 
If correct, then DNA is not affected by contextual circumstances, but in complex situation – 
such as DNA mixtures, there is the argument that DNA analysis may be subjective and relies 
on a number of factors. This objective/subjective debate had not been properly researched 
until Dror and Hampikian’s test: 
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6.7.1 Dror and Hampikian’s DNA analysis test: 
 
1. The study was conducted with qualified DNA experts who conduct real casework in 
accredited laboratories. 
 
2. That the examiners genuinely believed the contextual framework, since contrived contexts 
would not give the required effect or impact. 
 
3. Mixture DNA used from a real adjudicated criminal case, with DNA profiles of the victim 
and three suspects, chosen to provide analysis within an extraneous context.  
 
(The DNA evidence related to a gang rape case in which one of the assailants testified against 
other suspects in return for a lesser sentence as part of his cooperation in a plea bargain deal. 
However, those identified through the plea bargain denied any involvement in the rape. The 
DNA conclusions were critical to prosecution. If the suspects were excluded by DNA, or 
even if the DNA was ‘inconclusive’, the incriminating testimony of the admitted rapist would 
most likely not be allowed.  As potentially biasing as this domain irrelevant context was, it 
should not have affected their analysis. The mixture DNA from the sexual assault was 
examined by experts in the initial criminal case, and their analysis and conclusions were that 
the suspects that were identified by the cooperative assailant could not be excluded from 
being contributors to the mixture.) 
 
4. The mixture was presented to 17 examiners, fourteen female/three male with a mean age of 
41 and a mean experience conducting DNA analysis of 9 years, without the contextual case 
information. 
 
5. The results within those 17 examiners were compared to test the subjectivity in DNA 
analysis to assess subjectivity in DNA analysis and then compared with results from those 
who examined the mixture, within the contextual framework, to assess bias in DNA analysis. 
 
6. Each of the 17 DNA examiners independently examined the evidence, and gave one of 
three conclusions for each of the suspects: ‘cannot be excluded’, ‘excluded’, or 
‘inconclusive.’ One of the suspects, suspect 3, was the point of interest, as he was determined 
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as ‘cannot be excluded’ by the DNA examiners who examined his DNA within the 
potentially biasing context. 
 
In regard to suspect 3, the results from the 17 examiners varied. One examiner concluded that 
the suspect ‘cannot be excluded’, 4 examiners concluded ‘inconclusive’, and 12 examiners 
concluded ‘exclude’; which suggests subjectivity in DNA interpretation. If it was objective, 
then since the examiners all work in the same laboratory and work under the same 
interpretation guidelines, the answers would all have been the same. The subjectivity may 
reflect differences in training, experience, personality and motivation. 
 
Comparing the data between examiners from the context free environment with those who 
were exposed to the extraneous content framework: The DNA analysts who concluded that 
the suspect cannot be excluded within the biasing context of the criminal case, are in sharp 
contrast to the vast majority of examiners who examined the same evidence without this 
biasing context. Only 1 (out of 17) gave the same conclusion as the original analysts, 16 other 
examiners reached a different and conflicting conclusion (either ‘exclude’, 14 examiners, or 
‘inconclusive’, 4 examiners). Thus, the extraneous context appears to have influenced the 
interpretation of the DNA mixture. It must be emphasized, however, that these effects were 
observed for a DNA mixture analysis. Previous research in forensic identification suggests 
that contextual influences are most powerful when the evidence is ambiguous, complex, and 
a ‘hard call’.  
 
6.7.2 Low template DNA (LTDNA) 
 
David Balding [56], an expert in statistical analysis of DNA profiles, has stated that where 
there are very few (typically three, approximately) sample cells to examine (known as ‘low 
template DNA’ or ‘LTDNA’), that there is a general danger of material ‘dropping-out,’ 
whereby alleles simply disappear from the sampling data, or potentially more damagingly, 
‘dropping-in’, whereby a molecule of someone else’s DNA contaminates the sample, even in 
what has been considered a ‘clean’ environment. Considering the probability of whether the 
same could be said of higher copy DNA samples, is really a matter of common sense. If vital 
cells can simply disappear or appear, despite the best efforts of the expert, there must be an 
even higher probability of contamination occurring anywhere else along the chain, where the 
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persons handling the sample may not be quite so careful. Even if one accepts that the 
examination process is a perfect science, the variables in this process which contain elements 
of uncertainty may include a misreading or misinterpretation of the data by the expert (as 
discussed by Dror and Hampikian above), contamination of the sample, accidental swapping 
of the data with a different sample in the laboratory, and countless other opportunities for 
error. None of these variables can be said to be extrapolated from a firm statistical base, 
which is what makes DNA sampling as uncertain as any other form of evidence.  
 
Therefore the assumption that P(EHp) = 1, is based on a huge and irrational leap of faith that 
we can be 100% certain of anything. For the sake of this discussion, we will allow ‘1’ as the 
basis for P(E|Hp), but in reality a BN would be necessary to model the inevitable 
uncertainties which would arise and would certainly bring the probability value to a figure 
less than 1. 
 
DNA is not the only type of evidence which is capable of being presented as a RMP. Blood 
type, hair colour, or fingerprints which proliferate randomly in the world population are all 
capable of being presented as a RMP. We call this type of evidence ‘trace’ evidence, because 
it pertains to an unknown suspect who is said to be the source of the evidential trace. Even an 
eyewitness giving evidence that the suspect had a particular physical trait – such as skin 
colour, height, distinguishing facial features etc - can be considered ‘trace’ evidence, and that 
trait should be presented as a RMP.  
 
In the case of R v T [2], an expert witness used BT to calculate the probative value of rare 
footwear marks, but this was rejected by the Court of Appeal as footwear marks were said not 
to derive from a ‘sufficiently certain database’. However, this ruling has been criticised for 
its irrational reasoning [47]; which means that theoretically any evidence which has its 
probative value calculated by dividing its likelihood of a match with the defendant’s profile 
by a random or ‘coincidental’ match in the world population, is capable of being presented as 
a RMP. What is interesting about this is that it means that different pieces of evidence can 
successfully be combined to create a single posterior probability. What is necessary to 
achieve this is a consistent value K throughout the model.  
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6.8 Combining evidence with different RMPs: 
 
Let us say that there are two completely independent pieces of evidence in a case: A sample 
of DNA left at a crime scene with a RMP of 1/ 1million, and a rare footwear mark with a 
RMP of 1/100. The case is as follows: 
 
Hp: ‘That the defendant is the source of E1, E2 
Hd: ‘That someone else in the world population, alive at the time of the crime, is the source 
of E1, E2 
E1: DNA with a RMP of 1/1 million 
E2: Footwear mark with a RMP of 1/100 
 
By combining our 1/WP prior with E1, we calculate our posterior as 1/7,000 (of course, 
assuming E1 and E2 are independent). This posterior can now be used as the prior for our new 
piece of evidence: 
 
1/7,000 (prior) x 100 (where P(E|Hp) is taken as 1 if we assume a 0 error probability rate) = 
1/70 (posterior).  
 
What this means is that in our pool of 7,000 random suspects, we would expect to find 70 
suspects who carry both evidential profiles. In effect, the 70 suspects have been filtered twice 
by E1 and E2 from the same pool of suspects WP, making E2 a ‘sub-class’ of E1. This makes 
intuitive sense. There would be 70 ‘coincidental’ matches from the original 1/WP prior.  
 
We could equally say that E1 and E2 has a combined RMP of 1/100 million, using the product 
rule - much in the same way that DNA loci are multiplied together to give a master RMP for 
the entire sample. The order in which these two pieces of evidence is presented is immaterial, 
which means that Tribe’s [4] second objection, that a large prior would overshadow other 
types of evidence, is also without foundation. This ‘anchoring bias’ [57] a natural human trait 
which is argued to be prevalent in society is actually eradicated by a transparent and properly 
communicated application of BT. 
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6.9 Combining RMP evidence with ‘propensity’ evidence: 
 
If we accept that we can combine evidence RMPs, can we combine an RMP with other types 
of evidence not presented as a RMP?  
 
This following passage shows that the Nuffield Foundation believe RMPs can ‘relate’ to 
other evidence in the case: ‘Under the Doheny and Adams approach, random match 
probabilities displace likelihood ratios in courtroom testimony... If members of the public 
are, generally speaking, more familiar and comfortable with probabilities than with 
numerical likelihood ratios, it is reasonable to suppose that jurors will be better equipped to 
assess the probative value of DNA profiling evidence expressed as an RMP; especially if trial 
judges further spell out the logical implications of the RMP, as the Court of Appeal 
encouraged them to do in Doheny and Adams... However, this still assumes that jurors can 
make sense of the RMP, as a quantified measure of probative value, and relate it to the other 
evidence in the case.’ For this reason, it makes no sense to give LRs for individual pieces of 
evidence. An LR might be acceptable only for the ultimate ‘guilt’ v ‘innocence’ hypotheses, 
but for all evidence in a case a BN is the only means of fully explaining the 
interdependencies. 
 
Since the case of Roy Whiting [58] and the coming into force of the Criminal Justice Act 
2003, which widened the gateways to allowing defendants’ bad character evidence into his 
current trial, there has been a growing interest in combing propensity evidence with other 
types of evidence. The question is, is it possible to combine DNA with propensity evidence? 
Let us take the following case example: 
 
Hp1: ‘That the defendant is the source of E1’ 
Hd1: ‘That someone else in the world population, alive at the time of the crime, is the source 
of E1’ 
E1: DNA with a RMP of 1/1 million 
 
Hp2: ‘That the defendant is guilty’ 
Hd2: ‘That the defendant is not guilty’ 
E2: The defendant’s criminal record showing a strong propensity to commit similar crimes 
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After observing E1: P(Hp|E1)/P(Hd|E1) = 1/7,000 
 
Let us say that the juror ascribes a LR of 2 for E2, since it is his belief that the probability of 
seeing the propensity evidence is twice as likely if the defendant is guilty than if he is 
innocent. Therefore, 1/7,000 (prior) x 2 (LR) = 1/3,500 (posterior).  
 
At first glance this makes intuitive sense. The juror’s posterior reflects an increase in the 
belief of the defendant’s guilt after observing E2. However, this increase is without 
foundation. Taking our aforementioned key proposition; if we accept that our prior of 1/7,000 
reflects the number of equally guilty suspects then our posterior should do the same. E2 has 
effectively halved the number in our pool of suspects, but this cannot be accurate.  
 
Just because the defendant has propensity evidence, which has prosecution probative effect, 
does not mean that the number of suspects in our pool should reduce. We have not tested the 
other 6,999 suspects for propensity evidence of their own. Theoretically all 6,999 suspects, if 
they could be found and investigated, could all have propensity evidence against them - 
which means that the number of suspects cannot be reduced on the strength of E2.  
 
To clarify: Since we have not been able to establish that E2 is a sub-class of E1, we MUST 
assume that they are independent of each other, and we cannot draw any inferences about 
connections between the two. E1 and E2 are both important pieces of evidence in the case, but 
they have not been properly combined in a single model. Mike Redmayne [59] identifies the 
inherently different types of evidence, and potential difficulties in combining them, in the 
case of R v Adams, when he compares a ‘type of alibi’ (implying that the defendant was not 
at the scene of the crime and could not have left the trace) with the ‘sort of person who would 
have an alibi’ (arguing that the defendant’s character is such that his alibi is credible).  
 
Unfortunately, it has not yet been established that these two types of evidence, while maybe 
important as pieces of evidence in their own right, should not be used in combination to 
provide an overall probability of guilt. Aitken and Taroni [38] explained how in R v Adams 
the evidence was combined: ‘In Adams it was necessary to assign numerical values, not only 
to the explicitly probabilistic DNA evidence, but to all pertinent information before the jury. 
For example, the victim gave a description of her attacker which was hard to reconcile with 
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the defendant. She also failed to pick out Adams at an identity parade. For the purposes of 
illustration, a probability of 0.1 was assigned to this (palpably weak) identification evidence 
on the assumption that Adams was guilty, as against a probability of 0.9 assuming his 
innocence. This gives a ‘likelihood ratio’ of 9 in support of innocence. In addition, a former 
girlfriend of Adams gave an alibi which was not challenged at trial. This evidence was 
assigned a probability of 0.25 if the defendant were guilty and a probability of 0.50 if he were 
innocent. The jury were then instructed in how to combine these probabilities with ‘prior 
odds’ of guilt of 200,000 to 1 against and DNA evidence of 1 in 20 million (as calculated by 
the defence).’ As can been seen here, the figures a must be compelling to an unwary juror - 
small probabilities being combined with tiny ones to provide a minuscule probability of guilt 
– but as has been seen here, these combinations are not only illegitimate, they mean 
absolutely nothing. Of course, in Adams, the key problem was that the hypothesis of the 
defendant being ‘guilty’ was treated as being synonymous with him being the ‘source of the 
DNA evidence’ – which are two very different things. 
 
To illustrate this point, Professor Norman Fenton [60], an expert in creating BNs to show 
causal pathways in complex criminal cases, proposed the following model - before problems 
with the model were highlighted in this thesis -  in cases with similar evidence as Adams: 
 
H1 = The defendant is one of the world population who, before evidence is observed, is in the 
pool of suspects in the world population, with equal probability of being the source of a DNA 
trace. 
H2 = The defendant is one of 100 people seen at the scene of the alleged crime, with equal 
probability of having been the attacker. 
E1 = A trace of DNA found at the scene of the alleged crime, which an expert states has a 
random match probability (RMP) of matching 1 in every people in the world population. 
E2 = Evidence of the defendant’s past criminal action, which an expert states is twice as 
likely to be observed if the defendant is guilty of a similar crime (such as the one that he is 
currently charged with) than not. 
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Fig 6.9(a) 
 
.and below is this causal model with the priors added: 
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Fig 6.9(b) 
 
 
...and with the DNA evidence E1 added: 
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Fig 6.9(c) 
 
 
 
...and with E2 added: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
159 
 
 
 
 
Fig 6.9(d)  
 
As can be seen with this model, Professor Fenton, who, under standard practice, has 
attributed H1 with a prior of 1/100,000 to reflect a hypothetical world population, together 
with a H2 prior of 1/100 to reflect ‘location evidence’ of 100 people observed at the scene of 
the alleged crime, has then combined with E1 - a DNA RMP of 1/1000 (giving a LR of 1000, 
ie P(E|H) = 1 divided by P(E|¬H) = 1/1000) – and E2 – propensity evidence with a LR of 2 
(ie P(E|H) = 1 divided by P(E|¬H) = ½), to provide an overall posterior probability of guilt. 
 
While this may seem intuitively correct, due to smaller and smaller probabilities of innocence 
being generated as more and more evidence and hypotheses are added to the model, these 
probabilities have no foundation in reality, nor do they respect the jury’s task of attributing 
weight to evidence, for the following reasons: 
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1. If we accept the H1 prior of 1/100,000 for the hypothetical entire world population, 
this prior merely asserts that the attacker must have come from the world population, 
and this in turn establishes that someone must have committed the crime and that 
before any other evidence is observed, that everyone in the population has an equal 
probability of being the attacker; 
2. That H2 places the attacker into a smaller sub-class of the world population than 
100,000. While it is tempting to assume that H1 and H2 can be combined, they 
actually conflict. There is no way that we can create a smaller probability by 
combining 1/100 and 1/100,000, because to do that we would have to accept that the 
defendant being at the scene is fact rather than evidence. In effect, where there are 
two completely different and conflicting reference classes, which of these two classes 
do we prefer? 
3. That to bring E1 into the model, we would have to assume that DNA match evidence 
creates a ‘force field’ around each potential match, keeping them homogenously 
spread within the world population (ie spread evenly through the sample space) and 
perfectly evenly spaced from each other, in order that we could capture a precise 
number from within the sub-class; and  
4. That to bring E2 into the model, we would have to assume that the attacker is the only 
person in the sub-class who has the adverse propensity evidence weighing against 
them. In other words, the probability of innocence only becomes smaller here because 
we are assuming that everyone else in the sub-class is 100% certain not to have 
propensity evidence – not only absurd, but also asserted as fact rather than evidence. 
 
For these reasons, the posterior probability of guilt of the defendant having committed the 
crime, of 99.802% (H2), is staggeringly high, and would almost certainly convince a jury to 
convict, while not having any foundation in reality. Of course, this high ‘guilt’ probability 
greatly increases the risk of a miscarriage of justice due to an overvaluation of the 
prosecution evidence in the case. 
 
To expand on these issues, ‘location evidence’, ‘homogeneity’ and problems with 
assumptions of ‘perfectly evenly spaced’ DNA matches are investigated and discussed 
below: 
 
  
161 
 
6.10 Combining RMP evidence with location evidence: 
 
‘Location evidence’ places the defendant at or near the scene of the crime. It differs from 
trace evidence, in that the defendant himself, rather than just some of his physical traits, is 
known. Redmayne [18] explains that it is common practice in criminal trials to combine trait 
evidence, such as DNA, with location evidence: ‘It has been shown that the jury plays a key 
role in combining DNA evidence with other evidence adduced at trial, in particular by 
making decisions about the suspect population.’ Location evidence can come from a database 
of people living in a particular area, of which the defendant is a member; CCTV evidence 
placing the defendant at the scene of the crime; a witness who knows the defendant and saw 
him at the scene; or even an admission from the defendant himself that he was there. By 
placing the defendant at the scene of the crime, we can start to calculate the probability of his 
guilt.  
 
Let us say that the defendant was at the scene of the crime with the victim and one other 
unknown person and we know that there are no other suspects. We can therefore say that the 
probability of the defendant’s guilt is 50%. This must be so, because in the particular facts of 
the case it is assumed that the victim could not have killed himself, and the other accused 
person had an equal chance with the defendant of committing the crime. In a mob of 50 
people surrounding a victim, of which we know that the defendant was a member, we can say 
that his probability of guilt is 2%. We also know that the individual probability of guilt for 
everyone else in the mob is also 2%.  
 
The key to location evidence is that, due to the ‘mutual exclusivity/exhaustivity’ principle 
[10] the probability of guilt is equal with the size of the sample space, which means that the 
larger the pool of suspects, the smaller the probability of the defendant’s guilt. In this way it 
does not matter how close the defendant was to the scene of the crime, because location 
evidence designates a finite pool of suspects to be afforded an equal probability of guilt. It 
must also be noted that location evidence does not require the identities of the other suspects 
in the pool to be known in order that the probability of the defendant’s guilt is calculated.  
 
In Adams [54], the location evidence was ‘153,000 men in the Hemel Hempstead area’ - 
which provides a probability of guilt of 1/153,000 for each of this pool of suspects, including 
the defendant who was stated to live there - while in Collins [5], the location evidence was 
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‘couples in the Los Angeles area’ – which provides a probability of guilt of 1/n for each 
individual couple, including the Collins’ who were said to reside there, where ‘n’ is the 
sample space derived from a census database.  
 
In the U.S. rape case of People v Puckett [22], the defendant’s DNA profile was checked 
after discovering he had a criminal record in the state of California for similar offences. 
Colmez and Schneps [20] argue that the fact that the defendant came from California, 
provides a prior 0.12% probability of guilt based on the size of the population of that 
particular region. Redmayne [18] also endorses this approach: ‘In cases where there is no 
evidence against a suspect apart from DNA evidence - and with the introduction of offender 
databases such cases may become more common - the prior odds, which cannot be zero, must 
be based on the “suspect population”, the number of people who could possibly have 
committed the offence. The prior odds may then reflect the number of people in a city or even 
in a country. The prior odds of 0.000001 used in the example above would correspond to the 
jury's belief that the perpetrator of the crime could be anyone in a city with a population of 
one million.’ The suspect population evidence is combined with the DNA evidence to provide 
an overall posterior probability of guilt. In effect, the suspect population, or ‘location 
evidence’ or ‘reference class’, becomes the prior, which is then to be combined with the LR 
of the DNA evidence in a Bayesian model. 
 
Fenton and Neil [3] suggest that location evidence can formulate a prior. They argue that 
evidence of a mob of 100 people surrounding the victim, of which the defendant was a 
member, can form a prior of the defendant’s guilt of 0.01 to be combined with other 
evidence.  
 
In fact, Fenton and Neil also argue that the jury should be allowed to select a ‘range prior’ or 
a single point prior from that range, to suit its own belief of the accuracy of the evidence, 
thereby preserving its autonomous, fact-finding role. In Fenton and Neil’s example they 
combine this prior of 0.01 with a piece of DNA match evidence found at the scene of the 
crime, which has a RMP of 1/1 million, thereby calculating a posterior probability of guilt of 
99.99%, or in other words that ‘the probability of innocence is now one in 10,000.’ This case 
example is therefore: 
 
Hp1: ‘That the defendant is the source of E1’ 
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Hd1: ‘That someone else in the world population, alive at the time of the crime, is the source 
of E1’ 
E1: DNA with a RMP of 1/1 million 
 
Hp2: ‘That the defendant is guilty’ 
Hd2: ‘That the defendant is not guilty’ 
E2: A mob of 100 people, of which the defendant is a member, surrounding the victim 
 
Taking 0.01 (E2) as our prior, we combine it with the LR of the DNA evidence 
P(E|Hd1)/P(E|Hd1) = 1 million (E1) to calculate a posterior of 10,000 in favour of the 
prosecution hypothesis, or as Fenton and Neil say: ‘the probability of innocence is now one in 
10,000.’ The question is what does this posterior actually mean? If we take our RMP key 
proposition, the posterior should reflect the number of suspects still in the fray. In this 
example the number of suspects is 1, since the posterior has breached the WP threshold (to 
clarify, if the posterior had been 1/10,000, the number of suspects would have been 10,000, 
but in this case the posterior is 10,000/1, which means that there is only one suspect: The 
defendant – as long as you are able to confirm the DNA of the other people who were at the 
crime scene does not match ). The problem, however, is that we have lost the value K 
throughout the model. The 0.01 prior is not a RMP, which means that E1 and E2 do not share 
common values. In other words these two types of evidence are incompatible. Colmez and 
Schneps [20] similarly argue that a 0.12% probability of guilt based on location evidence, in 
the case of Puckett [22], can generally be combined with RMPs. As has been shown here, this 
is simply not the case. 
 
It might be argued that regardless of the disparity in K between E1 and E2, that the inferences 
drawn are still relevant. It might be said that a posterior of 10,000 accurately reflects the 
juror’s beliefs in the probability of the defendant’s guilt – which is precisely the reason the 
defendant is in court - regardless of whether the prosecution hypothesis should be Hp1 or Hp2. 
However, to adequately explain why this is not the case, an examination of each element of 
the case must be made: 
 
Taking E1 firstly: The hypothesis pairing of Hp1 and Hd1 leads us to a prior for this piece of 
evidence of 1/WP - which means that the posterior of this evidence alone is 1/7,000, meaning 
that there is a pool of 7000 suspects before E1 is combined E2.  
 
  
164 
 
 
Taking E2 secondly: The hypothesis pairing of Hp2 and Hd2 leads us to a prior for this piece 
of evidence of 50/50 or 1 - which reflects the division of two equal and opposite mutually 
exclusive and exhaustive [10] states. The posterior for this evidence is 1/100, meaning that 
there are 100 suspects before E2 is combined with E1. 
 
The question is, how can E2 reduce the number of suspects from 7,000 to 1? Well, much in 
the same way that propensity evidence cannot reduce the number of suspects in E1, nor can 
the location evidence, for much the same reason: The rest of the sample space has not been 
tested, which means that we have no way of knowing how many of the 7,000 suspects are 
also in the mob of 100 people. In essence, E2 is not a sub-class of E1. Tribe [4] called this 
lack of knowledge of a particular probability a ‘soft variable’, in which if it cannot be 
counted it cannot be said to exist. However in this case, since the 100 suspects have not been 
counted, rather than not able to be counted, the same argument can be made.  
 
Under circumstances where K is consistent for both E1 and E2, the evidence can be combined. 
Taking E2 in this example, where the posterior for this evidence is 1/100, this would mean 
that there are 100 suspects each with an equal probability of supporting the prosecution 
hypothesis of guilt. If the prior for this evidence was 1/WP as for E1, it would mean that there 
would be 100 suspects randomly placed within the world population.  
 
However, to reach this posterior, the LR for this evidence would have to be WP/100 – a very 
large number, and almost certainly not one in the contemplation of the witness (or any other 
means of arriving at the posterior) when arriving at 1/100. Even if this were so, the difference 
between 1/100 as a sub-class of 1/WP and 1/100 as an arbitrary probability is crucial. 
Combining evidence with a LR of 1 million (E1) and WP/100 (E2) from a 1/WP prior would 
give a posterior of approximately 1/70.  
 
This posterior reflects the filtration process of two pieces of evidence with the commensurate 
coincidences necessary to arrive at small probabilities. In essence, a rarefied 100 suspects 
from a world population of 7 billion people means that they all share a very special trait not 
seen outside of the group. But with an arbitrary 1/100 probability based on 100 suspects 
picked at random without the necessary filtration process? The coincidence factor is not 
there, which means that the small probabilities cannot be justified.  
 
  
165 
 
 
What makes this ‘lack of coincidence’ problem even more acute is that the 100 suspects were 
not individually plucked at random from around the world population and then placed in a 
group to be evaluated. They were picked in a single group located around the victim. This 
factor means that there is the added problem of secondary transfer of E1 to E2 by a number of 
different methods, including innocent transfer due to natural excretion, negligent transfer by 
emergency and investigating staff, or deliberate transfer by the guilty party seeking to 
contaminate evidence, simply because the suspects were in such close geographical proximity 
to the victim.  
 
Paradoxically, in this case P(E|Hd2) ≈ 1, since the probability of seeing the evidence would be 
close to certain (assuming a 0 probability error rate, of course) if the defendant was innocent, 
which means that the LR - P(E|Hp2/P(E|Hd2) - ≈ 1 also. Strictly speaking this would mean 
that the evidence is ‘neutral’ [10], which causes further problems in ascertaining its probative 
value. 
 
On the other hand, it might be argued that because the prior for any RMP of DNA is 1/WP - 
which means that the evidence proliferates randomly around the sample space, thereby 
evenly spacing out the suspects - that whoever is closest to the victim is most likely to have 
committed the crime. The proposition would be that since E2 places the defendant very close 
to the victim, he has a higher probability of being the attacker than anyone else sharing the 
DNA traits.  
 
If we take a very recent example of this way of thinking, we notice a flaw: ‘Prior 
probabilities are, as in any Bayesian approach, particularly difficult to elicit. In our network, 
the priors that need to be specified are the numbers in the probability tables for the scenario 
nodes. They represent the prior probability of a scenario, which could arguably be viewed as 
the plausibility of a scenario as it occurs in narrative research, expressing how likely a 
person would find a scenario beforehand. One can really only subjectively estimate these 
probabilities. Any attempt to objectively estimate this plausibility gives rise to a number of 
issues. Firstly, there is the principle that in court no prejudice should be held against any 
suspect, which is sometimes argued to mean that prior probabilities should be equal for 
everyone. However, this does not imply that two scenarios about different suspects should 
always have equal prior probabilities: that also depends on the coherence of the scenario. 
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Secondly, there is the reference class problem concerning how much detail to include in the 
prior probability. Knowing that a suspect lived in the neighbourhood where the crime took 
place undoubtedly leads to a higher prior probability (because there was more of an 
opportunity) while knowing that a suspect lived on the other side of the world decreases the 
prior probability. But even when the prior probability does not take into account in what part 
of the city the suspect lived, there will always be some prior information included, such as 
that the suspect lived somewhere in the country, on the continent on somewhere in the world. 
A subjective estimate of the priors still runs into the principle of equality in court: no 
distinction should be made based on prejudice. Therefore, in our model of the Anjum case, 
both prior probabilities for the scenario nodes being true were set to 0.001. Another problem 
with a subjective estimate, however, is that once the model is done, one might be tempted to 
view these numbers as if they are objective. In other words: explicitly quantifying the priors 
might lead to the false illusion of objectivity. We strongly emphasize that our method is meant 
to formalize subjective accounts of scenarios. In this perspective, our method supplies 
techniques to support a subjective decision with more formal tools.’ [61] The crucial flaw is 
to be found in the following assertion: ‘Knowing that a suspect lived in the neighbourhood 
where the crime took place undoubtedly leads to a higher prior probability (because there was 
more of an opportunity) while knowing that a suspect lived on the other side of the world 
decreases the prior probability.’ While this may be true intuitively, the real question is how 
this may be presented probabilistically.  
 
If we refer back to the ‘key RMP evidence proposition’ made earlier, the only question 
needing answering by the jury is ‘How many suspects are there?’ From the example above 
we start with a prior probability of 0.001, which means that there must be 1000 suspects 
before any other evidence is observed. The jury will know this from the following implied 
assertion: ‘that the suspect lived somewhere in the country, on the continent on somewhere in 
the world.’ After the other evidence in the case is combined, the jury will want to know 
exactly how many suspects there now are. Can this be done with any degree of accuracy? To 
answer this question, one must examine the assertions and their composite parts. 
 
Firstly, there are assumptions as to the sample space. If we must assume that those living 
closer to the victim have a higher probability of committing the crime, we must assume 
homogeneity.  
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6.10.1 Homogeneity: 
 
Homogeneity in the world population does not mean ‘perfectly evenly spaced’. In fact, 
Buckleton et al [6] state that it would be an error to assume homogeneity from one sample 
group to another. The danger of the CPS stating that ‘the old woman from Beijing’ would not 
be of interest to the investigation of a rape in Huddersfield, is that it implies that she would be 
too far away from the crime to be culpable. In any event, even if homogeneity was assumed 
to mean ‘perfectly evenly spaced’, this does not explain why there would be an element of 
uncertainty in the probability of a defendant sharing DNA traits with that of a crime scene 
stain presented as a RMP of, say, 1/1billion. As there would only be seven suspects in the 
world population and the victim and the defendant are found to be located together in a group 
of 100 people, why would there be any uncertainty at all that the defendant was the attacker?  
 
If the ‘perfectly evenly spaced’ homogeneity principle held true, the probability of the 
attacker being any of the other 6 suspects would be nil, which of course, in reality, is absurd. 
In Fenton and Neil’s example, ‘the probability of innocence is now one in 10,000’ has no 
logical basis at all, while Colmez and Schneps [20] build their probability of the defendant’s 
innocence in the case of Puckett [22] on the assumption that ‘offenders are distributed 
equally throughout the population, in terms of race and geography’ – an assumption which 
has no basis in reality. David Balding dismisses the idea that there is such a thing as a 
‘random match’ in the population, by discussing that there are shared genetic traits between 
relatives, which become weaker as the generational gap grows.  
 
This dependency between supposed unrelated individuals supports the argument that genetic 
traits are not ‘evenly spaced’ throughout the sample space, but are clumped together until 
migrated. Redmayne [18] agrees: ‘It is known that allele frequencies vary between races, and 
for this reason forensic science agencies keep separate databases for each of the major 
races, for example Afro-Caribbean, Asian and Caucasian. It has been argued, however, that 
each of these racial groups contains several genetically distinct sub-groups. A frequently 
used example is the United States Hispanic population, which contains people of Mexican, 
Puerto-Rican, Guatemalan, Cuban, Native American and Spanish descent, with proportions 
of these varying from region to region. The genetic differentiation of sub-populations is 
accentuated by the fact that people do not mate at random--choice of mate tends to be 
conditioned by racial, linguistic, religious and geographical considerations--so allelic 
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variation will be concentrated within sub-populations rather than dispersed throughout the 
population as a whole.’ Since separate databases are kept for each of the major races, and 
these races intermingle over time, the problem only becomes more and more acute. 
Buckleton et al acknowledge that the migration issue is becoming more significant in the 
modern world as humans find it easier to travel around the planet. This fact seems to have 
been largely overlooked by the Nuffield Foundation: ‘Since DNA is inherited from common 
ancestors, it is expected that the frequency of profiles will vary across ethnic groups. Some 
nationalities are more ethnically homogenous than others, but even in ethnically diverse 
countries like the UK many people will share common ancestors somewhere along the 
ancestral line. Moreover, people tend to intermarry within smaller groups for geographical, 
religious and cultural reasons. So, two people within an ethnic group are more likely to have 
a similar genotype than two people from different ethnic groups.’ 
 
Redmayne [18] doubts whether homogeneity can be assumed even within a single ethnic 
group: ‘In United States v. Two Bulls 925 F.2d 1127 (1991), a Native American database was 
used to calculate a match probability of 1 in 177,000. As Kaye (Kaye, “Comment: 
Uncertainty in DNA Profile Evidence” (1991) 6 Statistical Science 196 at p.197) points out, 
the assumption that the Native American population is homogeneous enough to justify a 
single general database is dubious’ [18] Still, the Nuffield Foundation [19] are resolute in 
their belief that homogeneity is a rational assumption: ‘Intuitively, if Defendant D and 
unknown perpetrator U are from the same population, the probability of a shared genotype is 
somewhat greater because the incidence of that particular genetic characteristic may be 
greater in D and U’s shared ethnic sub-population than in the general population. In these 
circumstances, the probative value of a matching profile will be correspondingly reduced. In 
mathematical terms, the likelihood ratio would be smaller because the genotype 
probabilities, forming the denominator of the likelihood ratio, would be larger.’ Yes, the 
incidence of a shared characteristic ‘may be greater in a sub-population than in the general 
population’, but the question is, how can this be effectively measured. While ‘intuitively’ the 
fact may be so, Tribe’s claim of a ‘soft variable’ within this area may hold true. 
 
6.10.2 Is homogeneity even relevant? 
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Secondly, even in the event that homogeneity can be considered a rational assumption, one 
must discover whether homogeneity is even in play. What does homogeneity mean? If we 
take a prior of 1/WP, this means that ‘every person in the world population has an equal 
probability of committing the crime’. Does this not also include opportunity? If we consider 
that the world population is the ultimate reference class - or location evidence – much in the 
same way that Fenton and Neil’s 1/100 prior means that there are 100 suspects gathered 
around the victim, is it not true that 1/WP also means the whole world are ‘gathered around 
the victim’ too’? If this is the case, it matters not that there is homogeneity, because every 
single person in the world population is equidistant away from the victim – in other words, all 
have equal opportunity as well as equal probability of having committed the crime. They are 
all the same distance away from the victim as each other!  
 
Therefore, while it may be said that the ‘old woman from Beijing’ may have less opportunity 
of having committed the crime than a local man, we can only say this separately from the 
DNA evidence – in effect the DNA evidence and the location evidence cannot and must not 
be used to pull each other up by their respective bootstraps. As an example, we could use a 
simple case: 
 
Let us say that in a bar there are fifty people, plus the victim of a bar brawl. There is therefore 
a reference class of suspects of fifty all who have the same probability and opportunity of 
committing the crime. Let us now say that a witness states that the defendant was the furthest 
person away from the victim. It would seem that the defendant had less opportunity of having 
committed the crime, since he was furthest away, but actually what the witness is doing is 
creating a separate reference class, containing only the defendant. Which is the correct 
reference class, 1 or 50? The two pieces of evidence actually contradict each other, since if 
the witness is deemed to be correct, the larger reference class is irrelevant. While the 50-
person reference class evidence seems to be important, it actually is not – the probability and 
the opportunity are conjoined, yet we assume them to be different concepts.  
 
In effect, this means that homogeneity is irrelevant – it matters not whether or not suspects 
are ‘perfectly evenly spaced’ around the globe, because in DNA matching, the expert’s prior 
starts on the premise that every member of the world population is probabilistically and 
opportunistically equal in being the suspect. 
 
 
  
170 
 
For this reason, any reference class prior - including 1/WP - is flawed, unless it is used in the 
unique manner prescribed in this chapter. Although Aitken and Taroni [38] have 
recommended the use of reference classes as priors, and have even stated the equality of 
suspects within that reference class, they have failed to recognise the importance of 
communicating K to the jury: ‘The relevant population is determined from the circumstances 
of the crime, and refers to the class of individuals to which the criminal, as yet unknown, can 
be said to belong. This population may be used to help determine--or, more strictly speaking, 
estimate --the probability of particular evidence, for example DNA frequencies... The 
probability that a person chosen at random from the relevant population is guilty can be 
calculated, in the absence of any other information, by dividing 1 by the number of people in 
the relevant population. Thus, if all we know is that there are 1,000 individuals in the 
relevant population, of whom one and only one is guilty, the probability of any individual 
chosen at random being the guilty individual is 1/1000. This may be taken as a numerical 
representation of the belief that the person chosen at random is just as likely, and no more 
likely, to be guilty as anyone else similarly chosen at random from the relevant population.’ 
The problem here for the jury, is how many suspects are there? From the example given here, 
it cannot be said.  
6.10.3 Priors and likelihood ratios for reference class evidence do not seem to exist in 
some cases: 
 
It has been argued [47] that BT is an appropriate means of gauging the probative value of 
evidence, regardless of its type or basis. While it may be argued that the LR should be used as 
a means of presenting the probative value of evidence, there are some cases where it is 
difficult to ascertain what the LR actually is. Let us take the following case example: 
 
Hp: ‘That the defendant is guilty’ 
Hd: ‘That the defendant is not guilty’ 
E: The defendant was seen at the scene of the crime with three other people 
 
Intuitively, we must calculate the posterior: P(Hp|E)/P(Hd|E) = 0.25 - which would equate to 
‘the probability of the defendant being guilty, given the evidence, is 0.25’ because the 
defendant has the same probability of being the guilty person as the other three suspects, who 
all have an equal probability of guilt of 0.25. In this way the posterior is mutually 
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exclusive/exhaustive. These four suspects are called a ‘reference class’, since they have been 
‘ring-fenced’ from the rest of the world population, and each carry an equal probability of 
guilt. The question is, what is the prior for this evidence, and having found the prior, what is 
the LR? 
 
Conversely, as an alternative, let us say that the prior P(Hp)/P(Hd) is 50-50 (or 1). This is a 
good place to start, because as we discussed in Chapter 3, Buckleton suggested that a 50-50 
prior might lead to a ‘safe’ prosecutor’s fallacy, and this following example shows exactly 
why 50-50 priors are almost impossible to justify in any case. BT is P(Hp|E)/P(Hd|E) =  
P(Hp)/P(Hd) x P(E|Hp)/P(E|Hd) and from this we can extrapolate the LR as: 
 
P(E|Hp)/P(E|Hd) = 0.25 
 
In the odds form of BT, this means that the evidence supports the defence hypothesis by 3:1, 
which should not as the evidence MUST favour the prosecution case. In effect, the evidence 
cannot be independent of the prior, because whatever the LR is, the posterior is always 0.25. 
 
However, let us say instead that the prior is 1/WP (the world population of approximately 7 
billion people) instead. This means that the LR = WP/4 (hugely in favour of the prosecution 
hypothesis) because: 
 
1/WP x WP/4 = 0.25 
 
But what does WP/4 as a LR actually mean? It means that the four suspects were filtered 
from a group of 7 billion suspects. But what was this process? To put WP/4 into perspective, 
this conditional probability would normally be achieved by finding a common trait between 
four suspects which would not proliferate in the rest of the world population. Let us say that 
this trait was ‘DNA with a RMP of 1/0.25WP’ – which would mean that identical traits 
would be found in around 1 in 1.75 billion people randomly scattered around the world 
population. P(E|Hp) - 1 (assuming a 0 error probability rate) / P(E|Hd) - 1/0.25WP = WP/4. 
Of course, this is just one solution of how to achieve a 0.25 posterior from an independent 
prior, but as can be seen from the case example, this was not the case when the four suspects 
were seen at the scene of the crime. These four, including the defendant, share no common 
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traits which are might be prevalent in the rest of the world population, except for the fact that 
they were seen together at the scene of the crime. 
 
Therefore, the only conclusion to be drawn from the evidence, in this case, is that there can 
be no real or meaningful LR in existence for reference class evidence. Of course, this 
problem also applies to CCTV evidence placing the defendant at the scene of the crime, or 
databases placing suspects within a geographical location etc. 
 
What is even more of a concern is that since the world population might also be considered a 
‘reference class’, since each member carries an equal probability of guilt, it can also be said 
that no meaningful LR can be formulated for this evidence either. This discussion has been 
expanded upon within Chapter 3. 
 
Even if it could be argued that E2 has an in-built prior of 50/50 instead, and not 1/WP, this 
causes a further problem: What is the LR for this piece of evidence? Since the posterior is 
1/100, we can extrapolate from a prior of 1, that P(E|Hp2)/P(E|Hd2) = 1/100, an increase 
towards the defence hypothesis, despite the defendant being found at the scene of the crime! 
It seems paradoxical that the LR should favour the defence hypothesis when it is actually 
evidence for the prosecution, until E1 and E2 are examined together:  
 
Firstly, E1: This posterior = 1/7,000, meaning there are 7,000 suspects with an equal 
probability of supporting Hp1 
Secondly, E2: This posterior = 1/100, meaning there are 100 suspects with an equal 
probability of supporting Hp2 
 
Under circumstances where K is consistent throughout the model, E2 would be a sub-class of 
E1 and would serve to reduce the number of suspects to 70. However, where K is not 
consistent throughout the model, E2 is independent of E1 meaning that the number of suspects 
is increased to 7,099 (not 7,100, because the defendant is actually a member of both groups).  
 
Professor Norman Fenton [60], using standard practice, illustrates how cases with evidence 
such as this are modelled: 
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In this simplified model, H1 = the probability that whoever committed the crime must have 
been present at the scene; H2 = the probability of ‘guilt’; E1 = the number of people, of 
which the defendant is one, observed at the scene who all share an equal probability of guilt. 
 
Fig 6.10.3(a) 
 
 
...then after observing E – and assuming H1 is true we get:  
 
Fig 6.10.3(b) 
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However,  the complete model with DNA evidence is this: 
 
Fig 6.10.3(c) 
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...now if we enter the assumptions and the fact that the defendant was one of four at the 
scene: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 6.10.3(d) 
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...and now we enter the DNA match evidence: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 6.10.3(e) 
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However, as with Figs 6.9 (a)-(d), the problems of incompatible priors and false assumptions 
of homogeneity and ‘perfectly evenly spaced’ DNA matches still exist. While the posterior of 
guilt (H2) is at a very high 83.15886% - heavily weighted in favour of the prosecution case – 
the evidence combination in the model is based on the following assumptions: 
 
1. That H3 is provides a prior of ¼, reflecting the evidence that the defendant was one of 
four people observed at the scene – this is to be taken as fact; 
2. That E2 is a DNA RMP, which assumes that in order to combine with H3, the DNA 
matches are homogenous in the world population and perfectly evenly spaced from 
each other.  
 
Incredibly, these assumptions also overlook the crucial point that even if we could assume 
that the DNA matches were homogenous in the world population and perfectly evenly spaced 
from each other, that the probability of the match closest to the victim not having committed 
the crime is 0 – a result that no mathematician would allow. 
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6.11 DNA and the Crown Prosecution Service: 
 
What does this all mean for DNA presented as a RMP as probative prosecution evidence? 
The CPS [7] has admitted that DNA should not be used alone to convict by suggesting that in 
a rape case in Huddersfield ‘an old woman from Beijing’ sharing DNA profile traits with that 
of the crime scene trace would be summarily excluded from enquiries. This argument needs 
to be broken down to examine how much of this evidence can and cannot be combined. Let 
us say that in this case, there was evidence from the victim that the attacker was a local white 
male aged 25-30. The evidence in the case can be broken down into: 
 
E1: Male attacker 
E2: Aged 25-30 
E3: DNA with a RMP of 1/1 million 
E4: Local to Huddersfield 
 
E1, E2 and E3 can all be combined, keeping K consistent throughout the model, to form a 
‘master RMP’. E4 cannot be combined with the other pieces of evidence, but is useful 
evidence to the prosecution hypothesis to keep the defendant ‘live’. The ‘old woman from 
Beijing’ can be excluded on the basis of not sharing traits E1, E2 and E3 with that of the 
attacker, but this is not ‘combining’ evidence in any true sense, in the same way that an 
attacker’s traits are combined. The reason is that the old woman from Beijing does not really 
exist unless she is found, located and excluded from enquiries.  
 
6.12 Conclusion: 
 
The CPS claims that DNA is not enough evidence to merit a conviction alone. Since DNA 
evidence is merely one type of trace evidence, this must mean that evidence presented as a 
RMP is not enough to merit a conviction alone. The other types of evidence – 
location/propensity etc - are important because they provide a full picture of the prosecution 
case. However, since these types of evidence cannot be easily combined with evidence 
presented as a RMP, for the reason that the hidden value K is not consistent throughout the 
model, this raises a question: Are these different types of evidence being used to support each 
other in practice?  
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In other words, is the CPS using propensity evidence to prove its case on, say, DNA, or using 
DNA evidence to prove opportunity? The only way to be sure that these dependencies do not 
occur is to promote transparency of legal reasoning through the medium of BT. We cannot 
know for certain that a prosecutor will not tell a jury that a person from Huddersfield is more 
likely to commit a crime in Huddersfield than a person from Beijing, purely on the strength 
of finding a DNA sample with a small RMP at the scene of the crime. This may be an 
accurate proposition, but using DNA evidence in this way to prove a completely unconnected 
point is not accurate. 
 
If any trace evidence, including DNA, is not enough to convict a defendant alone, and if trace 
evidence is not able to be combined with other types of evidence,  then the question is; what 
really is the probative value of trace evidence? It must be noted at this stage that this author is 
not questioning that DNA is not powerful evidence in and of itself, but that he is asserting 
that DNA match evidence should be applied correctly, and in most cases only to exclude 
suspects from enquiries – not to provide evidence with probative effect towards the 
prosecution ultimate hypothesis of ‘guilt’. 
 
6.13 Recommendations: 
 
Since it has been shown here that priors reflect the original fact finder’s (the lay or expert 
witness) reasoning process when valuing the evidence firsthand, this should put a stop to the 
debate as to what an ‘appropriate’ prior would be in any given situation and for any piece of 
evidence. Whatever reasoning process it took to formulate the pre-trial probative value of the 
evidence, this must be communicated to the juror in order that the significance of the 
evidence is not misinterpreted – and in doing so, the oft-silent, but crucial, value K will be 
preserved.  
 
Priors may well be subjective in nature, but in criminal trials, it is the agreement between the 
subjectivity of the witness and the subjectivity of the juror which is vital. If this express 
agreement is lost, the juror is left to his own devices as to interpretation of the case before 
him. While this may leave his role unfettered, it also means that due to his lack of autonomy 
in being able to gather evidence himself, it also means that his role is greatly uninformed. A 
 
  
180 
 
Bayesian model will provide transparency, and eradicate the risk of potential 
misunderstandings between counsel for the prosecution and defence, and the jury. 
 
When communicating priors, the jury must completely understand the nature of the prior in 
order that it understands what the posterior means. In DNA match testing, the key 
information relates to how many suspects there are in the case. By demonstrating here that 
the number of suspects in the case cannot be reduced by combining RMPs with other types of 
evidence, a new way of combining evidence must be sought. If not, there is the danger that 
evidence can be used by the prosecution to support each other, rather than supporting the 
prosecution case as a whole.  
 
Since it is generally the case that we are dealing with ever-decreasing probabilities, rather 
than increasing ones, any fallacious reasoning applied when presenting evidence, or any 
miscalculation of the probative value of evidence tends to favour the prosecution case. This 
will always carry the risk of miscarriages of justice against the defendant, which cannot be in 
keeping with the criminal justice system’s aim to provide the defendant with the benefit of 
the doubt wherever possible. 
 
Therefore, the only logical approach is to treat evidence within ‘types’ (for example, physical 
traits etc) as separate from each other, and not combine them across the types. In ensuring 
that this principle is adhered to, value K is preserved and properly communicated to the jury 
in order that the probative value of the presented evidence is accurately calculated. 
 
To take the example of a prosecution case where the credibility of the defendant is the key 
issue - for instance, where the alleged event was unlawful sexual penetration and the defence 
evidence is that the complainant consented to the sexual activity – the jury may be presented 
with a number of pieces of evidence, including (non-exhaustively); (i) trace evidence of the 
defendant’s presence at the scene; (ii) character evidence of the defendant; (iii) character 
evidence of the complainant; (iv) location evidence placing the defendant placing the 
defendant in a reference class in the proximity of the scene. We know that evidence (i) cannot 
be combined with evidence (ii), (iii) or (iv) without compromising K. However, how do we 
compare (ii) and (iii) to establish which of the complainant or the defendant is telling the 
truth? The way to do this is to examine the pairs of hypotheses which make up each piece of 
evidence.  
 
  
181 
 
 
So, for (ii) and (iii) alone, we may (depending on how the CPS brought the case) be looking 
at the case as follows: 
 
Hp0: That the defendant’s account of events is not credible 
Hd0: That the defendant’s account of events is credible 
E1: The defendant has adduced character witness evidence in support of his account of events 
E2: The defendant has adverse propensity evidence in support of the complainant’s account of 
events  
 
What is important to distinguish are the hypothesis pairings for E1 and E2, because without 
doing so, it may be that a jury could fallaciously decide that the stronger their perception of 
E1, the weaker their natural perception of E2 would be, based on the two pieces of evidence 
being mutually exclusive/exhaustive (MEE) of each other. Of course, the correct approach 
would be to ‘unpick’ the hypothesis pairings for each piece of evidence to ensure that the jury 
do not create non-existent dependencies.  
 
So, for E1, the hypothesis pairing might be: 
 
Hp1: That the defendant is generally truthful 
Hd1: That the defendant is not generally truthful 
 
However, for E2, the hypothesis pairing might be: 
 
Hp2: That the defendant has committed similar crimes in the past 
Hd2: That the defendant has not committed similar crimes in the past 
 
It can be seen here that there is no correlation between Hp1 and Hd2, nor is there any 
correlation between Hp2 and Hd1, yet it may be perceived that there is, especially if the 
defence do not make an express point, to the contrary, on the matter (despite the fact that it is 
not incumbent on the defence to disprove any part of the prosecution case). Therefore, it is 
crucial that the jury are informed of the hypothesis pairings for each individual piece of 
evidence, for without which, a weak piece of defence evidence runs the risk of inadvertently 
strengthening the prosecution case, and vice versa. The only way to ensure consistency in 
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approach, is by treating all pieces of evidence with a Bayesian approach of its strength in the 
case as a whole. The discussion of mutual exclusivity/exhaustivity (MEE) will be expanded 
upon in Chapter 7. 
 
Paradoxically, while it has been argued here that under the current practice BNs cannot assist 
in combining evidence across different types - due to a discrepancy in the value K across the 
types - Bayesian inference and reasoning has been useful in exposing many common fallacies 
and misconceptions about the way evidence is combined in complex cases. While this may 
seem like scant consolation to those who advocate the use of BNs to calculate overall 
posterior probabilities of guilt in courtroom proceedings under the standard current practice, 
there can be no doubt that quantifying uncertainty and charting dependencies in evidence in a 
casual model, such as a BN, can do nothing but assist a jury in establishing whether separate 
pieces of prosecution (or defence) evidence is being used to support each other to weigh 
towards the overall hypotheses of guilt or innocence. 
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7 CHAPTER VII: Problems and limitations with the ‘Lone Likelihood 
Ratio’ approach 
 
7.1 Introduction: 
 
The focus in this chapter is the likelihood ratio (LR) and its role in criminal trials. To date, 
the controversy engendered by the use of the LR – a traditional means of presenting the 
probative value of a piece of evidence - centres on the argument that the LR may or may not 
be used without a full Bayesian model (ie where a prior and a posterior probability are not 
considered). This chapter explains that a LR can never be considered in a vacuum and that in 
a criminal case the full Bayesian application must be provided to a jury in order that the 
evidence is prescribed its correct weight.  
 
This chapter is a natural continuation of the discussion of the LR and value ‘K’ in Chapter 6, 
but uses case law decisions in cases such as R v George [8] and Regina v Sally Clark [9] to 
explain where the ‘lone LR’ has caused problems which would have been eradicated with the 
use of a full Bayesian model to expose fallacies, errors and misunderstandings related to the 
evaluation and presentation of the evidence in the case. As a natural consequence of this 
discussion, the issue of mutual exclusivity/exhaustivity (MEE) is explained, discussed and 
resolved by an application of Bayesian reasoning. 
 
This author has co-authored and published two papers on this subject [10] [62], and the 
subject matter in this chapter is not only a key support for the research hypothesis, but is a 
vital recommendation towards the widespread introduction of BT to the criminal trial 
process. 
7.2 The likelihood ratio (LR): 
 
The ‘odds’ form of Bayes’ theorem (BT), P(Hp|E) / P(Hd|E) = P(E|Hp) /  P(E|Hd) x P(Hp) / 
P(Hd), where Hp is the prosecution hypothesis, Hd is the defence hypothesis and E is the 
evidence in the case, shows clearly that the posterior odds of guilt are the likelihood ratio 
(LR) P(E|Hp) / P(E|Hd) multiplied by the prior odds of guilt. However, as was discussed in 
Chapter 6, we also know that the (normally silent) value K must be consistent throughout the 
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model. With this in mind, we must also know that for BT to provide accurate probabilistic 
calculations, the LR is related to the prior.  
 
It has been be argued that the LR alone can be used to provide a measure of a the probative 
value (see paragraph 2.7) of a piece of evidence - without using a full Bayesian interpretation 
- but this argument disregards the fact that the LR was based on a pair of hypotheses, which 
therefore forms its natural prior. For example, a DNA sample presented with a random match 
probability (RMP) of 1/1 million, has a LR of 1 million (because P(E|Hp) = 1 (assuming a 0 
error probability rate), and  P(E|Hd) = 1/ 1million). What this means is that the DNA 
evidence, in the absence of any other evidence in the case, supports the prosecution 
hypothesis by a factor of 1 million. This seems very probative towards the prosecution 
hypothesis – and it is – until the full value of the evidence is presented with its natural prior 
of 1/WP based on the following hypothesis pairing: 
 
Hp: ‘The defendant was the source of E’ 
Hd: ‘Someone else in the world population, alive at the time of the crime, was the source of 
E’ 
E: DNA with a RMP of 1/1 million 
 
Once the prior is factored-in, the probative value of the evidence is put into a better 
perspective: There are 7,000 people in the world population with the same evidential traits, 
which means that with no other evidence in the case, this evidence actually supports the 
defence hypothesis by a factor of 7,000. In theory, the LR of this evidence can be used 
without express consideration of the prior, but for the jury to understand what the LR of 1 
million actually means or pertains to, the value K must be communicated to them by the 
expert - which involves a discussion of the prior. Therefore, a full Bayesian interpretation of 
evidence cannot be avoided in any case.  
 
Conversely, let us say that the LR of a piece of DNA evidence is presented as 1/1 million, but 
K is not communicated to the jury: P(E|Hd) = 1/1 million, which means that ‘the probability 
of seeing the evidence given that the defence hypothesis is true is one-in-a-million’. Without 
the communication of K (and therefore the prior of 1/WP), 1/1 million could wrongly be 
taken to mean ‘one in a million suspects’, instead of the accurate ‘one in every million 
suspects’ – a 7,000-fold increase in the suspect pool. At one point, it was thought that the LR 
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could be considered without the prior. Fenton and Neil discuss the advantages and 
disadvantages of using the LR without adopting the full Bayesian calculation: ‘Another 
advantage of using the likelihood ratio, is that it removes one of the most commonly cited 
objections to Bayes Theorem, namely the obligation to consider a prior probability for a 
hypothesis like ‘guilty’. Hence, the use of the likelihood ratio goes a long way toward 
allaying the natural concerns of lawyers who might otherwise instinctively reject a Bayesian 
argument on the grounds that it is intolerable to assume prior probabilities of guilt or 
innocence.’ While this statement is true, because a hypothesis of ‘guilt’ may not have a direct 
correlation to the hypothesis pairing used by the witness, it is nonetheless untrue to say that a 
piece of evidence can be considered away from its OWN hypothesis pairing. 
 
For the LR of a piece of evidence to provide an accurate probative value, the hypothesis 
pairing it refers to MUST be a true negation of each other [10], which means that the pairing 
must be mutually exclusive and exhaustive of each other. What this means is that the 
hypothesis pairing must show an exactly opposite view of the case, which must also 
encompass every possible eventuality. If it does not, the evidence cannot provide an accurate 
probative value towards either hypothesis.  
 
The Nuffield Foundation [16] recognises the importance of mutual exclusivity/exhaustivity as 
follows: ‘Probabilistic calculations of (un)certainty obey the axiomatic laws of probability, 
the most simple of which is that the full range of probabilities relating to a particular 
universe of events, etc. must add up to one.... Where there are two exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive possibilities, the probability of one can always be calculated if the other is known, 
e.g. p(Guilt) = 1-p(Innocent); and vice versa, p(Innocent) = 1-p(Guilt)...In relation to fact-
finding in criminal proceedings, this will often be G, guilt; or I, innocence. Since it is certain 
that the accused is either factually guilty or factually innocent (there is no third option), 
p(G|E) + p(I|E) = 1 (meaning that the probability of Guilt, given the Evidence; plus the 
probability of Innocence, given the Evidence, logically exhausts the range of all eligible 
possibilities).’ It is this acceptance that all events in the universe ‘must add up to one’ which 
supports the assertion that LRs must be mutually exclusive/exhaustive if they are to provide 
an accurate probative value towards a given hypothesis. Confusingly, the Foundation [30] 
later asserts that while mutual exclusively is vital, exhaustivity is not: ‘What an expert should 
be in a position to offer is the assessment of a likelihood ratio (LR) for the evidence. The LR 
is the ratio of two probabilities, conditioned on mutually exclusive (but not necessarily 
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exhaustive) propositions.’ However, this must be a mistake as mutual exclusivity naturally 
assumes that all possible outcomes have been considered and are accounted for. Any other 
result means that all events in the relevant universe will not ‘add up to one’, which leaves 
room for error and uncertainty. 
 
When dealing exclusively in LRs, rather than using a full Bayesian interpretation, it is easy to 
forget that the evidence pertains directly to a hypothesis pairing. For example, with DNA 
sampling where the identity of the sample donor is unknown, the hypothesis pairing used to 
formulate a RMP is: 
 
Hp: ‘The defendant is the source of E’ 
Hd: ‘Someone else in the world population, alive at the time of the crime, was the source of 
E’ 
E: DNA with a RMP of 1/1 million 
 
We know this to be true, because the pairing is mutually exclusive/exhaustive – if the 
defendant did not leave the sample, then someone else in the world population (alive at the 
time of the crime) had to have done. This issue of mutual exclusivity/exhaustivity has been 
recognised by Ward Edwards [12] when evaluating the evidence in People v Collins [5] when 
he states: ‘Some probabilities are independent; they are conditional only on the model in 
which they appear and not on any of the specific entities (eg hypotheses) within that model. 
Two events are conditionally independent of each other if knowing one does change the 
probability of the other, but that dependence would not exist if you knew the true state of 
some third event that links them. For example, in Collins, the way the female wore her hair is 
properly modelled as conditionally independent of whether or not the male driver was 
bearded, and vice versa. What links these two observations is the possibility that the 
perpetrator was Janet Collins. Evidence that the mugger had a blonde ponytail, as Janet 
Collins did, makes it more likely that the driver was Malcolm Collins, who was bearded. If 
you knew either that Janet Collins was or that she was not the mugger, being told either of 
these two observations would not change the probability of the other.’ In effect, mutual 
exclusivity/exhaustivity ensures that multiple pieces of evidence in a case only appear once - 
and crucially, are mistakenly taken to be independent of each other when they are not. 
 
 
  
187 
 
The prior of 1/WP denotes the prior probability before evidence is presented, which in the 
current population means a pool of suspects of approximately seven billion people - 
Buckleton et al [6] support this view. What this means is that the LR for any piece of DNA 
evidence presented as a RMP comes with an in-built prior which was the prior used by the 
sampling and testing experts arriving at locus probabilities, and it is the prior which will be 
adopted by the juror when the evidence is presented in court. The Foundation [30] confirms 
the position: ‘In a forensic context, the LR can be explained generically as the ratio of: (1) 
the probability of the forensic scientist’s observations, if the postulated fact in issue were 
true; to (2) the probability of the same observations if the fact in issue were false’. In no way 
can it be said that the LR of this evidence is used ‘without a full Bayesian interpretation’, 
because the Bayesian interpretation has already been considered.  
 
In effect, the prior 1/WP is itself a RMP, which when combined with a LR, provides a 
posterior ratio which reflects the number of potential matches in the new sub-class – still a 
RMP, albeit of the number of suspects in the smaller pool. 
 
We can also ensure that 1/WP is the correct prior for RMP evidence by considering an 
alternative hypothesis pairing of: 
 
Hp: ‘The defendant is guilty’ 
Hd: ‘The defendant is not guilty’ 
E: DNA with a RMP of 1/1 million 
 
Let us say that that there is evidence that the defendant was seen physically struggling with 
another man and the victim. In this case P(E|Hd) = 1, and not 1/1 million, because the 
probability of seeing the evidence if the defendant is innocent is 1’. In other words, the LR of 
the DNA would be 1 and not 1 million. This would, of course, mean that the DNA evidence 
is ‘neutral’, and would likely be excluded from the jury. In Bayesian terms, any evidence 
which leaves the prior unchanged is neutral.  
 
Neutral evidence is summarily excluded from the jury in the interests of justice to either 
expedite trial proceedings or to reduce the risk of unfair prejudice from the jury inaccurately 
valuing the evidence due to routine and institutional counter-intuition. In this case example, 
since the evidence would be found in every member of the pool (in this case two) of suspects, 
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it helps neither the prosecution nor defence hypotheses. It therefore follows that Bayesian 
inferences drawn from RMP evidence based on a 1/WP prior cannot be used on sub-sections 
of the population.  
 
The concept of the apparent ‘neutrality’ of trace evidence was debated in the case of R v 
George: 
 
7.3 R v George: 
 
In the case of R v Barry George [8] the evidence was a single particle of firearm discharge 
residue (FDR) found in the defendant’s coat pocket a year after the gunshot murder of 
television personality Jill Dando. At trial, the FDR was presented as having a 1/100 
probability of being found in the defendant’s pocket if he was innocent, and he was found 
guilty by the jury. After the trial, Dr Ian Evett, who from 1996 to 2002 worked for the 
Forensic Science Service (‘FSS’) and who had been developing an evidence analysis 
technique called Case Assessment and Interpretation (‘CAI’) - which adopts BT as its 
mathematical analysis tool - invited Mr Keeley, the prosecution expert, to apply the CAI 
technique to the FDR evidence on two different propositions:  
 
Hp: ‘That the defendant was the man who shot Jill Dando’;  
Hd: ‘That the defendant was not the man who shot Jill Dando’  
E: A single particle of FDR found in the defendant’s coat pocket a year after the alleged 
crime 
 
Mr Keeley estimated that the likelihood of his finding one – as had happened in this case - or 
a few particles, as 1 in 100 on either proposition.  
 
P(E|Hp) = 1/100 
P(E|Hd) = 1/100 
 
P(E|Hp)/P(E|Hd) = 1 
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The significance of this was that, in Mr Keeley's opinion, the finding that he made of a single 
particle had in fact been ‘neutral’, which he then confirmed to Dr Evett. On the strength of 
this finding, the defendant was retried without this ‘neutral’ FDR evidence, and acquitted. 
 
In this case P(E|Hp)/P(E|Hd) = 1, because the probability of seeing the evidence under either 
proposition is equal, which means that the evidence is neutral. However, it is argued [10] that 
since P(Hp) and P(Hd) in this case are not mutually exclusive/exhaustive, that the evidence is 
not neutral when looking at the case a whole. The reason is that that the evidence could 
support both P(Hp) and P(Hd) if, say, the defendant was not the man who shot Jill Dando yet 
still was found to have the evidence in his coat pocket. In this way the LR of the evidence 
provides inaccurate values and may unfairly weigh the evidence towards one proposition or 
another.  
 
The only way to an accurate probative value for this evidence, and therefore mutual 
exclusivity/exhaustivity, is to ensure that the background propositions which lead to the LR 
are true negations of each other and cover every possible eventuality. To do this, one must 
examine what the background propositions actually are. Evett et al [63] contrast ‘source-level 
propositions’ (SLP) with ‘offence-level propositions’ (OLP). The Nuffield Foundation [16] 
even break the levels into four: ‘A useful starting point in evaluating expert evidence is to 
identify the level of proposition (or type of answer) which the evidence addresses. Four 
different levels of proposition can usefully be distinguished: (i) source level propositions; (ii) 
sub-source level propositions; (iii) activity level propositions; and (iv) offence level 
propositions.’ The above hypothesis pairing is obviously an OLP because it compares the 
defence hypothesis of ‘guilt’ with the prosecution hypothesis of ‘innocence’.  
 
The key difference between this type of pairing and a SLP pairing is that with a SLP the 
pairing disregards the defendant’s innocence in favour of calculating the probability of the 
defendant being the original source of the evidence. ‘Guilt’ and ‘source’ are obviously not 
mutually exclusive/exhaustive states. 
 
In DNA testing where the evidence is presented as a RMP, this would be based on SLP, since 
the defendant’s guilt is disregarded in favour of calculating the probability of whether he was 
at the scene of the crime and left the crime scene trace – his guilt may be inferred from his 
presence, but cannot be ascertained simply by examining the DNA evidence alone. 
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Therefore, presenting DNA evidence on an OLP pairing is misleading because it implies that 
guilt can be assumed if the juror is satisfied that the evidence pertains to the defendant. 
 
In George, the FDR evidence is obviously trace evidence, because it is probative towards the 
prosecution hypothesis of ‘presence’. The key difference in probabilistic terms between OLP 
and SLP pairings is that for an OLP pairing, the prior is 50/50 (or 1) based on the two states 
of ‘guilt’ and ‘innocence’; whereas for a SLP pairing, the prior is 1/WP based on the seven 
billion states of ‘defendant is the source’ and ‘someone else in the world population alive at 
the time of the crime is the source’. This distinction is not easy to make.  
 
Redmayne [18] plainly has also shown the confusion between ‘match evidence’ such as 
DNA, and ‘guilt evidence’: ‘Discrepancies between two profiles which are said to match can 
considerably decrease the strength of DNA evidence. On a Bayesian analysis, the correct 
approach for an expert testifying in a criminal case is to provide the jury with a likelihood 
ratio which represents: ‘the probability of the evidence given guilt’/’the probability of the 
evidence given innocence’. From the appeal report in George [8], the appeal court interpreted 
the FDR to be neutral on the following proposition pairing: 
 
Hp: ‘The FDR came from the gun that killed Jill Dando’ 
Hd: ‘The FDR came from some extraneous source’ 
 
Of importance to note from the appeal court’s hypothesis pairing is that it arguably 
interpreted the evidence as a SLP pairing, not the OLP pairing that Keeley based his LR on. 
If this is true, then the likelihood of a juror, unused to dealing with forensic evidence has a 
higher risk of making a similar error than an experienced appeal judge. On a SLP pairing, 
P(E|Hp) = 1/100, which means that ‘the probability of seeing the evidence, given that the 
defendant is the source is 1/100’. This makes much more sense than a OLP pairing P(E|Hp) = 
1/100, which means that ‘the probability of seeing the evidence, given that the defendant is 
guilty is 1/100’. With this in mind, P(E|Hp)/P(E|Hd) = 1, which means that the evidence does 
not discriminate between any member of the world population, as the probability of finding it 
would have been the same on whoever would have been the defendant.  
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In this way, there is no material difference between the LR of this evidence and a RMP of 1 
for any type of trace evidence, including DNA. This seems intuitively incorrect until the 
hypothesis pairing for trace evidence, presented as a RMP, is re-examined: 
 
Hp: ‘The defendant is the source of the evidence’ 
Hd: ‘Someone else in the world population, alive at the time of the crime, is the source of the 
evidence’ 
 
The LR for this pairing is P(E|Hp)/P(E|Hd) = 1, which means the probability of seeing the 
evidence is the same whichever hypothesis is true. In other words, the same evidence can be 
found in every member of the world population, meaning that the evidence does not 
discriminate between any member of the world population. In George’s pre-appeal report 
prepared by the FSS, it was started that due to a large number of modern factors, including 
lifestyle issues and investigative practices, the probability of finding single particles of FDR 
in the atmosphere is high, and that the probability of these particles being attributed to the 
person it was found on is low.  
 
Therefore, it is easy to see how the court could have made the finding that the probability of 
finding the same piece of evidence on any defendant being investigated would be the same – 
thereby making the evidence ‘neutral’.  
 
There were many other non-mutually exclusive/exhaustive hypothesis pairings mentioned by 
the prosecution throughout the case: 
 
1. Para 18:  
Hp: FDR came from gun that killed victim 
Hd: FDR came from some extraneous source 
 
2. Para 22: 
Hp: FDR recovered from BG’s coat pocket, as he was the killer of the victim 
Hd: FDR recovered from BG’s coat pocket, but he was not the killer of the victim 
 
3. Para 23: 
Hp: BG is the man who shot victim 
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Hd: BG had nothing to do with the incident 
 
4. Para 26 (i): 
Hp: FDR came from a gun fired by BG 
Hd: FDR came from some other source 
 
5. Para 26 (ii): 
Hp: The wearer of the coat fired the gun 
Hd: The wearer of the coat did not fire the gun (the defence hypothesis is unspecified in the 
appeal report, but this is one possibility.) 
 
6. Para 27:  
Hp: FDR came from a gun fired at the time of the victim’s murder 
Hd: FDR came from some other source 
 
7. Para 28: 
Hp: FDR found as a result of BG firing a gun 
Hd: FDR found as a result of secondary contamination 
 
8. Para 32: 
Hp: The particle is FDR 
Hd: The particle is not FDR 
 
9. Para 33: 
Hp: FDR came from ammunition that killed the victim 
Hd: FDR came from any other ammunition that had that kind of percussion primer 
 
10. Para 37: 
Hp: That the FDR did not come from secondary contamination 
Hd: That the FDR came from secondary contamination 
 
11. Para 38:  
Hp: FDR came from the cartridge that killed the victim 
Hd: FDR came from some innocent source 
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12. Para 50: 
Hp: That the FDR was deposited on the coat other than innocently 
Hd: That FDR was deposited on the coat innocently 
 
Although these pairings did not result in express probabilistic calculations, is it easy to see 
how a jury might become confused as to what the content of the prosecution case actually is, 
and start to ‘accumulate’ pieces of prosecution evidence, which, while not independently in 
support of Hp, might, and are likely to be, misinterpreted to support Hp when combined. For 
this reason it is vital that a formal probabilistic model is used as an aid to ensure that evidence 
is given its correct weight and is not counted multiple times. 
 
Absence of evidence: 
 
Of course, the FDR in George could only be said to be neutral if it is not probative towards 
either the prosecution or defence hypotheses. Even if the evidence did not discriminate 
between members of the world population, does this still mean that the evidence is neutral? 
Since the prior for SLP evidence is 1/WP and the LR is 1, thereby formulating a posterior of 
1/WP, does this not actually support the defence hypothesis? Buckleton et al [6] identify the 
principle of ‘absence of evidence’ (to be contrasted with ‘evidence of absence’) which refers 
to a situation where some evidence has been searched for but not found. Buckleton uses to 
BT to interpret this evidence: 
 
LR = P(noE|Hp)/P(noE|Hd) 
 
The Bayesian interpretation is that ‘...unless some very special circumstances pertain, then 
the finding of noE will be more probable under Hd, and hence the absence of evidence 
supports Hd. Often in real casework, this is only weak support for the Hd.’ However, in light 
of the exclusion of ‘neutral’ evidence in cases such as George, the fact that the jury will never 
get to hear that the defendant was searched and found to have no more evidence than would 
be expected to be found on any other member of the world population, is something which 
carries the risk of unfairly weighing the case as a whole in favour of the prosecution 
hypothesis.  
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In other words, if the jury only get to observe SLP evidence, then this evidence will certainly 
support the prosecution hypothesis (there can conceivably be no SLP evidence placing the 
defendant at the scene of the crime which is actually exculpatory). It would be very probative 
towards the defence hypothesis in George, and similar cases, that the even after a rigorous 
forensic investigation, that only a single particle of evidence which does not discriminate 
between any member of the world population was found on the defendant – certainly more 
than ‘weak support for the Hd’. In their paper “When ‘neutral’ evidence still has probative 
value: implications from the Barry George Case”, Fenton, Berger et al [10] recommend the 
following causal BN model to show the dependencies between the hypotheses and evidence 
in the George case: 
 
Fig 7.3 
 
 
 
One of the dangers of using LRs which are not actually mutually exclusive/exhaustive is that 
evidence can be said to favour a hypothesis over its negation, without actually supporting the 
ultimate prosecution hypothesis of guilt. The risk is that a jury might believe that since the 
LR is mutually exclusive/exhaustive, that evidence with probative value towards Hp means 
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that the jury must convict. This may have been the case in cases such as R v Sally Clark, The 
Popi M and Nulty v Milton Keynes. 
 
7.4 R v Sally Clark: 
 
In the case of Clark [9] a mother was convicted for the murder of her two infant sons born a 
year apart. The prosecution raised the point that both babies could not have both died of 
sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS) - which the prosecution expert witness, Dr Meadows, 
sought to prove on statistical grounds. In his evidence, Dr Meadows stated that a single SIDS 
death occurred in 1 in 8,500 live births in the UK, which meant that, using the product rule, 
the probability of there being two SIDS deaths in one family was in the region of 1/73 
million.  
 
Unfortunately for the defendant, Dr Meadows committed the prosecutor’s fallacy [15], which 
may have been instrumental in the jury’s decision to convict. Since her successful second 
appeal (on a different point, concerning the wrongful non-disclosure of a test result indicating 
a possible cause of death), a point relating to some of the fundamental probabilistic flaws in 
the prosecution case engendered much debate concerning the use of the LR in cases such as 
this. Philip Dawid [64] argues that the probability of the double SIDS deaths should have 
been compared with the alternate hypothesis of murder, which occurs in approximately 1 in 
45,000 live births in the UK. Therefore the case would be as follows: 
 
Hp: ‘That the defendant’s two babies were murdered’ 
Hd: ‘That the defendant’s two babies died of SIDS’ 
E: The two dead babies 
 
By BT, Dawid argues that P(E|Hp)/P(E|Hd) = over 100:1 against murder. Norman Fenton 
[65] argues that the true negation of Hp is: Hd: ‘That at least one baby died of SIDS’, which 
provides a much lower of LR of 1:2.5 against murder – far more probative towards the 
prosecution hypothesis than Dawid’s formulation.  
 
Dawid and Fenton both acknowledge the same basic (and unlikely) assumption that murder 
and SIDS are the only possible alternative causes of death. The fundamental problem with 
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this assumption is that Hp and Hd are not mutually exclusive/exhaustive, which means that 
any LR favouring one hypothesis over the other may be misinterpreted to mean that the 
evidence favours the ultimate hypothesis pairing of the defendant’s guilt or innocence. The 
only true negation of ‘SIDS deaths’ is ‘not SIDS deaths’, while the only true negation of 
‘death by murder’ is not death by murder’. If we take LRs based on these two pairings, we 
have: 
 
Hp1: ‘That the babies did not die of SIDS’ 
Hd1: ‘That the babies died of SIDS’ 
Hp2: ‘That the babies were murdered’ 
Hd2: ‘That the babies were not murdered’ 
E: The two dead babies 
 
The first problem here is that Dawid compares ‘deaths per live births’, which cannot provide 
values related to the actual hypotheses, for which we would need to know the number of 
SIDS/murder deaths per number of infant deaths. Secondly, since there are dependencies 
between Hp1 and Hd2, and also Hd1 and Hp2 it is easy to see that SIDS and murder cannot 
easily be compared with each other to provide a meaningful LR. Even if these two states are 
comparable, the only way to gauge the LR’s impact on the case is to combine the LR with the 
prior. If the LR is based on SIDS/murder, and we know for value to K to be consistent 
throughout the model, the prior must also be: 
 
Hp3: ‘That the babies were murdered’ 
Hd3: ‘That the babies died of SIDS’ 
E: The autopsy reports on the defendant’s dead babies, together with the other prosecution 
evidence in the case 
 
The problem with this pairing is that the evidence must be annexed to it, but Dawid states that 
the evidence is ‘that the babies have died’, and does not explain how this evidence is annexed 
to the hypothesis pairing. In fact, the evidence Dawid uses is statistic related to the number of 
SIDS deaths/murder deaths per live births in the UK, which is based on other babies that have 
died - not the defendant’s. The Nuffield Foundation [16] also seems to endorse the use of 
evidence of other cases to support probabilistic values in the (very separate) case under 
consideration: ‘It might be very unlikely that two cases of SIDS would be experienced in a 
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single family. But it might be even less likely that a mother would serially murder her two 
children (we must make assumptions here, of course, about the impact of other evidence). So, 
taken in isolation, the bare fact of two infant deaths in the same family is probably more 
likely to be SIDS than murder. Unlikely though the former innocent explanation may be, it is 
not as unlikely as the latter, incriminating explanation.’ 
 
If the evidence favours neither the prosecution or defence case, then P(E|Hp3)/P(E|Hd3) = 1 - 
which means that the posterior remains at the same value as the prior. But what is the prior in 
this scenario? For the legal principle ‘innocence until proven guilty’ to apply, the posterior 
must reflect innocence. 
 
Let us say that the ultimate hypothesis pairing in the case should be: 
 
Hp4: ‘That the defendant is guilty’ 
Hd4: ‘That the defendant is not guilty’ 
E: The autopsy reports on the defendant’s dead babies, together with the other prosecution 
evidence in the case 
 
Hp1/Hd1 and Hp2/Hd2 do not reconcile with Hp/Hd4. The only rational answer is that the 
‘number of SIDS/murder deaths per live births’ is unrelated to the case, and that the 
defendant should be tried on the strength of the prosecution evidence against her, rather than 
on statistics relating to other cases that she has no knowledge of, or can defend herself 
against. This principle has been recognised by James Franklin [42] who argues: 
‘...probabilities most usually and easily quantified, as those arising from a proportion in a 
reference class like P(this A is a B |x% of all As are Bs) = x%, are of very doubtful legal 
relevance at all. The evidence that 99% of drivers cut a corner is not allowed as evidence 
that a particular driver cut that corner on a particular occasion. It is neither allowed as 
sufficient evidence to prove that hypothesis nor allowed as partial evidence. While there have 
been debates on the admissibility of certain kinds of other ‘similar fact’ evidence such as 
evidence of prior convictions and of character, there has been no serious suggestion that 
simple membership of a reference class of high criminality (or high criminality of a certain 
sort) should be admissible as evidence.’ 
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The same problem issue in Clark can be seen in the case of Nulty [66], where the three 
alternative causes of a fire were presented as a discarded cigarette end, a faulty electrical 
cable, or arson. The court in Nulty applied the reasoning from the maritime civil case of the 
Popi M [67], which based a LR of a sinking ship on the opposing hypotheses of the event 
being caused either by the negligence of the crew, or a peril of the sea, such as passing 
submarine.  
 
The judge in the case ruled out any evidence of wear and tear, and so felt obliged on the 
balance of probabilities to prefer the negligence hypothesis. The reason the judge gave, was 
that there was no other hypothesis or evidence presented which gave a viable alternative. The 
problem with this analysis is that neither of these hypotheses may have reached the required 
standard of proof.  
 
7.5 Conclusion and recommendations: 
 
As can be seen in this chapter, evidence in a complex case has the potential for being 
evaluated and presented in a way which may be misinterpreted as to its weight and/or 
relevance to the case as a whole. 
 
The interesting thing to note, is that it is plain and obvious that mistakes are routinely made 
where prosecution and defence hypotheses are somehow ‘divorced’ from the evidence 
purported to support them. In order to ensure that the jury is under no misapprehension as to 
the importance of a single piece of evidence, it must be viewed within the context of a full 
Bayesian model to show where the inherent dependencies and uncertainties are.  
 
If the full Bayesian model is not used at both the pre-trial evidence evaluation stage, or at the 
in-trial evidence presentation stage, there is a real danger that evidence may not only be 
ascribed the wrong weight, as in Regina v Sally Clark, but, as in R v George, it may be 
precluded from the jury’s decision-making process entirely.  
 
Of course, these two cases are the main focus of this chapter, but it should not be inferred that 
this is an insignificant problem with narrow application. It is simply that the problems 
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discussed in these two highly publicised cases rarely come to light and are almost never 
reported unless they are identified, exposed and become the subject matter of an appeal.  
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8 CHAPTER VIII: The Full Code Test 
 
8.1 Introduction: 
 
The focus of this chapter is the recommendation of a Bayesian approach to the pre-trial 
evaluation stage of evidence by the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and at the mid-trial 
‘submission of no case to answer’ (SNCA) application by the defendant, in order to ensure 
that there is a consistent, transparent, formalised framework to the decision to prosecute 
and/or continue with the case mid-trial. 
 
The chapter begins by explaining the threshold for the bringing of cases, which can be found 
in the Full Code Test for Crown Prosecutors and explains the flaws in this threshold which 
leaves wrongly-tried defendants without an effective remedy against the CPS - apart from the 
unsuitable remedy of defending themselves in a court which they should not have been in in 
the first place. The key case in this area is R(B) v DPP, [68] the ruling of which explains this 
apparent flaw in the system. There is also an analysis of the SNCA threshold for the same 
reasons. 
 
This chapter continues the examination of the case of R v George [8] – of which the problems 
of the ‘lone LR’ ascribing the potentially wrong weight of the evidence in that case, were 
discussed in depth in Chapter 7 - and explains how, after his retrial acquittal, the Full Code 
Test threshold left that defendant without any effective form of redress under the current 
system. Of course, this discussion in no way undermines the findings in Chapter 7 about the 
probative weight of the evidence in that case, or whether that evidence should have been 
precluded from the jury in the retrial. 
 
This chapter not only forms the key support for the recommendation of Bayes’ theorem for 
the research hypothesis, but should encourage further debate regarding reforming the Full 
Code Test with the addition of a Bayesian element. 
 
8.2 The Full Code Test for Crown Prosecutors: 
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The Full Code Test for Crown Prosecutors (FCT) [69] is issued by the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP) which aims to regulate the CPS’s decision to prosecute, by setting the 
threshold by which cases should or should not be brought. The test should act as a filter to 
prevent unmeritorious cases from reaching the trial stage, thereby saving public expense and 
providing the means by which citizens may seek redress against prosecutors who ‘should not 
start or continue a prosecution which would be regarded by the courts as oppressive or 
unfair and an abuse of the court's process’, as set out in FCT Code 3.5. The test is applied by 
each prosecutor individually at any time during the police investigation process, and before 
trial, and, as has been admitted [70] by the DPP policy director, there is no set formula for a 
consistent application.  
 
During the trial, the defence have the option of applying to the judge to have the trial stopped 
for lack of evidence in an application of ‘no case to answer’. For a defendant to succeed in 
this mid-trial application he must persuade the judge that there is insufficient evidence to 
proceed, and in this way he, again, may seek redress for an abuse of process if his application 
is wrongly denied. However, as with the FCT, there is no formal framework for an 
application of this test.  
 
The problem is that since lack of weight of evidence is the key to a defendant avoiding 
proceedings, and that it is well known [71] that lay people routinely attach inaccurate weight 
to evidence due to biases and acceptance of fallacious reasoning [13] [5] [8] [1] [14], these 
tests are not fit for purpose. One suggestion for achieving a consistent and transparent 
application of these tests is to apply Bayesian probabilistic reasoning to the evidence in the 
case and allowing the judge, prosecuting and defence counsel to fully and accurately evaluate 
the case against the defendant in order to make decisions to prosecute, and submissions of no 
case to answer, more efficient.  
 
8.3 The threshold: 
 
The FCT has two limbs as set out in Code 3.4; firstly, the ‘evidential stage’, where the 
evidential threshold for the bringing of a case is considered, and secondly, the policy test 
which allows cases which has passed the evidential stage to not be permitted to proceed on 
public policy grounds – for instance where the penalty is too low to justify the expense of 
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going to trial. The evidential stage sets out the threshold as: ‘Prosecutors must be satisfied 
that there is sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of conviction against each 
suspect on each charge... A “realistic prospect of conviction” is an objective test based solely 
upon the prosecutor’s assessment of the evidence and any information that he or she has 
about the defence that might be put forward by the suspect. It means that an objective, 
impartial and reasonable jury or bench of magistrates or judge hearing a case alone, 
properly directed and acting in accordance with the law, is more likely than not to convict 
the defendant of the charge alleged.  
 
In the case of R(B) v DPP [68], the High Court ruled that the prosecutor must take a merits-
based approach to the decision to prosecute, rather than a ‘bookmakers’ approach, which 
means that the prosecutor must place himself in the position of a reasonable, impartial, 
objective – and therefore, hypothetical - juror and ask whether, on balance, the evidence was 
sufficient to merit a conviction; rather than applying a purely predictive approach based on 
past experience of similar cases, since this would mean that cases which may contain enough 
evidence but which are notoriously difficult to prosecute – for instance, where there is no 
third party witness or external evidence to a crime alleged to have been perpetrated between 
by one person and another - would never be brought. However, although the prosecutor has a 
duty to make a probabilistic decision (‘on balance’) the test combines an objective 
assessment (‘enough evidence’) with a partially subjective one, where they place themselves 
‘in the position of a juror’, a position which allows any uncertainty in the evidence to be 
subsumed within the grey area between what the prosecutor may believe about the merits of 
the case, and what he thinks a hypothetical jury might believe. As a side note, this ruling 
which precludes the prosecutor from making a ‘bookmakers’ assessment based on similar 
cases, sits inconsistently with the case of R v Clark - as discussed in Chapter 7 - which 
allowed evidence of other parental infanticide rates and ‘sudden infant death syndrome’ 
(SIDS) rates to be compared with each other and used as evidence in the case at trial. 
 
The process which information becomes ‘evidence’ has a number of stages. Firstly, the 
information is witnessed by someone at the scene. This might be: (a) an eyewitness; or (b) an 
expert instructed by the police to collect crime scene samples left by the attacker. Then, this 
information is assessed by the witness. The information is passed to the police, and then it is 
passed to the CPS. After evaluation by the CPS, the information is passed to the jury for 
assessment as to its weight and accuracy, and finally a verdict is passed if the jury feel that 
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there is enough evidence to convict. The passing of this information from witness (either 
eyewitness or expert), to police, to CPS, to jury, inevitably carries a degree of uncertainty of 
its accuracy and/or subjective interpretation as to its weight.  
 
The CPS decision to prosecute must ask whether a hypothetical jury would ‘more likely than 
not’ convict on the strength of the entire case – prosecution and defence – facing the 
defendant. This does not mean that there is enough evidence to convict, only that the 
hypothetical jury’s perception of the weight of the evidence is such that there is a likelihood 
of conviction. Therefore, the test actually asks not whether there is enough evidence to 
convict, but whether a hypothetical jury will convict, based on sound received judicial 
directions. There are therefore two normative elements to the test; (i) that the trial judge will 
be capable of identifying, and does identify,  faulty reasoning in the presented evidence; and 
(iii) that the jury understands the judicial direction on the presented evidence, can apply it, 
and does, objectively, impartially and reasonably. The problem, is that the theory and the 
practice has not been shown to correlate and puts the defendant in a very precarious position 
if he must rely on sound probabilistic reasoning from the witness(es), the judge and the lay 
jury – ie a type of reasoning which is routinely found to be faulty.  
 
For instance, it is well known that a committal of the prosecutor’s fallacy [15] has the 
capability of greatly exaggerating weight of the prosecution case by transposing P(E|Hd) with 
P(Hd|E). In the case of DNA evidence with a random match probability (RMP) of 1/1 billion 
and a prior of 1/WP (a world population assumed to be around 7 billion people) this would 
have the effect of exaggerating the prosecution case as follows: 
 
P(E|Hd) = 1/1 billion, which is confused with P(Hd|E) = 1/1 billion 
 
...when actually, P(Hd|E) ≈ 1/7, meaning that the evidence actually supports the defence 
hypothesis by a factor of 7:1, rather than the prosecution hypothesis by a factor of 1 billion:1. 
 
In this example, a juror may convict due to not identifying the flaw in the reasoning, although 
the evidence would pass the evidential stage test. This routine mis-valuing of probability 
calculations has been well documented [72] in seasoned medical practitioners who should be 
used to dealing with such matters; so the likelihood of jurors or judges in the legal field - who 
are unused to interpreting evidence presented in mathematical form - making similar 
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mistakes, is very high. What is worse is that a Bayesian approach to evidence has been barred 
from general use by the Court of Appeal in the case of R v T [2] - which has meant that an 
RMP would be routinely presented without instructions as to its probativity in the case as a 
whole. Where evidence is presented as a RMP, the LR is:  
 
P(E|Hp) = 1 (assuming a 0 error probability rate)/P(E|Hd) = the RMP  
 
This could give a very high LR in favour of Hp, if the RMP is very small. The problem is that 
even if the LR greatly favours Hp, the evidence could still favour the defence case overall, 
after it is treated to the full Bayesian model. The CPS advocates that DNA evidence can and 
should be combined with ‘other types’ of evidence [7].  
 
Since only RMP can be combined with RMP evidence (see Chapter 6 for detailed discussion 
of this point), it is easy to see how even if DNA evidence is combined with other types of 
trace evidence, that the case can still favour the defence, even if the weight of accumulated 
evidence seems to favour the prosecution. In these instances a Bayesian model would act as 
an aid to a transparent and efficient decision-making process. 
 
There are three opportunities throughout the trial process to use a Bayesian model and 
compare results: 
 
(i) By the lay or expert witness himself, pre-trial. The witness will place values based on his 
perception of the weight of the evidence. For instance, if the evidence is an eyewitness 
account of a physical trait of the suspect, this can be converted to form a RMP, much in the 
same way a DNA sample can be valued. 
 
(ii) By the CPS, pre-trial. After receiving the evidence from the witness, the prosecutor can 
adjust the value of the evidence, based on what he feels the jury’s perception of the weight of 
the evidence would be. 
 
(iii) By the jury, post-trial. After hearing the evidence in the case, the jury will have the 
opportunity to re-value the witness’s evidence after hearing the whole case. This preserves 
the autonomous role of the trial fact finder, of ascribing weight to evidence [51]. 
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The use of model (ii) will show that the CPS has made a rational decision to prosecute, based 
on the foundation framework provided by model (i). Model (iii) will expose any biases and 
fallacies the jury might have in interpreting the evidence. For example, if the evidence in 
Model (i) is DNA with a RMP of 1/1 billion, this (in the absence of all other evidence) would 
support the defence hypothesis. Once the prosecutor has adjusted the weight of this evidence 
in model (ii), the jury will have the opportunity to see these evaluations and then apply his 
own valuation. The whole system will now run as transparently and efficiently as possible, 
not allowing for biases and fallacies to pervade the process, while also allowing a defendant 
the opportunity to know exactly the cases facing him in case he wishes to challenge the 
decision to prosecute. 
 
Of course, an alternative to Models (i) and (ii) would be to ensure that judges and juries are 
properly trained in the art of proficient routine probabilistic reasoning, perhaps using BNs 
during or after the trial. However, since this is unlikely, due to (a) the reluctance of the legal 
community to embrace commonplace Bayesian reasoning; and (b) the lack of a guarantee that 
mid or post-trial BNs would be correctly constructed or applied, the pre-trial Models act as a 
safeguard against later problems. In any case, there is no reason not to use the three Models 
as a ‘compare and contract’ mechanism between the actors in the case: the witness(es), CPS 
and jury. 
 
Currently, the decision to prosecute is not open to effective redress, since the prosecutor’s 
own subjective valuation of the evidence is not considered. All the prosecutor need do is 
argue that he has considered the fact finder’s likely re-evaluation of the evidence, and his 
decision to prosecute is vindicated, which, without a formal framework to show this decision-
making process, will mean that a successful case against a prosecutor is unlikely to be 
forthcoming. Therefore, Codes 3.4 and 3.5 have little to no effect in cases where there is little 
prosecution evidence against the accused, but the prosecutor believes that the fact finder will 
more likely than not convict anyway. 
 
8.4 Submission of ‘no case to answer’: 
 
The submission of no case to answer (SNCA) allows a judge to stop a trial at any point for 
lack of evidence, on the basis that unmeritorious cases will be saved from unnecessary public 
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expense and defendants from going through an unnecessary trial. The test comes from the 
case of R v Galbraith [73]: ‘...where the judge concludes that the prosecution evidence, taken 
at its highest is such that a jury properly directed could not properly convict on it, it is his 
duty, on a submission being made, to stop the case.’ What ‘taken at its highest’ means, is ‘if 
the prosecution evidence is to be believed’ – ie if it has not been refuted by the defence. This 
is a different test to the decision to prosecute, which allows for both the prosecution and 
defence cases to be considered (but by the prosecutor pre-trial, not the judge during trial), and 
is therefore a lower test.  
 
The problem with this test is that regardless of the test’s objective nature, it is largely at the 
judge’s discretion as to how he values the prosecution case, and without a formal framework 
with which to gauge the accuracy of this valuation is very difficult for a defendant, believing 
his has been wronged, to found a successful claim against the judge for applying the incorrect 
evidential weight. In fact, as with the prosecutor’s pre-trial decision to prosecute, the only 
thing that the judge need do is show that he has considered the prosecution evidence on a 
submission of no case to answer, and his decision to proceed with the trial will be vindicated.  
 
The appeal courts, in deciding whether the judge has made the correct decision, will unlikely 
interfere with the decision, unless the test has been incorrectly applied, or the decision has not 
been made at all. The reason is that the appeal will be on a point of law or procedure – while 
the appellate court is free to ask itself whether there was sufficient evidence to allow the case 
to proceed, it will not be a re-trial where the facts of the case will be open to a new 
interpretation by the upper courts. In any case, the appellate judge’s decision, in using the 
same test, will be as potentially flawed as the first instance trial judge’s, such as was applied 
in Barry George’s compensation claim [74] against the Secretary of State for justice for 
wrongly bringing his re-trial. As the High Court observed: ‘[The counsel for the defendant] 
did submit that the evidence left to the jury was weak and that although four planks of 
evidence were advanced by the Crown as we have identified above, in fact there was only 
one: the identification by the witness Mayes.’ The question which the court must ask itself is: 
“Has the claimant established, beyond reasonable doubt, that no reasonable jury (or 
magistrates) properly directed as to the law, could convict on the evidence now to be 
considered?” In light of the discussion in Chapter 5, which explains the subjective nature of 
the criminal standard of proof (BARD), this test contains no formalised framework with 
which to provide adequate redress for the wrongly-tried defendant. 
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In George’s compensation claim following his re-trial acquittal in R v George [8] , the High 
Court rejected the submission that there was no evidence to proceed with the case after the 
firearm discharge residue (FDR) evidence, which had been presented as part of the 
prosecution case in the defendant’s first trial, had been excluded from his re-trial: ‘… in the 
end, there was no submission formulated by [counsel for Barry George] capable of 
persuading us that the trial judge was wrong to leave the case to the jury. In our view, this 
has the consequence that this claimant’s case inevitably fails the test even as formulated by 
[counsel for Barry George]’. While this judgment is not conclusive that any claim would 
have failed, the words ‘there was no submission formulated, capable of persuading us that 
the trial judge was wrong’ is indicative of the fact that the appeal courts are (a) reticent to 
delve deeply into the trial judge’s decision-making process; and (b) have no means of 
providing actual proof that the decision made by the trial judge, and later itself, is sound.  
 
In September 2013, Keir Starmer, Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), in addressing a 
Home Affairs Select Committee [75], defended the CPS’s pre-trial decision to prosecute the 
actor Michael Le Vell for rape, and stated that the correct procedure for the decision to 
prosecute had been followed and test applied, and during the trial, the judge had correctly 
applied the test for a submission of no case to answer. This indicates that the DPP, as well as 
the appellate courts, are reluctant to examine the substance of the trial judge’s decision, as 
long as the correct procedure in applying the test has been followed. 
 
8.5 Remedies available to the wronged defendant: 
 
The remedy for a defendant who wishes to bring an action against the CPS for a wrongful 
decision to prosecute, or against a judge who has wrongly allowed a trial to continue, comes 
by way of judicial review. The action is not an appeal, but a challenge to the manner in which 
a decision by a public authority has been made. 
 
Part 54 of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 [76] provides the definition for judicial review:  
 
54.1(2)(a) a “claim for judicial review” means a claim to review the lawfulness of- 
 (i) an enactment; or 
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 (ii) a decision, action or failure to act in relation to the exercise of a public function. 
 
However, there is little hope of challenging the prosecutor’s decision to prosecute by way of 
judicial review, since as Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 2011 [77] suggests: ‘...it may be 
challenged within the trial process itself, notably by an application to stay proceedings on the 
grounds of abuse of process.’ The basic principle is that it is for the prosecution, not the 
court, to decide whether a prosecution should be commenced and, if commenced, whether it 
should continue. However, the courts have an overriding duty to promote justice and prevent 
injustice. [78]. ‘Abuse of process’ has been defined as something so unfair and wrong with 
the prosecution that the court should not allow a prosecutor to proceed with what is, in all 
other respects, a perfectly supportable case [79]. 'Unfair and wrong' is for the court to 
determine on the individual facts of each case. 
 
The categories for a stay for an abuse of process are not limited, but the authorities which 
may apply in cases relating to lack of evidence, are largely (i) An abuse of executive power; 
and (ii) Failing to obtain evidence. There are problems, however, with both of these 
categories if applied to the decision to prosecute: 
 
8.5.1 An abuse of executive power: 
 
This category includes cases such as Bennett [80] where the police have abducted the suspect 
and brought him to trial without complying with the correct arrest and detention procedure. In 
Redmond [81]  it was decided that the crucial issue was whether the prosecuting authorities 
have knowingly abused their powers.  
 
In cases where there has been a wrong decision to prosecute, the malice of the prosecutor is 
rarely an issue. In George, it was simply that the evidence was of neutral value – the 
prosecutor’s state of mind may have been as neutral as the evidence. 
 
8.5.2 Failing to obtain evidence: 
 
This category normally relates to material which was present at the decision to prosecute 
stage, but has somehow gone missing before trial. In Dobson [82], the test was stated to be 
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whether the police had a duty to obtain evidence, and whether they have, in bad faith, failed 
to obtain it. The Evidential Stage test at paragraph 4.5 contains the duty to obtain evidence, 
but even though there may have been a failure to obtain enough evidence to prosecute, the 
‘bad faith’ element is more often than not absent to allow a stay for an abuse of process. 
In Ebrahim [83], it was decided that there must be a serious fault on the part of the 
prosecution authorities for an application for a stay to succeed. It is so far untested as to 
whether not collating enough evidence to pass the Evidential Stage test is a ‘serious fault.’ 
 
In any case, a claim for judicial review is unlikely to succeed pre-trial, thereby ensuring that a 
wronged defendant actually stands trial to attempt to argue that he should not be there in the 
first place. The inherent jurisdiction of the court to stop a prosecution to prevent an abuse of 
process is to be exercised only in exceptional circumstances [78]. In R(B) v DPP [68], 
Toulson LJ confirmed the position: ‘The exercise of the court’s power of judicial review is 
less rare in the case of a decision not to prosecute than a decision to prosecute (because a 
decision not to prosecute is final, subject to judicial review, whereas a decision to prosecute 
leaves the defendant free to challenge the prosecution’s case in the usual way through the 
criminal court).’ This approach is expensive and time consuming, and can be incredibly 
damaging for a defendant who should be entirely free of trial procedure if the prosecution 
case against him is weak. The problem, is that the essential focus of the doctrine is on 
preventing unfairness at trial (not pre-trial), through which the defendant is prejudiced in the 
presentation of (not whether he should be in the position of defending), his or her case.  
 
The implementation of a Bayesian model pre- and/or mid-trial would reduce the emotional 
toll on defendants, who, by rights, should not be tried; since as Annabelle Jones [24] 
observes: ‘If Barry George is innocent of the murder of Jill Dando and was in fact convicted 
on the [62] basis of the jury's misunderstanding of the forensic evidence, he has spent nearly 
eight years of his life behind bars for a crime that he did not commit. The effects of this on 
any individual would be long-lasting; the effects on an arguably already unstable and 
vulnerable individual such as Barry George could be even more damaging.’ Of course, 
Jones’ comment that the defendant ‘did not commit the crime’ was simply an allusion to his 
acquittal and not whether the FDR evidence in the case actually DID have probative effect 
towards the prosecution hypothesis – for further discussion on this point Chapter 7 discusses 
the FDR evidence, and the two papers written by Fenton, Berger et al [10] [62] provides a 
full Bayesian model to explain and expose the flaws of the reasoning in the case. 
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8.6 Conclusion: 
 
Having explored in detail the Full Code Test and SNCA test thresholds, it is obvious that the 
large amount of discretion afforded the decision-makers – the CPS and the trial judges in the 
case – in the decisions of whether to bring or continue the case, pre- and/or mid-trial, means 
that the wrongly-tried defendant has very little chance of success in appealing these decisions 
if there is no formalised way to show how these decisions were arrived upon. 
 
Take a simple example: The police have charged the Defendant with one count of stabbing 
with intent to kill. Bayes theorem shows that there is only a 50% chance of the Defendant’s 
guilt – perhaps on DNA match evidence with a fairly high RMP, combined with eyewitness 
evidence of a reasonably common physical trait - which, absurdly, would be enough to allow 
the case to proceed to trial if a jury mistakenly believes that the evidence is enough to 
convict. 
 
Let us say that, on presentation of the case, the jury labouring under biases and/or fallacious 
reasoning, believes that there is a more than 90% chance that the Defendant is the attacker 
and that this is a high enough threshold to put the prosecution hypothesis beyond reasonable 
doubt. The CPS, in full knowledge that there is only a 50% likelihood of guilt, would be 
forced to proceed with a trial.  
 
Therefore, it is proposed that a scale of guilt would be presented along with the evidence in 
the case, for the jury to choose: 
 
> 50% 
50 – 60% 
60 – 70% 
70 – 80% 
--------------------------- Proposed threshold 
80 – 90% 
90 – 99% 
99 – 100% 
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If more than 50% of the jury choose, say, at least 80 – 90%, then the CPS would have to 
proceed on the basis that it is more likely than not that the jury would convict. 
 
But surely in the nature of transparency and the overriding justice objective in criminal trials, 
the CPS would be compelled to disclose the counter-intuitive errors of the jury’s decision? 
With that being the case, it would surely be better for the BT calculations to be disclosed as 
part of the pre-trial evidence, rather than allow the jury to labour under a misapprehension as 
to the value of the presented evidence. 
 
As far as criticism that 80 – 90% does not represent a threshold which would indicate a juror 
would convict if passed, is concerned, the argument would have to be posed: what figure 
would suffice? Obviously, a juror intuitively decides whether a threshold, by which to 
convict, has been passed, otherwise only a 100% certainty standard of proof would do. So 
therefore, an arbitrary line must be drawn, and 80% has been chosen. 
 
Conversely, if when all of the evidence has been calculated and there is at least a likelihood 
of around 80 – 90% in support of the guilty hypotheses, but a lay person only believes that 
the evidence has a small chance of convicting the Defendant, does the CPS proceed? The 
answer would have to be ‘no’. 
 
Therefore, within this chapter, we recommend a Bayesian approach to pre- and/or mid-trial 
decision-making which will have various positive effects including: 
 
• Providing a transparent, logical, formalised framework approach to pre- and/or mid-
trial decisions in order to save time, expense and the risk of a wrongful conviction of 
defendants by juries with natural biases against tried defendants - even if the weight 
of evidence does not merit a conviction. 
 
• Allowing an appeal court the proper tools necessary to decide whether or not to allow 
an appeal for a wrongly-brought trial, thereby saving time and expense. 
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• Allowing a defendant the tools necessary to decide whether or not his claim for a 
wrongly brought case has merit in an appeal, thereby saving time and expense. 
 
All of these points support not only the research hypothesis, but also help generate debate and 
make necessary and vital recommendations in reforming the Full Code Test and SNCA 
process. 
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9 CHAPTER IX: Overall Conclusions 
 
The research hypothesis is: ‘It is inevitable that in criminal cases with multiple pieces of 
evidence, a Bayesian approach to evidence evaluation and presentation must be used’. The 
main areas of research, therefore, were: 
 
• An investigation of the need for probabilistic modelling, whether pre- or mid-trial 
• The amenability and feasibility of evidence to modelling 
• A question of whether Bayes’ theorem (BT) is the most appropriate method to model 
uncertainty 
• Whether the current methods of explicit probabilistic modelling are correct and 
appropriate 
 
The approach taken in this thesis was to research the problems with probabilistic reasoning in 
the legal cases such as those listed in Chapter 4 and examine the reasons why these problems 
seemed to routinely occur. The conclusions drawn were complex and varied. After an initial 
investigation, with reference to industry-recognised practitioner materials by Buckleton and 
the Nuffield Foundation, it was obvious that there were many inconsistencies in the approach 
to the foundation principles of probability theory which had the potential to lead to the wrong 
weight being attributed to pieces of evidence in the case, thereby leading to the natural 
conclusion of the entire prosecution hypothesis - in cases such as R v Sally Clark – or defence 
hypothesis – in cases such as R v Barry George – being unfairly weighted. 
 
This disparity was evident in the way that fundamental probabilistic principles, such as those 
discussed in Chapter 2, are applied by practitioners and expert witnesses to complex legal 
cases. One of the most common fallacies committed is (and will continue to be, without BT 
applied to negate its effects) is the ‘prosecutor’s fallacy’. However, this fallacy is only 
considered common because it is fairly easy to identify due to its explicit probabilistic 
presentation and its dramatic effect to a prosecution or defence case. 
 
Chapter 3 began by examining the prosecutor’s fallacy and the problems for legal hypotheses 
when one occurs, and examined the UK courts’ attitude towards the fallacies. This line of 
research uncovered a worrying misinterpretation of the fallacy by the courts, which only after 
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a Bayesian analysis of the problem exposed the issue that there could never be an 
‘acceptable’ committal of the fallacy, regardless of the Court of Appeal ruling on the matter. 
An application of BT to the problem would have eradicated this and would prevent this 
problem from occurring in the future. This chapter looked at the need for BT and concluded 
that there is a need. 
 
While examining the possibility of using BT to eradicate the prosecutor’s fallacy, the 
research area began to expand to consider the use of BT to examine other potential fallacies 
and misinterpretations of the probative value of probabilistic evidence. The first task was to 
examine why some types of evidence are considered by the UK courts in rulings such as R v 
T (2010) to be ‘probabilistic’ (and therefore amenable to BT) and why others are not. This 
distinction is researched in Chapter 5 and the conclusions drawn are simple – that there is no 
distinction between different types of trace evidence; which means that, theoretically, all 
trace evidence is capable of being modelled in a Bayesian network (BN) for evaluation pre-
trial or in-trial presentation to a jury.  
 
Chapter 5 also examined the key alternative method to BT, in order that any recommendation 
of BT stands up to scrutiny as the best and most appropriate method of evaluating and 
presenting evidence. The Wigmorean method – a method recommended by legal-
mathematical scholars, supported by the Nuffield Foundation in London – is discussed and 
examined. This chapter concludes the following: (a) that as far as the amenability of evidence 
to modelling is concerned, that the evidence is amenable; and (b) that as far as the 
appropriateness of BT for use as the recommended method of evaluating and presenting 
explicitly quantified evidence in a case is concerned, that BT is the most appropriate method. 
 
Chapter 6 contains the most in-depth study of prior probabilities ever conducted. Until now, 
in most academic studies, the only controversy exposed by a discussion of priors is that of 
their subjective, and therefore uncertain, nature – an issue which UK courts finds unpalatable. 
However, what the research in this chapter discovered was that the value ‘K’ – denoting 
context - in mathematical models, is routinely ignored. This crucial mistake can, and does, 
lead to miscalculations of the probative value of evidence, due to consideration of the 
existence of causal pathways (as discussed in Chapter 2) which do not exist in the way the 
experts believed they did. These problems can only be rectified by a Bayesian approach to the 
cases as a whole. Interestingly, Chapter 6 does not deal with explicit ‘fallacies’ in the way 
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that Chapter 3 does, but this problem with K potentially far more damaging, as the problems 
are buried within the model, would likely never be disputed by prosecution or defence 
counsel or judges, and would never come to light without the discussion in this chapter. In 
fact the Crown prosecution Service (CPS) guidelines, which govern the way cases are 
brought and presented, overlook this problem at the most fundamental level. Therefore, while 
in this thesis BT is recommended to eradicate fallacies, it also becomes the vital tool in 
eradicating basic errors in probabilistic reasoning connected with all aspects of evidence in a 
case. 
 
In fact, the conclusion drawn in this chapter is a complicated one, as can be seen in paragraph 
6.13. In essence, it is that BT should be used to eradicate the fallacy that evidence across 
types can be combined using the traditional Bayesian methods. This is done is by examining 
the hypothesis pairing which relates to the individual piece of presented evidence, and 
ensuring that K is not compromised when that piece of evidence is combined with the other 
evidence in the case.  
 
Chapter 7 examined the likelihood ratio (LR) and discusses how the full Bayesian approach 
to probabilistic reasoning must be used, instead of the ‘lone LR’ approach favoured by some 
academics. This chapter builds on the recent papers published by Fenton, Berger et al which 
centre on problems within the R v George and R v Clark cases, and concludes with the 
recommendation that in order for a piece of evidence to carry the correct probative value, it 
must be considered in light of all of the evidence in the case – the method for which must be 
a full Bayesian model. 
 
Chapter 8 referred back to the CPS guidelines - which were first analysed in Chapter 6 - and 
explains how BT must be used, pre-trial, to assist prosecutors in whether or not to proceed 
with a case to trial by calculating, probabilistically, the probative value of the evidence in the 
case towards the prosecution hypothesis. The chapter concludes that without this formalised 
approach to evidence evaluation, that there is no appropriate means of redress for wrongly-
tried defendants. 
 
On a more general level, the author asserts that BT is the only means of quantifying 
uncertainty, exposing unreasonable assumptions and charting dependencies between 
supposed separate pieces of evidence in complex legal cases, in order that any decision-
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making – whether by prosecutors, defence counsel, juries or judges - pertaining to a case, is 
accurate, transparent and logical. BT is not merely a method of quantified mathematical 
modelling, it helps us (a) understand the relationship between pieces of evidence and their 
causal pathways to a given hypothesis; (b) recognise the crucial (and oft-forgotten) issue of 
context; and (c) identify and negate our natural biases and intuitions which may otherwise 
have – and undoubtedly routinely has - clouded our judgement. 
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